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Abstract
This thesis consists of four chapters positioned at the interface of economics and ge-
ography. They analyse spatial disparities in economic activity using applied micro-
econometric methods.
Chapter I describes trends in wage inequality once differences in local costs of living
are taken into account. I use spatial variation in house prices to construct a local
consumer price index and show that prices rose faster for non-graduates than for
graduates between 2001 and 2011. In a period when nominal wage inequality came
to a halt real wage inequality kept rising.
Chapter II builds up on this result and analyses the effect of real wage differen-
tials on working hours. Looking at individuals that face different wages and house
prices as they move across labour markets, I find that working hours are significantly
higher in low real wage areas. The effect is due to labour supply adjustments of low
skilled workers implying that affordability considerations are more important than
additional leisure options due to a higher amenity level.
Within a city amenities are important determinants of an individual’s location de-
cision. Chapter III looks at the role of amenities for skill specific sorting in British
cities. An amenity value is inferred from a hedonic regression and correlated with
neighbourhood as well as individual characteristics. The results suggest that holding
income constant graduates are willing to pay 0.2% more for amenities than individ-
uals with a lower educational status.
Chapter IV studies the effect of a public sector employment shock on private sector
employment using the relocation of the German government from Bonn to Berlin
as a natural experiment. The findings indicate that the relocation of jobs generates
localized employment spill-over effects in the service sector. 100 additional pub-
lic sector jobs generate 60 private sector jobs up to a 1km distance from the area
receiving the relocation.
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Introduction
Context
This thesis consists of four chapters which have in common that they explore the
spatial dimension of the labour market. The questions relate to the field of urban
economics which addresses the distribution of income and production across space
and the geographic location of economic agents relative to one another. The dis-
cipline is based on theoretical reasoning and the use of quantitative methods to
test the theoretical predictions on data. One of the main contributions of the field
of urban economics is to provide micro-foundations leading to the emergence of ag-
glomeration and spatial inequality. The field addresses explicitly the production and
consumption externalities which give rise to cities (Quigley, 1998) and derives policy
recommendations on issues such as land use, environmental quality, transportation,
housing, income distribution and financing of urban public services.
That productivity differs across space becomes evident when looking at differentials
of factor prices across labour markets. Local labour markets in the UK and else-
where are characterized by considerable differences in earnings and land costs. In
the absence of a corresponding productivity advantage firms would locate to labour
markets offering cheaper inputs. This argument holds especially for firms producing
traded goods as they face the same price on the national or international market.
Therefore, average productivity has to be higher in cities where nominal wages and
prices for land are higher (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001).
What are the dominant factors that make some places more productive than oth-
ers? Some places might have a natural advantage such as a natural port, which
reduces shipping costs and makes it easier and less costly to trade. Another nat-
ural advantage might be access to raw materials such as coal or iron ore allowing
specialized industries that heavily depend on these inputs to develop. As over time
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moving goods across space became faster and cheaper due to the invention of new
technologies and logistic systems (e.g. freight trains and aeroplanes, containers and
largely automated transport hubs) and as the focus of production shifted towards
knowledge as the most important input, places endowed with natural resources lost
most of their relative competitive advantage. Today, Combes et al. (2008) estimate
that only 3% of differentials in productivity advantages (of the French economy) can
be attributed to natural endowments.
Alternative explanations dating back to Marshall (1890) gained in importance over
time. In this view the clustering of economic agents is an advantage itself and gives
rise to ‘agglomeration economies’. Agglomeration of economic activity allows a bet-
ter match between the required skill level of a job and a worker’s skill set and also
makes it easier for workers to find a new job in case they are laid off. Proximity and
density also facilitate knowledge spill-overs. Workers who are close to one another
have more chances to interact, spread ideas and learn from each other. Finally,
agglomeration benefits might accrue from input sharing due to linkages between
intermediate and final goods suppliers.
For each of these sources of agglomeration economies empirical tests have been de-
signed. See for instance Costa and Kahn (2000); Overman and Puga (2010) for
labour market pooling, Jaffe et al. (1993); Glaeser and Maré (2001); Arzaghi and
Henderson (2008) for knowledge spill-overs, Holmes (1999) for input sharing and
Rosenthal and Strange (2001); Ellison et al. (2010); Faggio et al. (2014) for the
relative importance of each of the sources of agglomeration. I contribute to this
literature by providing evidence on the reinforcing mechanisms of agglomeration
economies. Chapter IV of this thesis shows that the size of an external employment
shock to an area amplifies itself by triggering demand for local goods and services.
This demand creates new jobs in the private service sector, the so called local mul-
tiplier effect.
Chapter I to III are based around the fact that productivity differentials are capital-
ized in both wages and rents, and that spatial wage disparities alone are therefore
uninformative about differences in standards of living and economic welfare. Differ-
ences in wages have been widely studied as wage inequality raises equity and fairness
questions. Similar questions arise when looking at the cost side of local labour mar-
kets as different people choose to live in different locations. Chapter I starts by
exploring how inequality measures change, when local cost of living are taken into
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account and how these measures evolve over time. For which reasons do individu-
als choose to live in areas characterized by relatively low wages and relatively high
cost of living? If workers are sufficiently mobile they would move from low to high
real wage areas in order to increase their utility level. Rosen (1979) and Roback
(1982) noticed that if the assumption of spatial equilibrium holds, areas where high
costs of land or housing are not offset by higher wages must offer another form of
compensation. Their model predicts that regions characterized by low real wages
must be more desirable places to live. Among others Gibbons et al. (2011b) and
Albouy (2008) provide recent empirical evidence for the capitalization of amenities
into local wages and house prices. Chapter II builds on previous findings and looks
at the relationship between real wage differentials and working hours across labour
market areas. Higher relative costs of living may reflect a higher amenity level, thus
increasing the quality of leisure in an area. But they also make an area more difficult
to afford, thus requiring low income workers to increase their labour time.
The distinction between high skilled and lower skilled workers is further pursued in
Chapter III, as preferences for amenities are likely to vary across different groups of
individuals. The chapter addresses the question whether high skilled workers con-
centrate in certain areas because they have a higher preference for amenities than
lower skilled workers.
The increased interest in research questions that have a spatial focus would not have
been possible without improvements in the availability of data and the development
of adequate statistical methods and software packages. For example, determining
the attenuation of agglomeration economies with distance is impossible with ag-
gregate data as it requires geographically refined data that has information on the
precise location of an economic agent.
Today detailed micro data, i.e. large data sets that have information for a single
agent such as a firm or an individual, are collected and made available for research
and governmental purposes by the national statistical offices. These data have often
been attributed a detailed geography that allows the exact location of the agent in
space. Recently, the movement of ‘Open Data’ has gained momentum and other
public institutions have made their data freely available. For instance, in the UK
it is now possible to look up the number of crimes that happened within the last
year in one’s immediate neighbourhood and the underlying crime level data is freely
available for download on the police website.
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The increase in the availability and quality of data has been accompanied by method-
ological improvements of quantitative methods and the design of new instruments
to determine causal relationships. The surge in georeferenced data led to the devel-
opment of geographic information systems (GIS) that are able to manage, analyse
and present all types of spatial or geographical data.
These developments have made it possible to address research questions that have
previously not been possible to address and to reassess existing questions with bet-
ter data. My research is thus part of an exciting and dynamically evolving field. I
summarize the approach taken in this thesis and the four main chapters in the next
section before I turn to the full exposition of each research question in Chapter I -
IV.
Summary of Chapter I - IV
The approach taken in this thesis is to explore the spatial dimension of the labour
market in a number of distinct settings using micro-data and applied micro-econometric
methods. While Chapter I and Chapter II treat local labour markets as single func-
tional units, Chapter III and Chapter IV take a closer look at dynamics that take
place within the unit of a labour market. The thesis centres around the observation
that economic activity and economic outcomes are unevenly distributed across space.
Chapter I and II focus on differences in the cost of living across space and show their
impact on economic outcomes such as inequality and labour supply. Chapter III and
IV look at possible reasons why some areas are more productive than others.
Chapter I
Chapter I analyses how wage inequality changes when local cost of living are taken
into account. Unequal economic outcomes of different population groups have been
widely studied as the fair distribution of economic gains is considered as crucial for
the social cohesion of society. Differences in costs across population groups have
received less attention, though they have similar implications.
In this chapter inequality is measured as the real wage difference between university
degree holders and non-degree holders. As a starting point I describe differences in
the distribution of skilled workers across UK labour markets along with differences
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in the distribution of house prices and house price growth between 2001 and 2011.
I then follow the procedure proposed by Moretti (2013) and use spatial variation
in house prices to construct a local price index. As individuals spend a large share
of their total expenditure on housing, high house prices considerably reduce the
purchasing power of wages in local labour markets.
The regression analysis shows that nominal wage inequality remained unchanged
over the decade. When differences in local prices are accounted, for I get a different
result as local prices rose faster for non-university graduates than for graduates.
Real wage inequality, which takes differences in local costs of living into account,
kept rising in a period when nominal wage inequality came to a halt.
In order to understand which processes drove the increase in real wage inequality,
I decompose the change in costs of living for each skill category into changes in
the distribution of skill groups across space and changes in prices for different skill
groups as in Moretti (2013). The analysis shows that high skilled workers at least
partially offset increases in costs of living by moving into cheaper areas whereas
lower skilled workers are less mobile and stay put even though prices in their area
increase.
Chapter II
Chapter II builds on the results of Chapter I and looks at the relationship between
real wage differentials and working hours across labour market areas. High costs of
living that are not offset by equally high wages might reflect a higher amenity level,
thus increasing the quality of leisure in an area. But they also make an area more
difficult to afford which might make it necessary for workers to increase their labour
time.
I construct a measure of area level real wages by combining information on house
prices and wages for the analysis. Following Gibbons et al. (2011b), I adjust local
wage levels for differences in skills across areas and local house prices for differences
in the quality of the housing in terms of structure. I then observe how individuals
adjust their working hours when moving across labour market boundaries that offer
different real wage levels.
I find that working hours are significantly longer in low real wage areas and that
this effect is stronger for low skilled workers. This indicates that affordability con-
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siderations are more important than the additional leisure options that arise from
the presence of better local amenities. I also test for a direct effect of amenities on
working hours but find no conclusive evidence for a link between the two.
While amenities make an area more attractive, they also make it more difficult to
afford living there. To get by, poorer workers in high-price areas have to work longer
hours than similar workers in cheaper places. Alternatively, high-income people in
high-price areas trade off cash for leisure time. Understanding these choices helps
policymakers understand just how ‘liveable’ some cities are.
Chapter III
Chapter III focuses on reasons for the location choices of high skilled workers. As
seen in the previous chapters high and low skilled workers increasingly chose to live
in different areas. As the level of human capital is an important determinant of the
economic success of an area (Lucas, 1988) it is crucial to understand which factors
drive individual location choices. Chapter III addresses the question whether high
skilled workers choose to live in areas offering a higher level of amenities because
they have a higher preference for amenities than lower skilled workers. We investi-
gate the relation between amenities and skills by looking at the sorting behaviour
of individuals within British cities.
Several studies have linked the sorting of highly skilled workers across labour mar-
kets to differences in the local level of amenities. It is, however, difficult to separate
the impact of amenities on an individual’s location choice from labour market char-
acteristics such as for instance differences in the local productivity level.
We propose an empirical test for the existence of education biased preferences for
amenities in UK cities based on a two stage estimation approach. The analysis is
done at the within city level to rule out the confounding role of job opportunities. In
the first stage, we estimate a standard hedonic regression assuming that the value of
amenities is capitalized into housing prices. From this regression we derive a com-
posite amenity measure that captures all unobserved neighbourhood characteristics,
such as for instance crime levels, proximity to green areas, restaurants and cafes.
In the second stage, we analyse how the amenity consumption as captured by this
measure is distributed across individuals belonging to different education groups.
Our results show that high skilled individuals, earning the same income as low skilled
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workers with similar characteristics, locate in more attractive neighbourhoods. This
sorting behaviour provides empirical evidence in favour of a preference bias since
individuals with higher educational achievements are willing to forgo a greater por-
tion of their wage to live in attractive places. Skill related sorting into areas offering
a high amenity level is, therefore, one channel that explains spatial differences in
productivity.
Chapter IV
In Chapter IV we study a setting that gives insight into possible policy levers for the
attenuation of existing spatial inequalities and differences in economic performance.
The aim of the chapter is the identification of employment spill-over effects. It
shows that a public sector employment shock generates demand for services and
thus creates new jobs in the private service sector. This result provides evidence on
the reinforcing mechanisms of agglomeration economies.
We use the move of the seat of the German government from Bonn to Berlin in
1999 as an exogenous shock to quantify the effect of job relocations on the spatial
pattern of employment changes within local labour markets. The main theoretical
argument for employment multiplier effects is that each additional public sector job
may increase demand for locally-produced goods and services and that this increase
in demand may trigger additional jobs in the private non-tradable sector. The
theoretical counter argument is that higher rents and wages increase local production
costs which impede new businesses from forming or hamper existing businesses’
competitiveness. These general equilibrium effects may offset the multiplier effects
as the new jobs might crowd out existing ones.
We approach the question of the existence of job multipliers empirically. We have
access to detailed panel data based on a 50% sample of all Berlin establishments
between 1992 and 2010. Due to the lack of official sources on local public sector
employment, we collected information on the number of jobs of each relocating
institution, the year the institution moved in or out of Berlin and the address of the
institution in Berlin from historical sources. This new and rich database allows us
to estimate an empirical model across small areas in Berlin and to quantify possible
employment spill-overs into neighbouring areas. Following Gibbons et al. (2011a)
we apply a special form of a difference-in-difference strategy where we compare
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employment changes in postcodes receiving relocations at different distances with
postcodes further away from any relocation. A standard difference-in-difference
strategy would not allow for the possibility of employment spill-overs as it compares
areas that were directly treated with those not receiving any direct treatment.
We find evidence for the presence of a local employment multiplier. Relocating 100
public sector jobs into an area generates 52 additional jobs in the private sector. We
also find evidence for spatial spill-over effects: relocating 100 public sector workers
into a 1 km wide distance ring around the postcode boundary increases employment
in the private sector by 33 jobs. This effect comes through job gains in the service
sector, while manufacturing employment is not influenced by the relocation.
Public sector relocation programmes thus seem to be a suitable measure to address
very local employment problems.
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Chapter 1
Real wage inequality in the UK
1.1 Introduction
From the late 70s onwards wage inequality in the UK rose at a fast pace (see for
instance Gosling (2000) and Atkinson (1999)). The topic has been discussed exten-
sively as wage inequality may directly reflect an uneven distribution of opportunities
between different groups of people. Due to the equity dimension of the problem,
many fear that wage inequality causes social and economic instability. Studies have
linked increases in inequality to higher crime rates (Kelly, 2000), lower civic par-
ticipation (Costa and Kahn, 2003; La Ferrara, 2002) as well as lower productivity
and economic growth (Stiglitz, 2012). In light of these findings, it is good news that
wage inequality came to a halt in the 2000s.
Similar distributional questions arise when looking at the cost side between different
groups of people. One of the reasons for the rise in wage inequality throughout the
80s and 90s is that education became more highly valued in the labour market. Rel-
ative to workers without a university degree, graduates improved their position in
the labour market substantially (Machin, 2011). Workers with different educational
attainments are, however, unevenly distributed across space and are thus likely to
face differences in local costs of living. For example, if consumer prices were higher
in areas with a high concentration of educated workers, their purchasing power mea-
sured at the national level would be relatively lower than of workers with a lower
educational attainment. That this factor matters becomes apparent when looking at
rental prices across areas in the UK. The price for a representative house in London,
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for instance, is more than 40% higher than the price of a similar house in Brighton.1
Similarly, if consumer prices underwent differential changes across space and grew
faster in areas with a high concentration of highly educated workers, this group of
workers would lose out on purchasing power over time relative to workers with a
lower educational attainment.
As price movements are measured for the country as a whole, the implications of
spatially disaggregated price changes on the evolution of real wages can easily go
unnoticed. Therefore, new challenges arise when thinking about the measurement
of wage inequality in a spatial sense and taking local costs of living into account is
likely to substantially alter common measures of wage inequality.
This paper addresses these challenges by analysing trends in inequality once differ-
ences in costs of living across labour markets are taken into account. As an official
statistic for this purpose does not exist in the UK,2 I follow the methodology by
Moretti (2013) to construct a local cost of living index, that captures price differ-
ences across local labour markets as well as changes in spatial price differences over
time. The index is based on the Retail Price Index (RPI), which was used until
2013 as the official inflation measure in the UK and is published by the Office for
National Statistics. As individuals spend a large share of their total expenditure
on housing and data for local house prices is readily available in the UK, the newly
constructed local component of the RPI is based on house prices. The new measure
shows considerable variation of price levels and price changes across labour market
areas.
The analysis is based on information from several datasets. The Census 2001 and
2011 provide a detailed picture of the distribution of highly educated workers across
space and allow the documentation of changes in the spatial skill distribution over
time. In contrast to local prices of consumer goods and services, local house prices
are readily available. The Land Registry publishes information on all prices and
addresses of housing transaction in England and Wales which I use to construct
the local cost of living index. Finally, the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
(ASHE) has detailed information on wages and earnings as well as the geographic
location for a 1% sample of employees on the Inland Revenue PAYE register. The
data sources used in the analysis are described in Appendix A.1.
1Price information are based on Land Registry data in 2011.
2The most detailed geography for Regional Consumer Price levels for goods and services that is
produced by the ONS is at the level of Government Office Regions.
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The paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. To the best of my
knowledge it is the first study that looks at the co-evolution of wages and local prices
over time in England and Wales. A measure of real wages is derived by deflating
nominal wages with the local cost of living index. I document changes in real wage
inequality by comparing the evolution of real wages for university degree holders
and non-degree holders between 2001 and 2011. I furthermore look at the most
recent time period, for which little evidence on the evolution of wage inequality or
real wage inequality is currently available.
The results of the analysis suggest that real wage inequality which takes into account
local costs of living is less pronounced than nominal wage inequality, as university
graduates are overrepresented in expensive areas. However, between 2001 and 2011,
degree holders experienced relatively slower increases in local costs of living. On the
one hand, cost of living in very skilled labour markets increased relatively less than
cost of living in less skilled labour markets. On the other hand, university degree
holders chose to move to areas characterized by relatively lower costs of living. As
a result real wage inequality between university graduates and non-graduates kept
rising between 2001 and 2011 even though nominal wage inequality came to a halt.
For men the increase amounts to 2.5 percentage points, for women to 1.8 percentage
points.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 documents the dis-
tribution of degree holders across LMAs in England and Wales and geographical
differences in house price levels. Section 3 describes the construction of the local
RPI. Section 4 uses the measure to show how real wage inequality evolved in compar-
ison to nominal wage inequality. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 presents
robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.
1.2 The location of skilled and unskilled workers
and spatial variation in prices
Real wage inequality will differ from nominal wage inequality if (i) skilled and un-
skilled workers are unevenly distributed across labour markets and (ii) local costs of
living differ across labour markets. In this section I analyse the spatial distribution
of skills and prices in England and Wales to motivate the subsequent construction
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of a local price index.
1.2.1 The location of skilled and unskilled workers
In the UK skilled workers are concentrated in specific areas. Figure 1.1 shows the
geographic distribution of highly qualified workers across Labour Market Areas in
England and Wales. Areas refer to 138 Labour Market Areas that were derived
from the 2001 definitions of travel to work areas.3 The share of qualified workers
measured as the number of employed university degree holders aged 16 to 64 with
respect to the total number of employed workers ranges from above 40% in areas
around London to less than 25% in the north and north east of England.
Table 1.1 gives an overview over the ten most skilled and least skilled Labour Market
Areas in England and Wales in 2001 and 2011. In 2011, 47% of workers hold
a university degree in London, university cities such as Cambridge, Warwick and
Oxford have equally high values of c. 44%. Among the least skilled areas are Norfolk,
Lincolnshire Fens with a share of degree holders of less than 20% and Mansfield and
West Lincolnshire with shares of 22%.
The national share of employees holding a university degree rose quite dramatically
from a national average of 24.7% in 2001 to a national average of 35.2% in 2011.4
Those places with a high concentration of degree holders in 2001 became even more
skilled in comparison to places where the share of graduates was relatively low
in 2001. With the exception of London all cities in the top list experienced an
increase of the share of university degree holders of more than the national average
of 10.5%. London’s position as an outlier is most likely due to graduates choosing to
live in cities around London and accepting long commutes for a job in the capital.
Guildford, for instance, which is a labour market in the direct neighbourhood of
London, experienced an increase in the share of university graduates amounting to
11.3 percentage points, in Brighton, 53 miles south of London, the share of university
graduates increased by 12.0 percentage points. With the exception of East Cornwall,
all places in the bottom list experienced increases of less than the national average.
A possible explanation for these pattern is that cities offering a high level of amenities
3Some rural TTWAs were aggregated into contiguous units to assure a large enough sample size in
each geographical area based on the ASHE sample. See Gibbons et al. (2011b) for additional
information on the exact aggregation procedure
4These shares amount to 19% in 2001 and 27% in 2011 when all people aged 16 to 74 respectively
16 to 64 are chosen as the baseline.
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disproportionally attract highly-educated workers (Carlino and Saiz, 2008). Another
possibility is that complementarities exist between an individual’s education level
and city size, and university graduates sort into specific labour markets because they
are more productive in large cities (Behrens et al., 2010).
1.2.2 Variation of local costs in England and Wales
This section documents spatial variation in the costs of living which are inferred
from differences in house prices across labour markets. In contrast to local prices of
consumer goods, local house prices are readily available. The underlying data are
taken from the Land Registry which tracks all residential property sales in England
and Wales. In 2001 a total of 1.23 million sales were recorded, in 2011 total sales
amounted to 0.65 million.
To begin with average prices are calculated for each of the 138 LMAs in England and
Wales. Figure 1.2 (left) shows average prices of houses sold in 2001. House prices
differ substantially across labour markets. Average prices in London are more than
four times as high as average prices in Burnley, Nelson and Colne the cheapest LMA.
Though indicative, these estimates might suffer from bias as they are uncorrected for
structural building attributes. The bias arises as, for instance, rural areas are likely
to have a much higher share of free standing homes than urban areas. Simple average
prices are therefore likely to be relatively higher in rural areas and relatively lower
in urban areas. This sort of bias can be alleviated using the characteristics available
in the data source in order to adjust housing prices for differences in structural
attributes. Equation 1.1 shows a hedonic estimation approach.
ln(pia) = µa + γXi + ia (1.1)
ln(pia) is the transaction price of house i in area a, µ is an area fixed effect, Xi a vec-
tor of housing characteristics including the property type (Detached, Semi, Terraced
or Flat/Maisonette), whether the property is newly built or not and whether the
property is freehold or leasehold and ia denotes the residual. The regression output
is shown in Table 1.2.5 As expected, semi-detached, terraced houses and flats are
5The analysis has also been conducted using data on housing sales provided by the Nationwide
Building Society. The dataset has less transactions but more variables on the structural
attributes of each house. See Appendix A.1 for a description of the dataset. Using the
Nationwide data in the main analysis yields very similar results with respect to the Land
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more expensive than detached houses, buyers pay a premium for new buildings and
freehold properties are more expensive than leasehold properties. I recover the coef-
ficients from this regression and estimate the price of a house with average national
characteristics for each Labour Market Area.6
After the correction LMAs in the South East turn out to be slightly more expensive
compared to the uncorrected averages as shown on the middle map in Figure 1.2.
Brighton and Bristol, for instance, changed the price category after the correction
for structural attributes, as they have a larger share of relatively cheaper flats and
terraced houses than the average LMA. Even in the case that differences in housing
attributes are accounted for, spatial price variation remains very pronounced. Lon-
don is the most expensive LMA where houses with average structural characteristics
are sold at five times the price as in Hartlepool.
Looking at price growth rates reveals a strikingly different picture. Prices increased
faster in areas with initially low prices and at a slower pace in areas where prices were
relatively high in 2001. The right map in Figure 1.2 shows growth rates between
2001 and 2011 for house prices corrected for differences in structural attributes.
LMAs near the Scottish border, in West Wales and cities around Doncaster experi-
enced the highest price growth, South East and Central England saw prices increase
at a slower rate. In Portsmouth or Oxford, for instance, prices grew by less 80%,
whereas in areas such as Hartlepool and Doncaster prices increased by 140% within
the decade.
1.2.3 House prices and education levels
In England and Wales high skilled workers tend to concentrate in expensive cities.
Figure 1.3 (left) plots the relation between a labour market’s share of degree holders
in 2001 and average house prices in 2001. The plot shows that prices and the
share of degree holders are positively correlated. However, those places with a high
concentration of the highly educated in 2001 experienced slower increases in house
prices. This becomes apparent when looking at the right scatterplot in Figure 1.3
which plots the relation between the share of degree holders in 2001 and price growth
Registry data. Tables are available on request.
6The price is estimated as ln(p¯a) = µˆa + γˆX¯. If x is a categorical variable the coefficient is
multiplied with the share of houses in England and Wales that have the specific characteristic.
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between 2001 and 2011. The relation holds across the LMA size distribution; in the
scatterplots the size of the circle is proportional to the size of the LMA population.
1.3 Construction of a local price index
Spatial disparities in the costs of living are pronounced, as has been shown in the
previous section. An official statistic that measures differences in local price levels
and price inflation across local areas does, however, not exist in the UK. Price
inflation in the UK is measured by the Retail Price Index that is published by the
Office of National Statistics.7 It measures price changes of a consumer basket that
represents average consumption patterns of UK households. Every month the ONS
collects approximately 110,000 prices for this representative basket made up of 650
items. As a locally disaggregated index would require the repeated collection of this
data in every area of interest, it is clear that such an effort would drastically increase
the time and cost of the construction of the RPI.
The local price index derived in this paper uses variation in house prices across
Labour Market Areas to circumvent this problem. Expenditure on housing related
items makes up a considerable share of total household expenditure and amounts to
c. 40%. The share of expenditure on housing is much higher than the expenditure
share on other non-tradable goods. As prices of tradable goods are unlikely to
differ much across areas, the focus on house prices is likely to give a representative
approximation of general differences in local prices.
As in Moretti (2013), the inflation measure is constructed in several steps. First, I
calculate average house prices in each LMA using transaction price data. Second, I
net out price changes in the housing component of the RPI to get a RPI based on
non-housing goods and services only. Finally, I calculate a local RPI that takes into
account variation in local prices in the base year as well as differences in price changes
over the following decade. The measure is then used to demonstrate differences in
the level of costs of living across education groups.
7It was superseded the Consumer Price Index as the principal inflation measure in 2013 to meet
international standards. The RPI is preferred over the CPI as it includes expenditure on owner
occupied housing. I could have equally used the CPIH which the ONS started publishing in
2014 as it equally includes estimates of owner occupied housing cost. The official time series
goes back only until 2005 which makes the measure unsuitable for my analysis.
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1.3.1 Technical details
The procedure used to construct a local cost of living measure in this paper closely
follows the procedure of the ONS for the Retail Price index. Table 1.3 shows expen-
diture shares for the five broad groups in the Retail Price Index in 2001 and 2011.
Expenditure on housing related items made up 36.2% of total household expendi-
ture in 2001 and increased to 40.8% in 2011. Housing expenditure includes rentals,
owner-occupiers’ housing costs8, utilities and households goods and services. It is
possible to net out the housing component of the RPI as the exact price changes and
weights for the division are available for download on the ONS website. The RPI is
calculated as the sum of price increases of each good weighted by the percentage of
total expenditure that is spent on the specific good.
RPIt,0 =
n∑
i=1
pit
pi0
· wi
For the case where we consider only two goods, namely housing related goods and
non-housing goods the formula simplifies to
RPI = RPInh · (1− wh) +RPIh · wh
By rearranging the equation the formula can be used to calculate a RPI for non-
housing goods such that
RPInh = RPI · 11− wh −RPI
h · w
h
1− wh
where RPI is the official price index published by the ONS, wh is the share of total
expenditure spend on housing goods and services and RPIh is the price inflation
measure for the housing component only. Price increases of the representative con-
sumer basket used for the construction of the RPI and the consumer basket without
housing are stated in Table 1.4. The upper lines of Table 1.4 show that the RPI
increased by 36% between 2001 and 2011, whereas price levels increased by only
28% once the housing expenditure component is taken out.
8Owner-occupiers’ housing costs consist of mortgage interest payments, house depreciation, build-
ings insurance, ground rent, and other house purchase costs (such as estate agents’ fees and
conveyancing fees).
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Based on the non-housing index, I calculate the local RPI using the quality adjusted
average house prices that vary across LMAs. To begin with prices are brought on
a scale that is comparable to the RPI. LMA price levels are divided by the employ-
ment weighted average price across all LMAs in 2001. The local RPI for 2001 is
then estimated as the weighted average of the national RPI (net of housing) nor-
malized to one and the normalized house prices that vary across LMAs. Following
the official procedure of the ONS local price inflation is measured as the sum of the
increase in house prices between 2001 and 2011 weighted by the expenditure share
on housing in 2011 and the official RPI net of housing weighted by the expenditure
share on non-housing goods. Using the 2001 index as a baseline the 2011 local RPI
is calculated as the product of the local RPI in 2001 and local price inflation between
2001 and 2011.
1.3.2 Average costs of living across education groups
Real wage inequality differs from nominal wage inequality as university degree hold-
ers are overrepresented in areas characterized by higher costs of living relative to
non-degree holders. Accordingly, changes in real wage inequality depend on relative
changes in wages for skilled and unskilled workers as well as relative changes in local
costs of living for both groups. Table 1.4 shows the average house prices and the
average local cost level faced by degree and non-degree holders in 2001 and 2011.
The average costs are calculated as
pq01 =
n∑
a=1
ωqa,01 · pa,01
pq11 =
n∑
a=1
ωqa,11 · pa,11
pq01, p
q
11 denote the local price, respectively RPI, in 2001 and 2011, for q=high skilled
workers or q=lower skilled workers, ωqa denotes the share of skill category q in LMA
a and pa,01 denotes the local price respectively RPI of LMA a in year 2001. In both
years, high skilled workers face on average higher housing costs than lower skilled
workers. The difference amounted to 17.6% in 2001. Between 2001 and 2011 house
prices almost doubled for both skill groups. High skilled workers faced a house price
increase of 86.8%, the increase amounted to 93.0% for lower skilled workers. As a
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result the price gap between the two skill groups narrowed to 13.8% in 2011.
A similar pattern is visible for local costs of living. The lower panel shows that in
2001 the overall cost of living experienced by degree holders is 6.2% higher than
the cost of living experienced by non-degree holders. The gap decreases to 4.6% by
2011. The difference in the local RPI between education groups is less pronounced
than the difference in house prices because the local RPI includes non-housing costs
as well as housing costs.
1.4 Analysis of real wage inequality
In this section, I estimate the nominal wage premium for skilled workers and show
how the premium changes when differences in local costs of living are accounted for.
The analysis is based on wage information from the Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings. As this dataset does not hold any information on university attainment,
a skill proxy is derived from the 3-digit occupation code according to the procedure
peoposed in Elias and McKnight (2001). Those occupations that are grouped into
the highest skill category are used as a proxy for degree holders. The sample includes
all full-time workers aged 25 to 60. The ASHE does not provide information on
income other than wages such as social security benefits or capital income. The
largest source of income is income from work which amounts to c. 70% of total
income. The focus on earnings is, therefore, able to provide a general overview over
inequality and is the source of income which has received most attention in the
inequality literature.
The first subsection presents estimates of the wage premium for skilled workers in
nominal and real terms. The second subsection shows a decomposition of the overall
effect into a part that is due to differential price increases for different skill groups
and another part that is due to relative changes in the spatial distribution of skill
levels.
1.4.1 Regression analysis of real wage inequality
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 1.5 show estimates of the conditional nominal wage dif-
ference between high skilled and lower skilled workers for women and men. Equation
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1.2 shows the main estimating equation.
ln(heit) = β0 + β1Sit + β3Tt + β4Sit · Tt + β5ageit + β6age2it + it (1.2)
The dependent variable is the log of nominal hourly earnings of individual i in year
t, which is regressed on an indicator Sit equal to one if worker i is high skilled and
zero otherwise, a time dummy Tt which is equal to one if the year equals 2011, the
individual’s age and age squared and an interaction term of the skill dummy and
the time dummy.
Results in column (1) show that male high skilled workers in 2001 earn on average
60.9% more than lower skilled workers.9 Between 2001 and 2011 hourly earnings
increased on average by 25%. The increase is similar for both skill groups as the in-
teraction term of the skill and year dummy is insignificant. For women the earnings
gap for high skilled and lower skilled workers is lower than for men and amounts
to 51.7% as shown in column (2). For both skill groups, earnings increased by 31%
between 2001 and 2011. Nominal wage inequality remained stable in the 2000 which
is in line with findings by, for instance, Machin (2011).
Looking at wage inequality within labour markets leads to similar results. Columns
(3) and (4) in Table 1.5 show estimates with LMA fixed effects. Wage inequality is
2 to 3 percentage points lower when differences in wages across LMAs are controlled
for, otherwise the results do not change.
To assess the role of differences in local costs of living hourly earnings are deflated
by the local RPI. The lower panel in Table 1.5 shows regression results based on the
log of real hourly earnings as the dependent variable. Taking into account local price
differences reduces inequality in 2001 by c. 5 percentage points for male (60.9% to
55.3%) and female workers (51.7% to 46.4%). Between 2001 and 2011 wage gains
could not keep up with local price increases, all workers saw their real hourly wage
decrease substantially. In 2011 male high skilled workers earned on average 16.2%
less than a decade before, for male lower skilled workers the fall in earnings amounted
to 18.7%. Even though nominal wage inequality remained constant during this time
real wage inequality continued to rise due to heterogeneous price increases for high
and lower skilled workers. For male workers real wage inequality increased by 2.5,
9The number is similar in size to estimates by Machin (2011) who uses the General Household
Survey and Labour Force Survey as underlying datasets.
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for female workers by 1.8 percentage points.
1.4.2 Decomposition of the effect
Two possible channels can explain the relatively stronger price increase for the lower
skilled. Between 2001 and 2011 lower skilled workers might have moved to areas that
were relatively more expensive in 2011 or areas where mostly lower skilled workers
lived in 2001 experienced higher price increases. Accordingly, the change in cost
of living can be decomposed for each skill category into changes in the distribution
of skill groups and changes in prices for different skill groups (Moretti, 2013). The
decomposition is shown in Equation 1.3.
pq2011 − pq2001 =
n∑
a=1
ωqa,2011 · p¯a,2011 −
n∑
a=1
ωqa,2001 · p¯a,2001
=
n∑
a=1
(ωqa,2011 − ωqa,2001) · p¯a,2011 +
n∑
a=1
ωqa,2001 · (p¯a,2011 − p¯a,2001) (1.3)
pq2011−pq2001 denotes the absolute change in prices between 2001 and 2011 for q=high
skilled workers or q=lower skilled workers, ωqa is the share of skill category q in LMA
a and p¯a,2001 is the price of an average house in LMA a in year 2001, respectively
p¯a,2011 in 2011. Dividing the expression by the average price paid by a worker of
skill category q in 2001 gives the corresponding growth rates.
pq2011 − pq2001
pq2001
=
∑n
a=1(ω
q
a,2011 − ωqa,2001) · p¯a,2011
pq2001
+
∑n
a=1 ω
q
a,2001 · (p¯a,2011 − p¯a,2001)
pq2001
(1.4)
The expression on the left denotes the growth rate of housing prices for skilled (less
skilled) workers between 2001 and 2011. On the right it is expressed as the growth
rate due to the change in the distribution of skilled (less skilled) workers across
LMAs and the growth rate due to LMAs holding different concentration levels of
skilled (less skilled) workers in 2001.
The upper panel in Table 1.6 shows the decomposition of the overall price change.
If the distribution of degree holders across LMAs had not changed degree holders
would have experienced a price increase of 90.5% between 2001 and 2011. This
increase is muted by 3.7 percentage points, however, as degree holders moved to
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less expensive labour market areas. High skilled workers at least partially offset
increases in costs of living by moving into relatively cheaper areas. For lower skilled
workers the respective numbers are 92.7% and 0.4 percentage points, indicating that
the distribution of non-degree holders across space changed only marginally. Lower
skilled workers are less mobile and stay put even though prices in their area increase.
Table 1.6 shows that prices increased everywhere in England and Wales, but areas
where many lower skilled workers lived in 2001 increased by more relative to areas
with a high concentration of high skilled workers.
The differential increases in house prices translate into differential increases in the
local RPI. The lower panel of the table shows the decomposition of the local RPI
according to qualification class. If the distribution of degree holders across LMAs
had remained unchanged degree holders would have experienced an increase in the
local RPI of 54.6% between 2001 and 2011. As the spatial distribution changed the
increase was 1.1 percentage points lower. Costs of living increased by 2.4 percentage
points for low skilled worker relative to high skilled worker between 2001 and 2011.
Half of this change is due to skilled workers moving into relatively cheaper areas the
other half is due to the fact that areas where mostly lower skilled workers lived in
2001 experienced a higher increase in costs of living.
1.5 Discussion of results
So far there is only one study that proposes a theory explaining changes in real
wage inequality. Moretti (2013) develops a spatial equilibrium model where expen-
sive cities experience localized skill biased technological change (SBTC), leading to
higher demand for high skilled workers in expensive places relative to cheaper ones.
The model explains that in the US real wage inequality increased by less than nom-
inal wage inequality between 1980 and 2000 because skilled workers concentrated in
cities that became more and more expensive over the same time period.
This paper considers the subsequent decade, which in contrast to the decades before
is characterized by a constant level of nominal wage inequality. An additional dif-
ference is that during this period in the UK high skilled workers moved to cheaper
LMAs relative to lower skilled workers. Notwithstanding these differences, it is pos-
sible that the UK experienced a similar development between 1980 and 2000 as the
US. The large difference in average prices paid by university graduates relative to
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non-graduates which amounted to 17.6% in 2001 is likely to be the result of a similar
sorting process as took place in the US.
Rises in real wage inequality cannot in all cases be transferred one to one into changes
in disparities in wealth. As the local cost of living index is based on variation in
house prices, one has to note that rising house prices themselves generate changes
in the wealth distribution. As houses are an asset, increasing house prices enrich
homeowners whereas renters and first time buyers face higher costs of living. If all
lower skilled workers were homeowners, the stronger price increase they experienced
would in principle increase their wealth relative to high skilled homeowners. Em-
pirically, c. 27% of non-degree holders rented their home in 2001 compared to 16%
of employees holding a university degree. These numbers increased to 19%, respec-
tively 32% in 2011.10 This implies that increases in house prices increase wealth of
high skilled workers relative to lower skilled workers. The rise in real wage inequal-
ity by 2.5 percentage points is thus most likely a lower bound for the rise in wealth
inequality.
Another question is in how far recent changes in house prices translate into ongoing
costs for owner occupiers. Owners who bought their houses 10 years ago incur the
costs associated with price levels of that time rather than with current price levels.11
The Land Registry data used in this analysis shows that each year a large number
of people buy and sell a house: in 2001 1.2 Million and in 2011 0.65 Million houses
were sold. Though, not every worker is equally concerned by changes in current
house price levels, they are still a meaningful indicator for local costs of living due
to the large number of yearly transactions as well as the increasing share of renters.
Whether rises in real wage inequality are equivalent to changes in relative well-being
depends on why university graduates moved to cheaper labour markets. One pos-
sibility is an increase in relative labour demand. If the relative demand of skilled
labour increases in cheaper LMAs, for instance, because new firms locate in these
cities to hire skilled labour, relative inequality of skilled workers increases as much
as the relative nominal wage. This is because the new jobs created for the high
skilled are equally well paid relative to low skilled jobs in more expensive LMAs and
local costs of living are considerably lower.
10Numbers are taken from the Labour Force Survey.
11Another factor that impacts on ongoing costs for owners are changes in interest rates. Between
2001 and 2011 interest rates fell by around 3 percentage points from 7% to 4%. The decrease
in interest rates, therefore, alleviates the actual increase in house prices.
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The finding that costs of living grew relatively less in areas that experienced a high
increase in the share of skilled workers is surprising given that high skilled workers
receive a higher income than low skilled workers and are thus able to spend more on
housing. A possible explanation is that workers increasingly chose to rent in high
price areas. As noted above the national share of workers who rent their home in-
creased by 5 percentage points for lower skilled workers and by 3 percentage points
for high skilled workers. This indicates that house prices reached a level that makes
is difficult even for the well-educated to afford to buy a property. Another possi-
bility why house prices for high skilled workers decreased relative to lower skilled
workers is that the relatively low house prices themselves underlie the decision of the
high skilled to move to another area. Between 2001 and 2011 national house prices
increased by over 90% due to the lack of new developments.12 Graduates in LMAs
with a high share of skilled workers face the highest price levels. First time buyers
might have decided to look for a house in relatively cheaper areas. As can be seen
in Table 1.1 London, which is the city with the highest house prices, experienced
an increase in the skill share below average, while cities around London experienced
high increases in the LMA skill share. This would results in an increase in commut-
ing time for high skilled relative to lower skilled workers between 2001 and 2011. To
avoid increasing house prices high skilled workers accept longer commutes that in
part offset the benefit of lower housing costs.
1.6 Robustness checks
In this section I undertake several robustness checks for the above findings. Table
1.7 shows alternative specifications for the wage and real wage regressions. The
dependent variable in the upper panel is the log of hourly earnings, the dependent
variable in the lower panel is the log of real hourly earnings. Columns (1) and
(2) show inequality estimates using urban workers and rural workers, respectively.
Column (3) excludes London workers from the sample and column (4) looks at
cities only, excluding London. Results for women are presented in columns (5) to
(8). Estimates in the upper panel show that nominal wage inequality remained
constant for all sub-samples apart for male workers living in rural areas, where
12In Britain each year c. 260,000 additional houses would have to be built to keep up with increased
housing demand and to stabilise affordability (Cheshire, 2014).
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nominal inequality decreased by 2.4 percentage points between 2001 and 2011.
Estimates in the lower panel show that the increase in real wage inequality is due to
workers in urban labour markets. In rural LMAs, real inequality remained constant
between 2001 and 2011. Relative rises in prices for high skilled workers in rural areas
are offset by relative rises in wages. Real wage inequality rose faster for workers in
London. Excluding London workers reduces the rise in real wage inequality to 1.1
percentage points and the coefficient is insignificant. In cities other than London real
wage inequality kept rising by 1.7 percentage points between 2001 and 2011. Real
wage inequality increased by 2.4 percentage points for women in cities and remained
constant in rural areas as shown in columns (5) and (6). For women London has a
less prominent role, outside London real wage inequality increased by 2 percentage
points, in cities other than London by 2.9 percentage points.
As a further check, I divide the class of lower skilled workers into subclasses. I
use skill categories ranging from one for the highest skilled workers to four for the
lowest skilled workers based on the three digit occupation classification (see Elias
and McKnight (2001) for details). Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1.8 show regression
results with the alternative skill classification for male and female workers. Wage
inequality for men remained unchanged for workers of different skill levels. For
women the picture is different, wage inequality between the highest and the lowest
skill group (which refers to elementary occupations) remained constant whereas
wages increased at a slower pace for medium high skilled and medium low skilled
workers.
1.6.1 Allowing regional expenditure shares to vary across
regions
All estimates in the previous sections are based on constant expenditure shares
on housing across areas. One concern is that housing expenditure shares may vary
across labour markets, for instance individuals living in high price areas might spend
a larger share of their income on housing than individuals living in low price areas.
Because college graduates are over-represented in expensive cities like London and
under-represented in less expensive cities like Hull, this could increase the housing
expenditure share of college graduates relative to high school graduates, everything
else constant.
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To address this possibility I use housing expenditure shares that vary across Govern-
ment Office Regions (GORs). The shares are based on the Living Costs and Food
Survey and published by the ONS.13 Expenditures are detailed for the internation-
ally agreed standard classification for reporting household consumption expenditure.
I use this information to reconstruct expenditure on housing for each Government
Office Region. Details on this approach are provided in Appendix A.2.
The results are shown in Table 1.9. Each entry shows the interaction term of a skill
indicator with a 2011 year dummy from separate regressions. As a benchmark, I
deflate wages by a GOR level RPI that is constructed using constant expenditure
shares on housing across regions. The left part of the table shows how the change of
the geographical unit for the local RPI effects the results of the main specification
shown in Table 1.5. Considering changes in the local RPI across GORs instead of
LMAs leads to a smaller increase in inequality, for women the increase changes from
1.84 to 1.47 percentage points, for men from 2.53 to 1.99 percentage points. Real
wage inequality significantly increased for urban workers of both gender groups.
Inequality remained unchanged between 2001 and 2011 for workers living in rural
areas and increased for urban workers living outside London.
The results based on varying expenditure shares on housing that are shown in the
left column of Table 1.9 exhibit a very similar pattern. As expenditure shares are
higher in high cost areas the increase in real wage inequality is slightly lower than
in the case where constant housing expenditures are assumed and the significance
level decreases. Qualitatively little changes when expenditure shares on housing are
assumed to vary across GORs.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyses trends in inequality once differences in costs of living across
labour markets are taken into account. University graduates and non-graduates
increasingly chose to live in different areas. As workers with different educational
attainments are unevenly distributed across space they face differences in local costs
of living.
I find that deflating the skill premium by a local RPI that takes into account varia-
13Due to the small sample size of the Living Costs and Food Survey is is not possible to derive
expenditure shares that vary across labour markte areas.
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tion in prices across labour markets yields two results. First, real wage inequality is
c. 5 percentage points lower than nominal wage inequality as university graduates
face on average higher costs of living than non-graduates. Second, after the rise in
nominal inequality came to a halt by the end of the 90s real wage inequality con-
tinued to rise at a moderate pace because local prices rose faster for non-graduates.
Between 2001 and 2011 real wage inequality increased from 55.3% to 57.8% for men
and from 46.4% to 48.2% for women. Nominal wage inequality remained at 60.9%
for men and 51.7% for women.
The decomposition of increases in local costs of living shows that areas that had a
high share of non-degree holders experienced faster cost increases than areas that
had a high share of degree holders. Furthermore, degree holders moved into rela-
tively cheaper labour markets during the time period which further increased the
differential cost increase between the two skill groups.
The results imply that more attention should be paid to the differential costs that
individuals face as wage disparities alone are uninformative about differences in
standards of living and economic welfare.
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Figure 1.1: Percentage of workers holding a university degree across labour markets in
2011.
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Figure 1.2: Average house prices across 138 LMAs in England and Wales in 2001 (left) and price growth between 2001 and 2011 (right).
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Figure 1.3: Relation between the share of degree holders in 2001 and house prices in
2001 (left) and changes in house prices between 2001 and 2011 (right).
Table 1.1: Top and bottom 10 LMA ranked according to the share of skilled workers in
2011.
share of share of
Labour market area degree holders degree holders % point
in 2001 in 2011 change
Most skilled LMAs in 2001
London 37.5% 47.2% 9.7%
Cambridge 33.3% 44.8% 11.5%
Oxford 33.2% 44.1% 10.9%
Reading and Bracknell 33.1% 43.8% 10.7%
Warwick and Stratford-upon-Avon 31.8% 44.4% 12.6%
Brighton 31.4% 43.4% 12.0%
Wycombe and Slough 30.8% 41.5% 10.7%
Guildford and Aldershot 30.3% 41.6% 11.3%
Bath 30.2% 41.1% 10.9%
Harrogate 28.5% 39.5% 11.0%
Least skilled LMAs in 2001
East Cornwall 15.6% 27.0% 11.4%
North Norfolk 15.5% 24.6% 9.1%
Scottish Borders 15.3% 24.1% 8.8%
Barnsley 15.1% 24.2% 9.2%
Grimsby 14.7% 23.5% 8.8%
Dudley and Sandwell 14.6% 24.9% 10.3%
East Anglia Coast - 14.0% 22.5% 8.5%
Gt Yarmouth and Lowestoft
West Lincolnshire 13.9% 22.2% 8.3%
Mansfield 13.2% 22.0% 8.8%
Norfolk, Linolnshire Fens 11.8% 19.6% 7.8%
The shares of qualified workers are based on 2001 and 2011 Census data. The upper panel shows
the ten Labour Markt Areas with the highest share of highly qualified workers in 2001. The lower
panel shows the teb Labour Market Areas with the lowest share of highly qualified workers in
2001.
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Table 1.2: House price regressions using 2001 and 2011 price
data from the Land Registry.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Log price Log price
semi-detached -0.540*** -0.493***
[0.00120] [0.00155]
terraced -0.821*** -0.694***
[0.00119] [0.00156]
flat -0.795*** -0.747***
[0.00228] [0.00314]
new 0.261*** 0.151***
[0.00148] [0.00197]
leasehold -0.128*** -0.128***
[0.00188] [0.00271]
Constant 11.97*** 12.62***
[0.000929] [0.00117]
N 1228250 654263
R-sq 0.571 0.515
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Labour Market areas. ***, **
and * indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. The dependant
variable is the log of 2001 and 2011 prices. Regressions are based on
data from the Land Registry. LMA fixed effects are included in all
regressions.
Table 1.3: Expenditure shares on the five broad groups in the
Retail Price Index in 2001 and 2011.
Broad Group 2001 2011
Food and Catering 16.9% 16.5%
Alcohol and tobacco 9.7% 8.8%
Housing and household expenditure 36.2% 40.8%
Personal expenditure 9.6% 8.2%
Travel and leisure 27.6% 25.7%
Source: Office for National Statistics - RPI detailed annual average
indices: 1988 to 2011.
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Table 1.4: House prices and costs of living across education groups.
2001 2011 % change
Official RPI 1 1.357 35.7%
Official RPI without housing 1 1.278 27.8%
House prices
Degree holders 116,085 216,832 86.8%
Non-degree holders 98,698 190,503 93.0%
Difference 17.62% 13.82%
Local RPI
Degree holders 1.046 1.606 53.5%
Non-degree holders 0.985 1.536 55.9%
Difference 6.20% 4.57%
Notes: The upper panel shows price changes according to the official RPI as published by the Office
for National Statistics and the official RIP without its housing component. The middle panel shows
house prices for degree holders and non-degree holders. This information was derived from Land
Registry data on house prices and 2001 and 2011 Census data on the spatial distribution of workers
with different qualification levels. The middle panel shows the local cost of living measure derived
in this chapter for degree holders and non-degree holders.
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Table 1.5: Estimates of real wage inequality in 2001 and 2011.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES male female male female
log hourly wage
High skill 0.609*** 0.517*** 0.571*** 0.482***
(0.0196) (0.0206) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Year 2011 0.250*** 0.311*** 0.247*** 0.311***
(0.00704) (0.0104) (0.00850) (0.0106)
High skill*year 2011 0.0105 0.00544 0.0121 0.00824
(0.0133) (0.00684) (0.0131) (0.00654)
log hourly real wage
High skill 0.553*** 0.464*** 0.565*** 0.477***
(0.00783) (0.00900) (0.0115) (0.0114)
Year 2011 -0.187*** -0.119*** -0.185*** -0.119***
(0.00607) (0.00720) (0.00558) (0.00706)
High skill*year 2011 0.0253** 0.0184*** 0.0232* 0.0166***
(0.0124) (0.00651) (0.0126) (0.00636)
N 115,177 64,836 115,177 64,836
LMA FE NO NO YES YES
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Labour Market areas. Significance levels *: 10% **:
5% ***: 1%. The dependant variable is the log of hourly earnings in the upper panel and the log
of real hourly earnings in the lower panel, where real hourly earnings are defined as hourly earnings
divided by the local RPI. The skill indicator is derived from the 3-digt SOC2000 classification.
Columns (1) and (2) show estimates for male workers, columns (3) and (4) show estimates for
female workers. Age and age squared are included as controls in all specification. LMA fixed
effects are included in columns (3) and (4).
Table 1.6: Decomposition of overall effect.
Compo- Price
% change sition change
House prices
Degree holders 86.8% -3.7% 90.5%
Non-degree holders 93.0% 0.4% 92.7%
Local CPI
Degree holders 53.5% -1.1% 54.6%
Non-degree holders 55.9% 0.1% 55.8%
Difference across skill groups 2.4% 1.2% 1.2%
Notes: The upper panel shows house prices for degree holders and non-degree holders. This
information was derived from Land Registry data on house prices and 2001 and 2011 Census data
on the spatial distribution of workers with different qualification levels.
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Table 1.7: Robustness checks for real wage inequality in 2001 and 2011.
male female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
urban - urban -
VARIABLES urban rural no London no London urban rural no London no London
log hourly wage
High skill 0.612*** 0.560*** 0.581*** 0.583*** 0.518*** 0.483*** 0.484*** 0.482***
(0.0185) (0.0155) (0.00819) (0.00876) (0.0197) (0.0209) (0.00990) (0.0109)
Year 2011 0.243*** 0.283*** 0.257*** 0.250*** 0.305*** 0.338*** 0.322*** 0.318***
(0.00733) (0.00819) (0.00429) (0.00475) (0.0114) (0.00942) (0.00581) (0.00673)
High skill*year 2011 0.0185 -0.0242* -0.00535 0.000522 0.0109 -0.0210 0.00687 0.0139
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.00590) (0.00645) (0.00687) (0.0231) (0.00905) (0.00954)
log hourly real wage
High skill 0.556*** 0.533*** 0.547*** 0.548*** 0.463*** 0.464*** 0.457*** 0.454***
(0.00864) (0.0132) (0.00578) (0.00613) (0.0103) (0.0193) (0.00798) (0.00866)
Year 2011 -0.192*** -0.168*** -0.182*** -0.186*** -0.122*** -0.108*** -0.112*** -0.114***
(0.00668) (0.00892) (0.00475) (0.00548) (0.00809) (0.00800) (0.00555) (0.00664)
High skill*year 2011 0.0325** -0.00859 0.0114 0.0170** 0.0238*** -0.0118 0.0208** 0.0286***
(0.0133) (0.0146) (0.00715) (0.00819) (0.00688) (0.0222) (0.00850) (0.00893)
N 94,780 20,397 94,892 74,495 53,982 10,854 51,741 40,887
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Labour Market areas. Significance levels *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%. The dependant variable is the log of hourly earnings
in the upper panel and the log of real hourly earnings in the lower panel, where real hourly earnings are defined as hourly earnings divided by the local RPI. The
skill indicator is derived from the 3-digt SOC2000 classification. Columns (1) and (2) show estimates for male workers, columns (3) and (4) show estimates for female
workers. Age and age squared are included as controls in all specification. LMA fixed effects are included in columns (3) and (4).
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Table 1.8: Nominal and real wage inequality for four skill classes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log hourly wage log hourly real wage
VARIABLES male female male female
Medium high skill -0.430*** -0.232*** -0.383*** -0.197***
(0.00864) (0.0166) (0.00530) (0.0118)
Medium low skill -0.710*** -0.593*** -0.644*** -0.534***
(0.0301) (0.0252) (0.0146) (0.0111)
Low skill -0.861*** -0.844*** -0.804*** -0.775***
(0.0365) (0.0494) (0.0251) (0.0292)
Year 2011 0.261*** 0.315*** -0.162*** -0.102***
(0.00770) (0.0115) (0.00915) (0.00911)
Medium high skill*year 2011 -0.00350 -0.0436*** -0.0155 -0.0490***
(0.0172) (0.0122) (0.0156) (0.0104)
Medium low skill*year 2011 -0.00527 -0.0221*** -0.0263*** -0.0350***
(0.00712) (0.00752) (0.00855) (0.00820)
Low skill*year 2011 0.0135 0.0233 0.00351 -0.00111
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0124) (0.0133)
N 115,177 64,836 115,177 64,836
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Labour Market areas. Significance levels *: 10% **:
5% ***: 1%. The dependant variable in columns (1) and (2) is the log of nominal hourly
earnings, the dependant variable in columns (3) and (4) is the log of real hourly earnings, where
real hourly earnings are defined as hourly earnings divided by the local RPI. The skill indicators
are derived from the 3-digit SOC2000 classification. Columns (1) and (3) show estimates for male
workers, columns (2) and (4) show estimates for female workers. Age and age suared are included
as controls in all specifications.
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Table 1.9: Robustness checks allowing expenditure shares to vary across Government
Office Regions.
constant shares varying shares
male female male female
change in real wage inequality 0.0199 0.0147** 0.0176 0.0128*
(0.0125) (0.00666) (0.0131) (0.00679)
change in urban real 0.0286** 0.0217*** 0.0261** 0.0198***
wage inequality (0.0133) (0.00678) (0.0127) (0.00704)
change in rural real -0.0178 -0.0202 -0.0182 -0.0212
wage inequality (0.0146) (0.023) (0.014) (0.0232)
change in real wage 0.00571 0.0161* 0.0048 0.0156*
inequality outside London (0.00666) (0.0088) (0.00928) (0.00885)
change in urban real wage 0.0129* 0.0253*** 0.0118 0.0249***
inequality outside London (0.00746) (0.00916) (0.0102) (0.00921)
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by Labour Market areas. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%,
5% and 10% significance level. The dependant variable the log of real hourly earnings, where
real hourly earnings are defined as hourly earnings divided by the local RPI. The coefficients
shows are the coefficients of the interaction of a skill indicator with a year 2011 dummuy. The
skill indicator is derived from the 3-digt SOC2000 classification. Model 1 and 2 show estimates
assuming constant expenditure on housing across GORs, model 3 and 4 show estimates assuming
that expenditure shares on housing vary across GORs. Age and age squared are included as
controls in all specifications.
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Chapter 2
Real wages, amenities and the
adjustment of working hours
across local labour markets
2.1 Introduction
Differences in working hours across local labour markets are substantial but they
are largely undocumented and unexplained in the economic literature. For instance,
inhabitants of Newbury work on average c. 35 hours per week, whereas inhabitants
of South Devon work only 31 hours. When looking at part-time workers these dif-
ferences are even more pronounced. Working hours vary by up to six hours across
different areas.1 Putting these figures in relation to cross country comparisons shows
that differences in working hours across local labour markets can be as pronounced
as across countries. For instance, French workers worked on average 953 hours in
2007, UK Workers 1094 and US workers 1321 (Blundell et al., 2011). Assuming 46
working weeks a year this translates into a weekly difference of three hours between
France and the UK and five hours between the UK and the US.
Various explanations for the observed cross country differences in working hours
have been offered. These include differences in labour market regulation, tax and
welfare systems (Prescott, 2004) and cultural predilections for leisure (Alesina et al.,
2005; Blanchard, 2004). All these factors are firmly grounded in the literature as
explanatory variables for differences in working hours between countries. However,
1Numbers are taken from pooled observations of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
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as they are predominantly determined on a national level, they cannot explain the
observed differences across labour markets within countries.2 Therefore, local fac-
tors have to be considered.
Recent work that looks into labour supply adjustments within countries mainly fo-
cuses on changes in working hours over time. Several studies assess the effect of
newly introduced policies such as the minimum wage (Stewart, 2004; Stewart and
Swaffield, 2008; Zavodny, 2000) or tax reforms (e.g. (Meghir and Phillips, 2011)).
This literature ignores the spatial dimension of the phenomenon. As a result ge-
ographical differences in working hours within a country so far have received very
limited attention.
This paper focuses on the link between area level real wages and labour supply.
The analysis is based on a real wage index that captures differences in wages and
house prices for 157 labour market areas in the UK. Wage and price levels differ
substantially across local labour markets. The average wage in London in 2011 was
38% higher than the average wage in Liverpool. At the same time the rent for a
two bedroom apartment in London was almost two and a half times as much as
the rent of a similar apartment in Liverpool.3 This implies that an area which is
characterized by high wages and high prices might offer the same real wage level
as an area which is characterized by low wages and low prices. The comparison of
wage disparities alone would yield a very different result.
Differences in real wages have two different interpretations in the related literature.
Studies of the housing market usually see high house prices that are not offset by
equally high incomes as an affordability problem (Kutty, 2005; Quigley and Raphael,
2004; Stone, 2006). This view is especially prevalent for moderate-income house-
holds. In contrast, the regional and urban economics literature usually follows the
equilibrium interpretation introduced by Rosen (1978) and Roback (1982). In their
view regions characterized by low real wages must be more desirable places to live.
As workers are mobile, they would move from low to high real wage areas if they
were not compensated by a higher amenity level. Among others Albouy (2008) and
Gibbons et al. (2011b) provide recent empirical evidence for the capitalization of
2Tax levels are determined on a national level and calculated on total income. In areas where costs
of living are high and workers get a wage premium as compensation for the higher costs of
living, taxes might actually be higher relative to areas with lower wage levels and lower costs
of living. The subsequent analysis mainly works with after tax wages to account for this issue.
3Information for rents was taken from the website of the Valuation office Agency
(http://www.voa.gov.uk).
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amenities into local wages and house prices.
If higher relative costs of living reflect a higher amenity level, they increase the
quality of leisure in an area. But they also make an area more difficult to afford.
These facts suggest that not only wages but also local prices could be important
determinants of an individual’s labour supply choice.
This chapter enhances the existing literature in several ways. First, it focuses on a
phenomenon that has previously received little attention and documents the vari-
ation in working hours across local labour markets in the UK. Theoretical papers
usually assume that labour supply is constant across space. However, as this chapter
shows, spatial differences in working hours are as pronounced as differences between
countries. Second, it proposes an explanation for why spatial differences in working
hours exist by establishing a link between local real wages and labour supply. The
findings indicate that affordability is a key consideration for workers in relatively
high cost areas when determining their labour supply. Working hours are signifi-
cantly longer in low real wage areas and this effect is stronger for low skilled workers.
Finally, the paper provides evidence that this link can be partly attributed to dif-
ferences in the local amenity level.
The empirical analysis uses panel data and individual level information on working
hours. It is thus possible to estimate individual fixed effect models which are able
to control for time invariant individual heterogeneity in working hours. Compared
to OLS the fixed effect estimation increases the consistency of the results as all time
invariant unobserved variables that might bias the results are controlled for. To the
best of my knowledge this paper is the first that looks at labour supply differences
across British labour markets and which considers spatial differentials in real wages
and the level of amenities as driving factors of local labour supply decisions.
So far few papers in the economic literature focused on the analysis of local labour
supply. A brief documentation of differences in working hours across regions is pro-
vided by Dex et al. (1995) using the BHPS.4 Ward and Dale (1992) choose a func-
tional unit of analysis when looking at differences in female labour supply across UK
TTWAs. They find that for women full-time and part-time working status varies
across space but as Kodz and Britain (2003) notice there is not much further anal-
ysis or explanation of these patterns in the existing literature. Commuting time is
considered by Black et al. (2013) as an explanation for differences in local labour
4The paper looks at difference for first level NUTS regions across Britain
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supply in the US as it impacts labour force participation of women. Their approach
contains some similarities to the one taken in this paper, however, their focus lies
on the extensive margin and they explain local differences in the employment rate,
whereas I focus on the intensive margin and explain differences in working hours. A
notable study that provides an explanation for differences at the intensive margin is
the work by Rosenthal and Strange (2008a) on hours and agglomeration. They ar-
gue that highly qualified workers increase their working hours in densely populated
areas due to fierce competition, whereas low skilled workers in dense areas decrease
their hours as their work load is spread across a larger number of people.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 documents the distri-
bution of working hours across space and presents descriptive evidence on working
hour differentials for 157 labour market areas in Britain. Section 3 describes the con-
ceptual framework and explains the mechanisms underlying the empirical analysis.
The construction of the real wage measure that the empirical analysis is based on
is described in Section 4. The outline of the empirical strategy follows in Section 5.
Results and several robustness checks are discussed in Sections 6 and 7 and Section
8 concludes.
2.2 Working hours across labour market areas
Information on working hours is taken from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earn-
ings. The data is a 1% sample of workers on the PAYE register and is considered the
most reliable dataset on working hours in the UK.5 The ASHE contains information
on basic working hours, overtime working hours and total working hours measured
as hours per week. The results presented in this section are based on basic weekly
hours rather than total working hours.6 Basic working hours are preferred as the
ASHE contains data on paid overtime but not on unpaid overtime. For low skilled
workers it is much more common to be paid for overtime hours, whereas for high
skilled workers overtime tends to be unpaid (Kodz and Britain, 2003). Using total
working hours in the analysis could, therefore, lead to skill related bias. The de-
5The responses to the survey are provided by employers who report contract hours and paid
overtime working hours; employees are believed to overstate their hours worked in Labour
Force surveys as time use data as well as hours reported by employers are generally lower
(Blundell et al., 2011)
6Total hours are calculated as basic plus overtime hours.
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scriptive statistics are based on workers aged 25 to 60. 7
In a first step mean working hours are calculated for 157 labour market areas8 us-
ing the pooled dataset. Working hours in South Devon the lowest ranked LMA
amount to 31.2 hours per week, whereas residents of Newbury work on average 35.3
hours. For urban areas the differences are less pronounced but still remarkable.
For instance working hours in Northampton (34.2) and Southend-on-Sea (32.7), two
medium sized cities in England, differ by 1.5 hours per week.9 The map in Figure 2.1
shows the spatial distribution of working hours across LMAs. The highest working
hours are found in central England. They generally decrease when moving closer to
the coast with the exception of the cities Cardiff and Newport.
To get a more detailed picture the ASHE data is stratified according to full-time and
part-time worker status,10 gender and skill levels11. Gender differences in the labour
market are prevalent due to a variety of reasons (see Killingsworth and Heckman,
1986, for a survey). Skill related differences have increasingly gained attention in the
urban and regional economic literature as workers sort across different labour mar-
kets according to their skill level (Combes et al., 2008; Lee, 2010). It is, therefore,
expected that average working hours differ across these categories. Table 2.1 shows
different percentiles of mean working hours as well as the minimum and maximum
value across LMAs for full-time workers. Comparing the difference between hours
worked in the highest and lowest LMA for the different strata reveals that variation
for full-time workers amounts to two to three hours. The variation is quite simi-
lar across the different categories, but women work on average one hour less than
men. Higher skilled male workers tend to work one hour less than lower skilled male
workers while for female workers there is no such difference across skill classes.
Table 2.2 shows the same statistics for part-time workers. The first noteworthy fact
is the much larger variation in working hours by part-time workers in comparison to
full-time workers. Looking, for instance, at the group of high skilled female workers
7Results using total working hours and different age groups are presented in the robustness section.
8LMAs are derived from the 2001 definition of TTWAs by the University of Newcastle. As in
Gibbons et al. (2011b) TTWAs with sample sizes of less than 200 workers were grouped into
contiguous units.
9I conduct a two sample t-test with equal variance to test for differences in means. The differences
of mean working hours are highly significant with a t-value of 13.94 for rural areas and 10.78
for urban areas.
10Throughout the paper full-time workers are defined as those that work between 35 and 80 hours
per week, part-time workers as those who work less than 35 hours per week.
11Following the classification proposed by Elias and McKnight (2001) the standard occupational
classification 2001 (SOC03) is used to derive four skill categories. I subsume skill class 1 and
2 as low skilled workers and skill class 3 and 4 as high skilled workers.
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in urban areas shows a difference of 5.5 hours between the area where the longest
and shortest hours are worked. Some of the patterns for full-time workers are re-
versed. Working hours of high skilled workers vary much more than those of low
skilled workers and they work on average longer hours.
The two tables suggest that local factors are important determinants of labour sup-
ply as significant differences in working time are found within all strata.12
2.3 Conceptual framework
Wages differ substantially across space, which by itself should have implications for
the amount of labour supplied in different areas. Two microeconomic effects deter-
mine the adjustment of labour supply in response to a change in wages. An increase
in the wage rate induces workers to increase their leisure time as leisure is a normal
good. The income effect of the wage increase, therefore, reduces working hours. At
the same time opportunity costs of leisure increase when workers are paid more.
This induces workers to substitute away from leisure and work longer hours. As the
two effects work in opposite directions, the sign of the total effect of a wage increase
on labour supply is unclear.
Barzel and McDonald (1973) introduced a novel argument into the discussion on
labour supply that focuses on working time decisions of low wage workers. Those
who earn a very low wage and who have no other source of income than the remu-
neration of their labour might not be able to earn a subsistence income defined as
an income just enough to buy a consumption bundle that covers all basic needs.
Starting with an hourly wage rate of zero an increase in the wage rate constitutes
a point where the worker is able to earn the subsistence income when he supplies
the highest possible amount of labour. As the maximal possible amount of labour is
supplied at this point a further increase of the wage rate can only decrease a workers
labour supply.
Now consider two labour markets LM1 and LM2 and assume that costs of living
are higher in LM2. Figure 2.2 shows the hour wage combinations s1 and s2 that
generate an income high enough to cover the subsistence level in the two labour
markets. The diagram illustrates that at each given wage rate longer hours have to
12These numbers are not corrected for other factors such as industry composition or individual
sorting yet
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be worked in LM2 to meet the local subsistence level.
For most workers the position of the subsistence line does not have an influence on
their working time decision as wages are high enough to make subsistence consider-
ations irrelevant. However, for those workers who are at the lower end of the wage
distribution affordability is a major concern. For very low wage rates the labour
supply curve is likely to follow the subsistence line and, therefore, predicted to be
negatively sloped. Figure 2.3 shows the example of a backward bending labour
supply curve. The labour supply curve is negatively sloped for high wage workers
as the income effect is stronger than the substitution effect, the slope eventually
changes as the income effect decreases with lower wage rates. For low wage workers
the labour supply curve is positively sloped up to the point where the labour supply
curve intersects with the subsistence line. The result in this example is an inverse
S-shaped curve.
In a labour market where costs of living are higher the intersection of the subsistence
curve and the labour supply curve occurs at a higher wage level as shown in Figure
2.3. Workers in LM2 who are at the lower end of the wage distribution have to
increase their working hours relative to workers in LM1 if local differences in prices
are not exactly offset by higher wages, i.e. if real wages are lower in LM2 than in
LM1.
The urban and regional economic literature provides an explanation on why differ-
entials in costs of living and wages exist. The theoretical work by Rosen (1978) and
Roback (1982) shows that differences in real wages across space can be seen as a
measure for the level of local amenities. Workers are willing to accept lower wages
and pay higher rents in order to live in nice areas.
This amenity interpretation has two implications for the labour supply framework.
First, amenities make an area more attractive and facilitate a wide range of enjoy-
able leisure activities. Nice weather, scenic views, proximity to the sea or natural
parks are examples of attributes that increase the liveability of an area. The list can
be extended by cultural and historical amenities such as museums, theatres, art gal-
leries or historical sites and buildings and consumption amenities such as cafes, bars
and restaurants, cinemas, leisure centres etc. The presence of these amenities makes
leisure more valuable in some areas than others. Therefore, everything else equal,
an individual is expected to consume more leisure in an area that offers a higher
amenity level. Second, to the extent that amenities are capitalized into wages they
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lead to income and substitution effects. To the extent that they are capitalized into
prices they lead to affordability effects. This implies that amenities might indirectly
influence working hours through their effect on real wages and that all arguments
made for the effect of real wages on working hours equally apply to amenities.
2.4 Construction of the real wage index
The real wage index uses information on area level wages that are derived from the
ASHE and area level prices derived from the housing transaction provided by the
Nationwide Building Society (see Appendix A.1 of Chapter I). The wage index takes
into account that the composition of the workforce varies across areas. Similarly the
price index takes into account that the housing stock differs across areas. The pro-
cedure to calculate skill adjusted wages and quality adjusted house prices for each
of the 157 LMAs in the UK follows the approach taken in Gibbons et al. (2011b).
As in areas where costs of living are high and workers get a wage premium as com-
pensation for the higher costs of living, taxes are higher relative to areas with lower
wage levels and lower costs of living, I subtract taxes and national insurance con-
tributions from annual earnings. These are based on wage information from the
ASHE. The after tax wages are then normalized to 2007 levels using the consumer
price index of the ONS. In order to correct local wage levels for the skill composition
the log of after tax wages is regressed on individual and LMA fixed effects. From the
regression results I predict area specific annual net wages for a person with national
mean characteristics.
Housing prices are corrected for structural attributes in a similar manner to account
for the fact that structural attributes of houses differ across areas. For instance,
in dense urban areas houses are much smaller as households substitute housing for
other goods. The log of prices is regressed on a vector of housing characteristics and
an LMA fixed effect. The regression results are used to predict area specific house
prices, for a property with national mean characteristics.13
Similar to the approach taken in Chapter I, this information is used to derive a
local price index. The index is a weighted average of house prices and prices of
non-housing goods where the weights correspond to the average expenditure share
on housing and the average expenditure share on non-housing goods. For the cal-
13A full description of the approach is given in Gibbons et al. (2011b).
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culation of the index house prices are rescaled so that the area with average house
prices has the value one. The price of non-housing goods is assumed to be one. See
Chapter 1.3.1 of this thesis for a more detailed exposition of the procedure.
Finally, to derive the real wage index area local annual net wages are divided by the
local price index.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
Establishing a link between hours and wages brings up several identification prob-
lems. Unobserved preferences for working hours might well be correlated with un-
observed factors that determine productivity as workers differ in their propensity
to work long hours as well as in many other factors that influence their labour sup-
ply decisions. It is also possible that observed working hours do not correspond
to desired working hours. As workers face constraints in the choice of their hours
external shocks to the labour market are unlikely to be immediately reflected in
working hours.
The main estimating equation that aims at identifying the effect of area level real
wages on working hours is shown in Equation 2.1.
ln(hirt) = β1Irer + x′irtγ + z′irtδ + µi + τt + irt (2.1)
The log of working hours h of individual i in region r is regressed on the real wage
index Irer , a vector of personal characteristics xirt and a vector of structural char-
acteristics of the industry zirt. γ and δ are vectors containing the marginal effects
of the personal and industry characteristics and τt denotes time dummies for each
year between 1997 and 2007. The error term in Equation 2.1 is decomposed into a
time invariant individual fixed effect µi and a time varying error term irt .
Equation 2.1 is estimated using the real wage index Ire as explanatory variable
of interest and controlling for standard labour supply variables such as age, age2,
gender and occupation as well as a public sector dummy, firm size and a collective
agreement dummy. Additionally, 60 two digit industry fixed effects are included.
Sectors, such as the construction and transport sector, tend to have particularly
high working hours (Dex et al., 1995; Kodz and Britain, 2003). As industries are
not equally distributed across LMAs not controlling for differences in the local in-
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dustry composition would bias the estimation results.
The individual fixed effect µi captures all permanent heterogeneity of workers, such
as, for example, differences in general attitudes or tastes towards working long hours
which are generally difficult to measure. It also accounts for all unobservable factors
that do not change over time. These might include non-labour income as well as
marital status or the number of children. The inclusion of time dummies τt controls
for general macro-economic shocks that influence working hours such as for example
a change in the tax system or national welfare program.
As the real wage index is time invariant, it only changes when a worker moves to
a different location. Therefore, the identification of the real wage coefficient comes
from workers who move across labour market boundaries only. This specification
has the advantage that it resolves the problem of constraints in a worker’s choice
of hours. Prior research has shown that most adjustments in working hours after
an economic shock occur through job changes (Altonji and Paxson, 1990; Blundell
et al., 2008) as opposed to adjustments within the same job. Workers who move to
a different labour market also change their job and are thus able to choose a wage
hour package that reflects their preferences on working hours. As a result actual
hours are more likely to correspond to desired working hours after the move.
The problem of endogeneity between hours and wages arises in all labour supply
studies. I follow the approach taken in Rosenthal and Strange (2008a) who adopt
a reduced form approach to control for wage rates. Wage rates are not directly
included as an explanatory variable to avoid the reversed causality bias. Instead in-
dividual fixed effects as well as the set of personal characteristics are used as a proxy
for market wage.14 Fixed effects capture the time invariant part of an individual’s
wage such as different unobserved abilities and job preferences. However, they do
not capture the part of the wage that varies when individuals move across LMAs. A
mover faces a different wage level in his destination as well as a different price level.
These level differences are reflected in the real wage index. The time invariant part
of wages is thus captured in the fixed effect and the time variant part is captured
by the real wage index. This holds for sure for the representative individual that is
used to calculate the index. Under the assumption that movers who have the same
origin and move to the same destination undergo the same change in real wages it
14Rosenthal and Strange (2008a) rely on education dummies and personal characteristics to proxy
for wages. Due to the panel structure of my data I am able to include individual fixed effects
which further reduce possible bias.
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equally holds for all other individuals.
In order to get unbiased estimates from Equation 2.1 the decision to move has to be
independent from the decision to work a certain number of hours after controlling
for observable and time invariant unobservable factors. Factors known to determine
labour supply decisions which might at the same time influence the moving decision
such as age and gender are included as controls. The individual fixed effects capture
unobservable factors such as different attitudes to working long hours and prefer-
ences for a certain type of job. This reduces substantially the number of confounding
factors that might determine hours as well as the decision to move. Nevertheless,
it is possible that for instance due to changing private circumstances such as the
birth of a child the decision to move and the decision to change working time patters
coincide. Also commuting time is likely to be different before and after the move. I
will try to rule out these concerns in the robustness section where I include proxies
for the likelihood that a worker got married or had a child at the time of the move
as well as approximate commuting time.
It might also be the case that a worker moves in response to a negative or positive
income shock. Benito and Saleheen (2013) find that workers who experienced a neg-
ative shock significantly increase their working time and that adjustments are made
to some extent through job moves. It would be problematic if workers increased
their working hours and moved to a higher real wage area in response to a negative
shock. As will be seen later on, I find the opposite effect. Workers decrease their
working hours when moving to high real wage areas. A negative income shock seems
an unlikely driver of this result.
To address possible affordability considerations Equation 2.1 is augmented by an
interaction term of the real wage index with a dummy that denotes workers at the
lower end of the wage distribution. Instead of classifying the sample according to dif-
ferent wage levels I use different skill categories to reduce endogeneity issues between
wages and working hours.15 As shown in Figure 2.3, high costs of living increase the
local subsistence level, i.e. for each given wage level workers have to work longer
hours in order to meet a minimum living standard. If the local wage level is low and
costs of living are high, a larger share of workers is in proximity to the subsistence
threshold. These workers have to increase their working hours. No effect should be
15The skill groups were derived from the occupation classification using the method proposed by
(Elias and McKnight, 2001)
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found for high skilled workers for whom affordability considerations are irrelevant.
Equation 2.2 includes the interaction term Irer ∗ sk′irt of the real earnings index with
different skill categories.
ln(hirt) = β1Irer + Irer ∗ sk′irtα + x′irtγ + y′irtδ + µi + τt + irt (2.2)
Since differences in real wages are seen as a measure of local amenities in the
urban economics literature (Rosen, 1978; Roback, 1982) I also test for a direct link
between amenities and working hours. Such a test is difficult to implement as mea-
suring all attributes people value about an area is impossible. For instance, the
beauty of a landscape or a public place in the city is very difficult to quantify and
the list of amenities that impact the attractiveness of an area is arbitrarily long. As
a consequence estimates might be biased due to omitted variables or measurement
error. Also, many of the amenities are highly correlated with each other. This issue
raises concerns about multicollinearity in the regression approach.
I deal with these issues by using physical amenities only as they are objectively
measurable and, therefore, less prone to measurement error. For instance, the daily
sunshine duration is much easier to measure than for example a scenic view. Multi-
collinearity remains a concern when using natural amenities. Variables, such as, for
example, January and July temperature, are highly correlated with sunshine dura-
tion. They are, therefore, not included in the regression as this would undermine
the precision of the estimate.16
The regression that includes a set of physical amenities is shown in In Equation 2.3.
ln(hirt) = a′β + x′irtγ + y′irtδ + µi + τt + irt (2.3)
The real wage index Ire is replaced by a set of physical amenities denoted as vector a;
β denotes a vector of the amenity coefficients. The amenity vector includes sunshine
duration, rainfall, wind speed, coastal length and the difference between the lowest
and highest point within a LMA as a proxy for mountains. As a novel variable I
introduce wind speed in the analysis which is not included in prior studies. For
Britain’s geographic position wind is expected to be a disamenity. Coastal regions
in Britain are exposed to strong winds from the Atlantic sea and especially in high
latitudes and on the westerly facing coast these winds can reach very high speeds.
16The correlation between sunshine duration and July temperature is equal to 0.84
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A wind chill factor is, therefore, likely to be important in the case of Britain.
2.6 Results
The ASHE has c. 1.1 million observations for c. 232,000 individuals between 1997
and 2007.17 In this time period I count c. 76,000 moves across LMA boundaries
done by c. 50,000 individual movers. More details on the dataset and cleaning
procedure are provided in Appendix B.
Table 2.4 shows the estimation results for Equation 2.1. A simple OLS regression
without controls in column (1) shows that the real wage index and working hours are
negatively correlated, though, the estimated coefficient is not significantly different
from zero. This result does not change when control variables are included in column
(2). In column (3) the sample is restricted to workers who change labour market
areas at least once as this is the sub-sample used for the identification of the real
wage coefficient in the fixed effect estimation. Movers differ from non-movers with
respect to observable characteristics as can be seen in Table 2.3. They are thus likely
to differ also with respect to unobservable factors which in turn might determine
working hours. Column (3) shows that movers tend to increase working hours in
high real wage LMAs but the effect is not significant and close to zero in absolute
size. The comparison of columns (2) and (3) suggests that basing the identification
on the sub-sample of movers provides an upper boundary of the effect of real wages
on working hours, as the OLS coefficient is larger for movers.
As discussed in the previous section, simple OLS results are likely to suffer from bias.
Unobservable factors, such as, for instance, non-labour income and the propensity
to work long hours, result in an upward bias if individuals who like to work long
hours predominantly live in high real wage areas and individuals who have a high
non-labour income or savings predominantly live in low real wage areas. A fixed
effect estimation as in Equation 2.1 is able to capture these factors. The inclusion
of worker fixed effects as shown in column (4) results in an estimated coefficient
of -0.033 which is significant at the 1% level and decreases slightly to -0.042 when
17I exclude post 2007 observations as the UK was hit by the global economic crisis. The crisis led
to substantial changes in working practices. From the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter
in 2009 British GDP fell by 6.1%, the unemployment rate increased by 2.6% (Quelle OECD).
Low skilled workers were hit hardest, unemployment increased by almost 5% for elementary
occupations and process, plant and machine operatives between March 2008 and March 2009
(Muriel and Sibieta, 2009)
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control variables are added in column (5). A 10% increase in area level real wages
results in a 0.42% decrease in working hours. As the real wage index differs by
44% across areas, this leads to a variation in working hours of 1.85%. Assuming a
worker works 35 hours per week in the LMA offering the highest real wage he would
increase working hours by 38 minutes per week when moving to the LMA offering
the lowest real wage.
The negative sign of the coefficient might imply a strong affordability effect or that
the income effect is significantly larger than the substitution effect. If affordability
considerations were driving this result the effect should be strongest for those workers
earning lower incomes. Column (6) shows the results of Equation 2.2 where real
wages are interacted with a skill dummy indicating low skilled workers. The skill
interaction term is negative and highly significant implying that low skilled workers
reduce their working hours by more than high skilled workers when real wages
increase. Lower skilled workers who move to an area offering a 10% lower real
wage increase their working hours by about 0.85% more than high skilled workers.
Higher skilled workers do not change their labour supply when facing differences in
area level real wages. The overall negative effect of real wages on working time is,
therefore, due to labour supply adjustments of lower skilled workers.
The results from the fixed effect regressions imply that on average workers tend to
work longer hours in low real wage LMAs. In the urban economics literature real
wages are seen as a measure of the local amenity level. Real wages are lower in high
amenity areas as the value attributed to amenities is capitalized into local wages and
house prices. If differences in the amenity level were underlying the relation between
real wages and working hours, it should be possible to replicate the result by directly
including a set of amenities. In such a regression it is expected that amenities are
signed in the opposite way than the real wage index as a higher amenity level induces
lower real wages. In this interpretation amenities are expected to increase working
hours, whereas disamenities are expected to reduce working hours.
Column (1) in Table 2.5 shows the results of Equation 2.3 where the real earnings
index is substituted with a set of amenities. Sunshine and the presence of mountains
which are natural amenities are positively signed, whereas disagreeable weather
conditions such as rainfall and wind speed are negatively signed. All coefficients
apart from the coast length coefficient are significant at the 5%, respectively, 1%
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level.18 Proximity to the coast is an important factor in hedonic regressions when
US data is used. However, the distance between east and west coast in the US
is at its widest point c. 5500 km, whereas in Britain the maximum distance from
any geographical point to the sea is less than 106 km.19 Direct access to the sea or
coastal length of a LMA is, therefore, likely to be less important in the case of Britain.
The results show a significant correlation between natural amenities and working
hours. Disamenities are signed in the same way as the real wage index, whereas
amenities are signed in the opposite way. To test whether this effect comes mostly
through the amenities’ effect on real wages, the real wage index is equally included
in the regression in column (2). Conditional on local amenities, the real wage index
does not have a significant effect on labour supply. The effect of amenities remains
significant indicating that they affect working hours through additional channels
rather than through their effect on real wages only.
To further explore this issue each amenity is interacted with the skill dummy. As
shown in column (3) coastal length and wind speed decrease working hours of low
skilled by more than working hours of high skilled workers. All other amenity
variables have the same effect on working hours for both skill groups. The real
wage index is included in column (4). Conditional on physical amenities low skilled
workers increase their labour supply with falling real wages. The results in Table
2.5 are mixed with respect to the hypothesis that amenities influence working hours
by lowering local real wages. Whereas columns (1) and (2) seem to support the
hypothesis that amenities at least partly affect working hours through their effect
on real wages columns (3) and (4) do not provide any further evidence for this effect.
2.7 Robustness checks
The findings that working hours decrease with real wages and that this effect is
primarily due to adjustments of low skilled workers are tested using a variety of
alternative specifications. The upper panel of Table 2.6 shows robustness tests for
different gender and age groups. Columns (1) and (2) show results for separate re-
gressions for female and male workers. For both gender groups higher real wages do
18The importance of wind speed as a disamenity is confirmed by the fact that the coastal length
becomes negative and highly significant when wind speed is omitted in the amenity regression.
19The distance was calculated in ArcMap using a negative buffer. The village Kirk Ireton in
Derbyshire is the built up area furthest away from the coastline.
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not influence labour supply of high skilled workers but significantly decrease labour
supply of low skilled workers. The effect is stronger for female workers than for male
workers. Next, results are shown for different age bands. Column (3) shows results
for prime age workers aged 30 to 50. Column (4) shows results for workers aged 25
to 40 and column (5) for workers aged 40 to 60. The real wage effect remains stable
across all age groups.
A drawback of the ASHE is that it reports only few individual characteristics. The
lack of information on marital status and on the presence of children is of particular
concern as it is known from prior studies that both factors affect working hours
(see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a survey). The inclusion of individual fixed
effects controls for these factors as long as they do not change over time. However,
it is of course possible that a worker moves, for instance, because of the birth of a
child. As the presence of children influences labour supply, the main identification
assumption, namely that the decision to move is independent from the decision of
working a certain number of hours, would be violated. To alleviate this problem
proxies for the birth of a child and a change in legal status are calculated using infor-
mation from the 2001 Census. Each worker in the ASHE is matched with the share
of households with children and the share of households with cohabiting couples in
the worker’s neighbourhood before and after the move.20 A worker who moves from
a neighbourhood where most people do not have any children to a neighbourhood
where most people have children is very likely to do so because of the birth of a
child. To a lesser extent the same argument is valid for workers getting married or
moving together with their partner.
Column (1) in the middle panel of Table 2.6 reports regression results that include
proxies for marital status and the presence of children as additional controls. The
additional controls do not substantially alter the main result. For high skilled work-
ers real wages do not have a significant effect on working hours, whereas for low
skilled workers higher real wages significantly decrease working time. The labour
supply elasticity with respect to real wages once family conditions are controlled for
equals -0.15 for low skilled workers which is about twice the effect as in the baseline
specification.
Another factor that is frequently discussed as a determinant of labour supply is com-
20The neighbourhood is defined as the output area of the worker’s home postcode. This information
is only available from 2001 onwards as for prior years the home postcode is not reported in
the ASHE
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muting time. Commuting time can be viewed as a fixed cost of going to work. In
theoretical papers it is, therefore, often assumed that commuting time is negatively
correlated with working hours. For instance, Zenou (2002) assumes that workers
living far away from jobs provide lower effort levels than those residing closer to
jobs because of tiredness after the long commuting trip. Empirical studies did not
find a negative correlation between commuting time and working hours (Gutiérrez-i
Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2010) and the direction of the effect remains ambigu-
ous. In the main specification of the analysis the effect of real wages on working
hours would be biased downward if average commuting time was higher in areas
offering high real wages and commuting time had a negative effect on labour supply.
As a robustness check, the geographical distance between home and work post code
is added to the main specification as a proxy for commuting time. The distance vari-
able is also interacted with gender as Black et al. (2013) found that female workers
are more sensitive to commuting time than male workers when making labour par-
ticipation decisions. The results in column (2) show that the inclusion of commuting
distance on top of family conditions leaves the results unchanged.
Columns (3) and (4) in the middle panel analyse heterogeneous effects for rural
and urban areas. High skilled rural workers tend to work longer hours in high real
wage areas. As column (5) shows, this effect can be explained by differences in the
spatial distribution of households with children. Once this factor is controlled for,
the difference between working hour adjustment for high skilled workers in rural
areas and urban areas becomes insignificant. For low skilled workers the real wage
effect remains negative for workers living in urban and rural areas, though, it is not
significant for rural workers.
Column (1) of the lower panel of Table 2.6 shows results when London workers are
excluded from the sample. London has a dominant role in the British economy and
10.7% of the total number of moves are from or to London. Though, wages are high
in London the city offers the lowest real wages in the UK as costs of living are even
higher in comparison to other labour market areas. The main result for low skilled
workers is unchanged, high skilled workers tend to increase their working hours in
LMA offering higher real wages when London is excluded.
Rosenthal and Strange (2008a) found evidence for longer working hours in dense
urban areas because of increased competition between high skilled workers. I, there-
fore, control for population density and an interaction of population density and
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skill level in column (2). The real wage coefficient remains negative and highly sig-
nificant for low skilled workers.
In column (3) industry fixed effects are dropped from the regression, which does
not change the results. Industry fixed effects make a difference when running OLS
specifications but in the fixed effect regression they are largely captured by the indi-
vidual fixed effects.21 Column (4) shows results for total working hours that include
over-time hours which are very similar to the results based on basic working hours.
Finally, high skilled and low skilled workers are further divided into subclasses. I
use four skill categories which are based on the three digit occupation classification
(see Elias and McKnight (2001) for details). Column (5) shows that higher skilled
and medium high skilled workers do not change their working hours when real wages
vary. Medium low skilled worker decrease their working time in higher real wage
areas and the lowest skilled workers increase their working time the most.
Table 2.7 shows results for the sub-sample of full-time and part-time workers. The
results are based on movers who work full-time, respectively, part-time, for the entire
period of observation. For both groups low skilled workers decrease their working
time when they face higher real wages. Table 2.7 confirms the finding from the
main analysis. The fact that the magnitude of the coefficients of the split sample is
smaller than for the full sample suggest that part of the adjustment occurs through
changes from full-time to part-time status.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter documents and explains labour supply decisions in a local context.
Geographical differences in working hours within a country so far have received very
limited attention and the paper is one of very few that proposes mechanisms to
explain these patterns. In particular, it is the first to analyse a link between work-
ing hours, local real wages that take differences of housing costs into account and
different levels of local amenities.
The results show that working hours are higher in low real wage areas. A decrease
of local real wages by 10% adds about 0.42% to typical working week. Differences in
real wages are able to explain 38 minutes of the variation in weekly working hours
21The coefficient changes from -0.0623 (OLS without any controls) to -0.085 when industry fixed
effects are included and becomes weakly significant.
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across British labour market areas. This finding is driven by working time decisions
of low skilled workers indicating that workers have to work long hours to afford living
in areas where costs of living are not offset by equally high wages. A reduction of the
annual real wage of 10% increases weekly working hours of a low skilled worker by
0.85% more than working hours of a high skilled worker or put differently, differences
in real wages are able to explain c. 78 minutes of the observed difference in working
hours between high and low skilled workers across labour market areas. Amenities,
which are considered as the underlying reason for time persistent differences in real
wages, can at best partly explain this result.
These findings are relevant to a variety of policy questions ranging from the discus-
sion of the local living wage to the provision of affordable housing. Also, this chapter
shows the need to consider the interaction of local characteristics and labour market
outcomes rather than conducting empirical research at the national level only.
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Figure 2.1: Average weekly working hours for 157 LMAs.
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Figure 2.2: Hour wage combinations denoting the local subsistence level.
Figure 2.3: Labour supply and subsistence line.
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Table 2.1: Basic weekly working hours for full-time workers.
female urban rural male urban rural
high low high low high low high low
min 36.25 36.96 36.76 37.18 37.74 38.50 38.01 38.55
10 % 37.38 37.42 37.21 37.60 38.25 39.00 38.36 39.24
25 % 37.59 37.63 37.62 37.78 38.39 39.34 38.74 39.43
50 % 37.70 37.83 37.90 37.98 38.68 39.69 39.07 39.75
75 % 37.83 37.97 38.13 38.20 38.84 39.93 39.33 40.25
90 % 37.96 38.09 38.41 38.39 39.17 40.32 39.62 40.52
max 38.21 38.24 38.78 38.61 39.98 41.32 39.93 41.62
Notes: Information on basic hours is taken from the ASHE.
Table 2.2: Basic weekly working hours for part-time workers.
female urban rural male urban rural
high low high low high low high low
min 21.28 19.24 20.97 18.63 21.68 21.83 20.78 19.99
10 % 23.14 19.92 22.59 19.82 25.12 22.68 23.64 21.29
25 % 23.81 20.34 23.53 20.27 26.36 23.48 24.64 22.71
50 % 24.59 20.77 24.30 20.80 27.33 24.13 26.43 23.62
75 % 25.15 21.28 25.24 21.25 27.95 24.83 27.59 24.91
90 % 25.81 20.08 25.74 21.86 29.03 25.77 28.61 25.72
max 26.74 22.96 27.38 23.03 30.05 27.08 30.86 26.82
Notes: Information on basic hours is taken from the ASHE.
Table 2.3: Variable description
Movers Non-Movers
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Working hours 312151 34.5 8.6 810353 33.1 9.6
Real wage 312151 11209 995.4 810353 11192 1025.3
Weekly pay 312151 439.58 382.16 810353 374.63 350.99
Female 312151 0.431 0.495 810353 0.510 0.500
Age 312151 39.2 10.0 810353 40.9 11.0
Low skill 312151 0.465 0.499 810353 0.572 0.495
Part-time 312151 0.250 0.433 810353 0.330 0.470
Public sector 312151 0.365 0.575 810353 0.414 0.612
Collective agreement 312151 0.586 0.493 810353 0.597 0.490
Firm Size 312151 22612 46946 810353 14762 36217
Population density 312151 934 937 810353 1116 1082
Urban 312151 0.776 0.417 810353 0.807 0.394
Distance (m) 159075 16978 19551 418342 8628 11391
Notes: Variables are taken from the ASHE.
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Table 2.4: Regressions of working hours on the real wage Index.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS I OLS II OLS II mover FE I FE II FE II int
Variables ln(hours) ln(hours) ln(hours) ln(hours) ln(hours) ln(hours)
Ire -0.0623 0.00197 0.0353 -0.0331*** -0.0416*** -0.000133
(0.0534) (0.0416) (0.0279) (0.0123) (0.0120) (0.0134)
Low skill*Ire -0.0849***
(0.0253)
N 1,122,504 1,122,504 312,151 1,122,504 1,122,504 1,122,504
Individuals 231,955 231,955 49,878 231,955 231,955 231,955
R-squared 0.000 0.242 0.235 0.769 0.776 0.772
Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (100 repetitions). Significance levels *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%, Dep Var: ln(hours) = log of basic working
hours. Ire denotes a real wage index that has been derived using information on area level wages and house prices. The skill indicator is derived from the 3-digit
SOC2000 classification. Results in column 1 - 3 are estimated using OLS, column 4 - 6 are estimated using fixed effect refressions. Control variables include age, age2,
firm size, indicators for the public sector, rural areas, collective agreements and years as well as 2 digit occupation and industry fixed effects.
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Table 2.5: Regressions of working hours on amenities and amenities interacted with
skills.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amenities Amenities Amenities Amenities
and Ire and Ire
VARIABLES ln(hours) ln(hours) ln(hours) ln(hours)
Ire -0.00944 0.0199
(0.0140) (0.0157)
Low skill*Ire -0.0639**
(0.0294)
Sunshine 0.00462** 0.00399* 0.000419 0.00178
(0.00188) (0.00212) (0.00218) (0.00246)
Rain -0.00509*** -0.00501*** -0.00673*** -0.00695***
(0.00163) (0.00163) (0.00185) (0.00186)
Elevation 0.00481** 0.00454** 0.00185 0.00241
(0.00209) (0.00213) (0.00243) (0.00250)
Coast length -0.000217 -5.27e-05 0.00274 0.00242
(0.00149) (0.00151) (0.00169) (0.00170)
wind -0.00775*** -0.00768*** -0.00446** -0.00465**
(0.00173) (0.00173) (0.00203) (0.00204)
Low skill*sun 0.00625 0.00202
(0.00389) (0.00440)
Low skill*rain 0.00312 0.00366
(0.00340) (0.00341)
Low skill*elevation 0.00451 0.00277
(0.00435) (0.00443)
Low skill*coast length -0.00615** -0.00505
(0.00308) (0.00311)
Low skill*wind -0.00751** -0.00699**
(0.00355) (0.00356)
N 1,122,504 1,122,504 1,122,504 1,122,504
Individuals 231,955 231,955 231,955 231,955
R-squared 0.776 0.776 0.772 0.772
Controls YES YES YES YES
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (100 repetitions). Significance levels *:
10% **: 5% ***: 1%, Dep Var: ln(hours) = log of basic working hours. Ire denotes a
real wage index that has been derived using information on area level wages and house prices.
The skill indicator is derived from the 3-digit SOC2000 classification. The amenities sun, rain,
elevation, coast length and windspeed denote the average sun shine duration in hours per day,
the average rainfall in mm per year, the average altitude of an area above sea level, the length of
the coast line of an area in km and average wind speed at a height of 10 m above ground level in
knots. All variables are standardized and have mean zero and a variance of one. Control variables
include age, age2, firm size, indicators for the public sector, rural areas, collective agreements and
years as well as 2 digit occupation and industry fixed effects.
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Table 2.6: Robustness checks for the regressions of working hours on real wage Index
with interaction terms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ln(hours) ln(hours) ln(hours) ln(hours) ln(hours)
female male age 30-50 age 25-40 age 41-60
Ire 0.0401 -0.0153 0.00975 -0.00168 0.00632
(0.0313) (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0179) (0.0235)
Low skill*Ire -0.137*** -0.0536* -0.0558** -0.0680* -0.0883**
(0.0439) (0.0304) (0.0268) (0.0384) (0.0383)
N 548,050 574,454 998,051 560,883 561,621
Individuals 115,022 116,933 134,157 147,439 118,756
R-squared 0.749 0.704 0.780 0.786 0.815
rural +
LFS Commuting urban rural Census
Ire 0.0360 0.0358 -0.0225 0.154* 0.0419
(0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0151) (0.0797) (0.147)
Low skill*Ire -0.155*** -0.157*** -0.0607** -0.145 -0.147
(0.0551) (0.0551) (0.0299) (0.119) (0.218)
N 577,379 577,379 896,364 226,140 117,158
Individuals 177,104 177,104 195,121 54,031 38,708
R-squared 0.840 0.840 0.780 0.802 0.865
population no Industry total
no London density codes hours 4 skill groups
Real wage 0.0475** 0.0122 0.00608 -0.00300 -0.0105
(0.0188) (0.0142) (0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0215)
Low skill*Ire -0.113*** -0.0658** -0.0753*** -0.0796***
(0.0345) (0.0266) (0.0256) (0.0258)
Medium high 0.0267
skill*Ire (0.0319)
Medium low -0.0740**
skill*Ire (0.0334)
Lowest -0.111**
skill*Ire (0.0549)
N 909,463 1,122,504 1,122,504 1,122,504 930,041
Individuals 184,827 231,955 231,955 231,955 200,688
R-squared 0.775 0.772 0.770 0.770 0.797
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (100 repetitions). Significance levels *: 10%
**: 5% ***: 1%, Dep Var: ln(hours) = log of basic working hours. Ire denotes a real wage
index that has been derived using information on area level wages and house prices. The skill
indicator is derived from the 3-digit SOC2000 classification. Control variables include age, age2,
firm size, indicators for the public sector, rural areas, collective agreements and years as well as
2 digit industry fixed effects. In the middle panel of column 1 and 5 census information on the
output area shares of married households and households with children are included. In the middle
panel of column 2 controls for distance between home and work postcode as well as an interaction
of distance with gender are included. In the lower panel of column 2 the log of population density
is included as additional control.
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Table 2.7: Regressions of working hours on real wages for
full-time and part-time workers.
(1) (2)
full-time part-time
VARIABLES ln(hours) ln(hours)
Ire 0.00396 0.0185**
(0.00357) (0.00757)
Low skill*Ire -0.0342*** -0.0348***
(0.00810) (0.0125)
N 570,724 206,292
Individuals 121,176 57,441
R-squared 0.730 0.719
Controls YES YES
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (100 repetitions).
Significance levels *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%, Dep Var: ln(hours)
= log of basic working hours. Ire denotes a real wage index that has
been derived using information on area level wages and house prices.
The skill indicator is derived from the 3-digit SOC2000 classification.
Control variables include age, age2, firm size, indicators for the public
sector, rural areas, collective agreements and years as well as 2 digit
industry fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 show results for the sample
of full-time workers, columns 3 and 4 show results for the sample of
part-time workers.
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Chapter 3
The role of education for amenity
based sorting in British cities
3.1 Introduction
High and lower skilled workers increasingly choose to live in different areas (see
Chapter I). There is a lively discussion on whether sorting across cities is driven
predominantly by job opportunities or by the quality of life that differ across space.
While a branch of the literature emphasizes the role of cities as centres of consump-
tion that attract skilled labour by offering a wide range of amenities (Glaeser et al.,
2001; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006; Partridge, 2010) an alternative view focuses first of
all on the availability of jobs in a city in order to attract labour (Storper and Scott,
2009; Moretti, 2013). The debate on whether jobs follow people or people follow
jobs (see for instance Steinnes (1982); Gottlieb (1995); Deitz (1998) and Brueckner
(2001)), therefore, lies at the core of existing research. As the level of human capital
is an important determinant of the future economic success of a place (Lucas, 1988),
it is crucial to understand which factors drive individual location choices.
This paper investigates the relation between amenities and skills. It proposes an
empirical test for the existence of education biased preferences for amenities in UK
cities. As it is difficult to separate labour market factors from differences in the lo-
cal amenity level, we conduct the analysis at a more detailed geographical scale and
look at differences in the amenity consumption of education groups across neigh-
bourhoods. The empirical strategy consists of a two-stage estimation approach. In
the first stage, we estimate a standard hedonic regression assuming that the value of
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amenities is capitalized into housing prices. From this regression we derive a com-
posite amenity measure that captures all unobserved neighbourhood characteristics,
such as, for instance, crime levels, proximity to green areas, restaurants and cafes.
In the second stage, we analyse how the amenity consumption is distributed across
individuals belonging to different education groups. Here, the amenity measure de-
rived from the hedonic regression is used as the dependent variable. Differences
in the level of amenity consumption for individuals that earn a similar income but
belong to different education groups are interpreted as evidence of a preference bias.
The empirical investigation exploits a novel dataset that combines micro-data on
individual workers and house prices at a small geographical scale.
Our approach contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, by con-
structing our amenity measure at neighbourhood level we are able to account for
unobserved characteristics at city level. This has proven to be a substantial limita-
tion in previous studies that could not fully separate differences in the level of local
amenities from labour market opportunities (a more detailed discussion is provided
in the literature section). Second, by using price data per square metre we are able
to derive an amenity measure that does not depend on differences in the level of
housing consumption. Our hedonic regression exploits micro-data on house prices
and controls for a detailed set of housing features that influence local prices. Third,
we take into account the potential endogeneity between amenities and the local skill
level due to sorting. Previous evidence on Britain has shown that home-owners
in England and Wales are prepared to pay a substantial premium to avoid educa-
tionally poor neighbourhoods (Gibbons, 2003). This suggests that highly educated
individuals may primarily value the neighbourhood educational composition when
making their residential choice. We account for the fact that the demographic com-
position of local neighbourhoods may be considered an amenity per se by including
an extensive set of variables that capture the demographic structure of an area in
our second stage regression.
The results of the analysis suggest that highly educated individuals consume a higher
level of amenities than lower educated individuals earning a similar income. Hold-
ing everything else constant highly educated individuals have a higher valuation of
neighbourhood amenities indicating the existence of an education biased preference
towards amenity consumption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
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literature and findings related to our analysis. Section 3 describes the data and Sec-
tion 4 the empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the key results. Section 6 presents
several robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Our research contributes to an emerging body of literature which starts from the
observation that the share of skilled workers varies across labour markets and that it
tends to be highest in large expensive cities. Several studies have linked the sorting
of highly skilled workers across labour markets to differences in the local level of
amenities. Other studies have focussed on the link between amenities and differen-
tial population growth.
Lee (2010) provides a theoretical model predicting that the wage premium paid
in large urban areas is relatively lower for high skilled workers. Large cities offer
a higher consumption variety which induces high skilled workers to accept lower
wages. As consumption amenities drive up land prices in large cities relative to
small cities, low-skill individuals require a wage premium while high-skill individ-
uals might accept a lower premium or even a wage discount in these areas. Lee
(2010) looks at the example of the health care sector to document ability sorting
across local labour markets and finds empirical evidence in line with the consump-
tion amenity hypothesis. Black et al. (2009) show that not only do wage levels differ
across locations but so do returns to schooling (education-wage-gradients). They
develop a model predicting that high skilled workers tend to experience a lower real
wage premium to live in amenity cities than low skilled individuals and show that
the returns to education are relatively lower in expensive high-amenity locations.
Other studies focus on location decisions of individual movers to analyse the link
between amenities and skills and conclude that the level of local amenities plays
a significant role in the migration decision of skilled workers (Arntz, 2010; Mathur
and Stein, 2005; Chen and Rosenthal, 2008; Niedomysl and Hansen, 2010; Dorfman
et al., 2011).
It is, however, difficult to separate the impact of amenities on an individual’s loca-
tion choice from labour market characteristics, such as, for instance, differences in
the local productivity level. As Moretti (2013) notices high skilled workers might
choose to live in expensive cities because these cities are more attractive or because
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of the availability of highly specialized jobs. While in the former case higher costs
of living represent the price to pay for the consumption of desirable amenities in the
latter case they account for differences in productivity across space. Moretti (2013)
uses an IV strategy to distinguish between localized shocks in demand for skilled
workers and a change in the local level of amenities as the underlying reasons for
differential increases in the share of skilled workers between 1980 and 2000 in US
cities. The results point towards the predominant role of job opportunities for the
location choices of high skilled individuals and he concludes that expensive areas in
the US became more skilled due to the availability of highly specialized jobs gener-
ated by localized skill biased technological change.
Therefore, when performing the empirical analysis at city level, distinguishing be-
tween demand side factors (availability of job opportunities) and supply side factors
(availability of amenities) remains key to explain the sorting behaviour of high skilled
workers. Existing studies present evidence for both effects and have not yet come
to a final conclusion on their relative importance.
Further insights come from the related literature looking at the distribution and
evaluation of amenities within cities. The majority of contributions in this area
focus on a specific local amenity, such as school quality, crime or environmental
factors and use data on housing expenditures to recover their implicit prices (see
for example Graves et al. (1988) for the case of air pollution, Gibbons and Machin
(2003, 2006); Bayer et al. (2007) for school quality and Black and Machin (2011)
for a review on school quality, Gibbons (2004); Linden and Rockoff (2008) for crime
and Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) for airport noise).
The willingness to pay for amenities is, however, not necessarily homogeneously dis-
tributed across population groups. Theoretical papers often make the assumption
that amenity consumption rises sharply with income (e.g. Brueckner et al. (1999))
and there is empirical evidence that the consumption of amenities depends on the life
cycle and family composition (Chen and Rosenthal, 2008). Our study contributes to
this literature by assessing the variation of amenity consumption across individuals
focussing on individuals of different educational attainments.
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3.3 Data
For the purpose of this study we combine information from several datasets. In-
formation on individual wage and education levels is taken from the Labour Force
Survey (LFS). We use house price transaction data from the Nationwide Building
society in order to derive a local amenity measure. Finally, we exploit a wide range
of additional data sources to recover information on various kinds of natural, cultural
and consumption amenities to check the plausibility of our composite indicator.
The LFS is the largest regular labour market survey in the United Kingdom. It
allows research on a fine spatial scale as it records geographic information down
to the ward level.1 Our sample comprises individuals in employment from 1994 to
2010 for whom wage information and educational attainment are available.2 The
sample size amounts to 460,000 individuals, 30% of whom hold a university degree.
Individuals remain in the sample during five consecutive quarters, referred to as
wave 1 to 5. To avoid non-responses the earnings question was initially only asked
in the final wave. From spring 1997 onwards earnings questions were asked in wave
one and five in order to increase the sample size and reduce sampling error.3 Apart
from weekly wage and education, the LFS records information on the type of work,
such as occupation, full time status and public sector indicators as well as personal
characteristics, such as age, gender, ethnicity, marital status and the number of
children.
We derive a measure of local amenities using a hedonic price regression. Details
on the estimation procedure are given in the next section. Data on house price
transactions is provided by the Nationwide Building Society. Between 1995 and
2011 Nationwide recorded the price and geographical location of the property (seven
digit postcode) as well as a large set of housing characteristics, such as floor size, the
age of the building, number of bathrooms and bedrooms, heating and security type
for about 1.3 million housing transactions. Using the National Statistics Postcode
Directory, which provides a lookup from postcodes to higher level administrative
geographies in the UK, we add 1998 ward definitions to the transaction data. In
Britain there are c. 10.000 wards leaving us with on average 130 transactions per
1Wards have an average size of 20 km2 which is equal to 4.5 km x 4.5 km.
2Questions about individual earnings were introduced in winter 1992. We exclude information for
1992 and 1993 as the quality of wage data in the very first years is low.
3If wages differ in wave one and five we use the average wage.
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ward across the full time period. The yearly sample size lies between 30,000 and
127,000 observations.
To check the plausibility of the hedonic amenity measure, we also collected data
on local amenities at the ward level. We constructed an amenity database from
several sources. The Home Office holds a detailed register on crime incidents in
England and Wales. In 2010 it created a website that made street level crime data
freely available for download.4 Using the software ARCMap and geographical ward
boundaries provided by the data centre EDINA5, we identify the number of crime
incidents in 2010.6 We use the Business Structure Database (BSD) to identify busi-
ness organisations that have an amenity value. All businesses that are liable for
VAT and/or have at least one member of staff registered for the PAYE tax collec-
tion system appear on the BSD. We use the 2007 Standard Industry Classification
to identify restaurants, cafes, bars, public houses and clubs as well as libraries and
museums in the database.7 The BSD provides detailed information on the loca-
tion of each business using seven digit postcodes. Businesses with an amenity value
have then been allocated to British wards through the National Statistics Postcode
Directory which matches British geographies from postcodes to higher geograph-
ical levels. Additional data come from English Heritage, which holds an online
database providing information on all nationally designated heritage assets, includ-
ing listed buildings, registered parks and gardens and monuments.8 Using ARCMap
and exploiting information on the spatial coordinates of each record included in the
database we calculated the number of listed buildings within each ward. We also
use the software to calculate the share of the ward area that is covered by a listed
park or garden.
A detailed description of all variables used in the analysis is reported in Table 3.1.
4www.police.uk/data
5http://edina.ac.uk/
6These include antisocial behaviour, robbery, violent crime, damage and arson, public order and
weapons and vehicle crime. We use incidents that happened in 2012.
7We use business in 2010 with SIC07 codes 56.10/1 for licensed restaurants, 56.10/2 for unlicensed
restaurants and cafes, 56.30/1 for licensed clubs, 56.30/2 for public houses and bars, 91.01/1
for library activities, and 91.02/0 for museum activities.
8Data are available for download at http://www.english-heritage.org.uk.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy follows a two-step estimation procedure. In the first step we
derive an amenity measure using a hedonic regression. In the second step we use this
measure to analyse differences in amenity consumption according to an individual’s
education level.
3.4.1 Estimating the neighbourhood amenity level
We estimate a measure of amenities for British neighbourhoods where neighbour-
hoods are defined according to 1998 definitions of electoral wards. Workers living
in different neighbourhoods of a TTWA face the same local labour market and thus
have access to similar job opportunities. To estimate the level of neighbourhood
amenities we run a hedonic regression according to Equation 3.1 using OLS tech-
niques.
ln(pjwt) = x′jβ + aw + τt + jwt (3.1)
The log price per square metre pjwt for the transaction of house j located in ward w
at time t is regressed on a vector of housing characteristics xj, a time dummy τt for
each year between 1995 and 2011 and ward fixed effects aw. The coefficient vector
β contains marginal effects for all housing characteristics and jwt denotes the error
term. We recover the ward fixed effects aw from the regression and interpret them
as the level of amenities consumed by an individual living in the specific ward. A
plausibility check for this interpretation is provided in Appendix C.1.
The main advantage of this strategy lies in the possibility of recovering a composite
measure of amenities. This overcomes the problems associated with the use of a
large set of amenities in regression analyses. The list of available amenities is often
not exhaustive and the strong correlation between different kinds of amenities leads
to imprecise estimates. It also avoids the aggregation of a set of amenities to an
index choosing arbitrary weights (Diener and Suh, 1997; Lambiri et al., 2007).
Equation 3.1 addresses two common problems that arise in the hedonic estimation
of amenity levels. First, it controls for a long list of variables that describe the
type of the housing stock and its quality. Both factors are likely to differ systemat-
ically across neighbourhoods (e.g. suburbs with free standing housing versus inner
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city apartment blocks). Not controlling for these factors would result in biased
neighbourhood fixed effects as they would capture not only local amenities but also
unobserved housing characteristics. Given the detailed information available in our
housing data, we are able to factor out the bias due to the type of the house (de-
tached, semi-detached, terraced, flat,), tenancy type (freehold, leasehold, feuhold),
age of the structure, heating type (e.g. gas, electric, oil) as well as the number of
garages, bedrooms and bathrooms. Second, the estimation strategy shown in Equa-
tion 3.1 rules out differences in housing consumption. Using square metre prices as
the dependent variable guarantees that the neighbourhood fixed effects capture the
part of the price that is explained by differences in locational attributes rather than
the size of the house. This is important as, for instance, a detached house gives
access to the same local amenities as the neighbouring flat in an apartment block.
3.4.2 Estimating preferences toward amenities
Our second stage is aimed at testing whether preferences toward amenity con-
sumption vary with the level of education. Individuals determine their amenity
consumption through their location choice. Their sorting behaviour across neigh-
bourhoods with different amenity levels may thus reflect heterogeneous preferences
toward them. Using the amenity measure derived from the hedonic regression we
estimate Equation 3.2.
awik = δyi + φquali + z′γ + ρk + ηwik (3.2)
The amenity consumption awik of individual i living in ward w in city k depends
on the individual’s net income yi, qualification status quali, and a vector of con-
trol variables z containing age, gender and the number of children as well as job
characteristics, such as whether the individual works full-time or part-time or in the
public sector. It also contains a dummy on whether the worker receives any housing
subsidy. The term ρk denotes a travel to work area fixed effect and the term ηwik
captures all variation in the amenity measure that is not explained by the control
variables.
As highly educated individuals tend to earn higher wages, it is important to include
information on individual wages. Controlling for individual after tax wage nets out
the income effect that may potentially drive the amenity consumption. Similarly,
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other individual characteristics might have an effect on preferences towards amenity
consumption. The willingness to pay for amenities may, for example, depend on
family structure, age, gender and job characteristics. We include controls for these
factors in our regression as they are likely to influence an individual’s location choice.
The inclusion of travel to work area dummies controls for all amenities that are spe-
cific to the labour market, such as employment possibilities, a nice climate or the
availability of cultural venues. These factors might determine sorting across labour
markets, such that differences in the consumption of amenities between education
categories may instead be the result of differences in employment possibilities across
cities. A city, such as London, for example, is characterized by high wages as well
as high prices due to localized productivity advantages. The amenity measure de-
rived in Equation 3.1 will, therefore, be higher for London than for other cities. As
a result, university graduates would be systematically found to consume a higher
amenity level than similar individuals without a university degree if they were over-
represented in labour markets like London. All individuals living in the same TTWA
have per definition access to the same level of TTWA amenities.
While it is plausible to expect that skilled individuals sort into better neighbour-
hoods because of a higher amenity level, it is also possible that this sorting behaviour
influences the amenity level of a given place. The educational composition of local
neighbourhoods may constitute an amenity per se meaning that individuals are
prepared to pay a substantial premium to avoid educationally poor neighbourhoods
independent of other locational attributes. To account for these aspects we augment
Equation 3.2 by a vector of control variables κ that capture the socio-demographic
structure of the neighbourhood.
awi = δyi + φquali + z′γ + κ′λ+ ρk + ηwi (3.3)
Using information from the 2001 Census we calculate the share of university degree
holders, the age and family structure (i.e. the share of married households, house-
holds with children etc.) and the ethnic composition of each ward. By including
these additional controls we capture the amenity value that individuals place on the
characteristics of their immediate neighbours.
Though, we are able to control for a long list of variables, unobserved non-labour
income or wealth may bias our estimates. The skill coefficient φ in Equation 3.3
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would be estimated with an upward bias if high skilled workers built up more wealth
through savings or received larger intergenerational transfers.
We do not believe that this is a major concern to our analysis for several reasons.
First, to the extent that wealth is built up from savings from labour income and that
the propensity to save does not differ across education groups, accrued wealth will
be independent from the level of education once labour income is controlled for.9
Second, although it can be suggested that people from a more favourable family
background inherit larger personal assets and that university graduates today tend
to come from equally well educated families, we believe this issue is not the main
driver of our results. In fact, as the share of university degree holders expanded
rapidly during the last 40 years10, many workers holding a university degree to-
day are likely to come from a family background with lower educational attainment
than themselves. This implies that the majority of skilled individuals in our sample
are likely to have experienced, on average, similar intergenerational transfers than
non-degree holders. For younger graduates, for whom intergenerational transfers
are likely to differ, the introduction of student fees offsets their initial advantage to-
wards the accumulation of personal wealth. Average debt on entry into repayment
in England amounted to £15.000 in 2010 (Student Loans Company, 2014). At the
pre-2012 fee regime, graduates were expected to pay off their debts only by their
late 30s (Crawford and Jin, 2014). Recent graduates might, therefore, be even less
wealthy than non-graduates earning a similar income.
Another issue that might introduce a bias into the results is the potential reverse
causality between the share of highly qualified residents and the local amenity level.
The inclusion of the neighbourhood skill level in Equation 3.3 accounts for the pos-
sibility that the neighbourhood composition is seen as an amenity per se but it is
also possible that high skilled individuals first make their residential choices and
then directly influence the local amenity level. We further address this possibility
in the robustness section.
9The best-known economic theories of saving are the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman,
1957) and the life cycle hypothesis (Ando and Modigliani, 1963). These theories suggest that
individuals save to smooth available income at different stages of their life. Alternative theories
underline the importance of institutional factors, such as institutionalized saving mechanisms
and targeted financial education (Beverly and Sherraden, 1999). These theories emphasise the
importance of age as well as institutional factors as determinants of the saving rate, which are
similar for both across education groups.
10Participation in higher education increased from 8.4% in 1970, 19.3% in 1990 (Robertson and
Hillman, 1997), 33% in 2000 and 46% in 2010 (Ilochi, 2014).
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3.5 Results
The first stage of our estimation approach is aimed at recovering an indirect mea-
sure of amenity by wards through the hedonic regression. The results of the hedonic
regression of Equation 3.1 are shown in Table 3.2. In column (1) the log price per
square metre is regressed on a set of housing characteristics, in column (2) TTWA
fixed effects are included as additional controls and in column (3) ward fixed ef-
fect are included instead of TTWA fixed effects. Results in column (1) show that,
as expected, detached houses are more expensive than semi-detached and terraced
houses, freehold properties are more expensive than leasehold properties, buyers
pay a premium for new and very old buildings and the sqm price decreases with
the number of rooms. The positive sign for flats and maisonettes reflects the fact
that flats are more common in expensive urban areas. In fact, once TTWA fixed
effects are controlled for (column 2) the average price for flats is lower with respect
to detached houses.
Differences in housing characteristics are able to explain 57% of the variation in
square metre prices, the inclusion of TTWA fixed effects increases the R2 to 80%
and the inclusion of ward fixed effects (column 3) further increases the R2 to 87%.
This evidence suggests two key considerations. First, housing characteristics explain
slightly more than half of the variation in prices and the remaining proportion is
explained by other factors. Once TTWAs fixed effects are controlled for our hedonic
regression increases its explanatory power substantially implying that a significant
share of variation in prices depends on citywide characteristics. Finally, when we
account for ward fixed effects the R2 further increases which shows that there is
substantial variation in prices both across and within cities. Figure 3.1 illustrates
the within city variation of the amenity measure for four large cities: London, Birm-
ingham, Leeds and Manchester. The areas correspond to TTWA boundaries. In the
example of London the highest level of amenities, as measured by the index, is found
in Westminster, an area known for its cultural life and concentration of historical
buildings. Equally high values are found at the outskirts of London, for instance in
Richmond. This outer borough of London is known for its large number of parks
and open spaces and many protected conservation areas. The visual analysis as well
as the plausibility check in Appendix C.1 imply that the composite amenity measure
is able to capture actual amenities at a local scale.
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Our second stage regression is reported in Table 3.3. It shows the baseline results
of Equation 3.2 where the ward level amenity measure derived from the hedonic
regression is used as dependent variable to analyse the link between the amenity
level and skills.
The correlation between the skill dummy based on qualification and the amenity
level is positive as shown in column (1). On average high skilled individuals have
an amenity consumption that is 10% higher than that of lower skilled workers with
a similar income. Including individual level controls in column (2) and TTWA fixed
effects in column (3) reduces the difference to 7% and 6%, respectively.11
In column (4) we include the neighbourhood composition as additional control vari-
able as described in Equation 3.3. The inclusion of these controls substantially
reduces the size of the preference effect from 6% to 0.19% but the difference in the
consumption of amenities between high and low skilled workers remains significant
at the 5% level. We conclude that the composition of the neighbourhood in terms of
socio-demographic characteristics makes up a substantial part of overall perceived
neighbourhood quality and is especially valued by the high skilled.
The results in Table 3.3 indicate that for each income level high skilled households
consume a significantly higher amenity level than low skilled households, as they
choose to live in places characterised by a higher neighbourhood quality. Results
remain consistent when we include individual and neighbourhood controls as well as
travel to work area fixed effects. On average high skilled individuals have an amenity
consumption that is 0.19% higher than that of lower skilled workers earning a similar
income. In the case that the socio-demographic composition of the neighbourhood
is considered as an amenity the difference amounts to 6%. Also, the consumption of
amenities increases with income, implying that amenities are normal goods, which
is in line with the assumptions made in urban economic theory (see for instance
Brueckner et al. (1999)).
3.6 Robustness Checks
In Table 3.4 we present several robustness checks for our main finding. In column
(1) we show results for full-time workers only. High skilled individuals in full-time
11As the difference in the amenity level is derived from a semi-log equation, the coefficients can
be interpreted as approximate percentages. For small numbers the difference between the
coefficient and the exponent of the coefficient on the graduate dummy is negligible.
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employment might put more emphasis on job related location characteristics, such
as proximity to their work place or good transport links rather than on neighbour-
hood amenities. Nonetheless, results show that the level of amenity consumption
is 0.15% higher for high skilled workers in full-time employment relative to lower
skilled workers in full-time employment.
We also split our sample into individuals living in urban, respectively, rural TTWA.
The indirect amenity measure derived from the hedonic regression approach is likely
to capture different typologies of amenities in urban and rural areas. Results are
shown in columns (2) and (3). On average highly skilled individuals in cities choose
to live in neighbourhoods offering an amenity level that is 0.2% higher than that
of individuals with lower educational attainment. For rural areas the difference
amounts to 0.25%.
Finally, we check whether the skill related preference for amenities holds across all
age groups. Existing studies suggest that the preference towards amenities may
depend on the stage of the life cycle (Chen and Rosenthal, 2008). We show results
for prime aged workers between 25 and 40 in column (4) and for workers aged 40 to
55 in column (5). Younger highly educated workers tend to live in neighbourhoods
offering an amenity level that is 0.32% higher than that of younger, less educated
workers. For older workers the difference is not significantly different from zero.
Over the lifecycle university graduates and non-graduates become more similar in
terms of their preferences for amenities.
In column (6) we substitute the measure of skills that is based on qualification with
a measure of skills based on occupation. Following the classification proposed by
Elias and McKnight (2001) the standard occupational classification 2001 (SOC03)
is used to derive a skill classification that classifies professionals and managers as
highly skilled. The amenity preference effect is similar in size as for the education
based classification and amounts to 0.22%.
We also run additional robustness checks to analyse the relevance of the potential re-
verse causality between the share of highly qualified residents and the local amenity
level. This bias might arise as, for instance, a high share of high skilled residents
might endogenously increase school quality in an area through peer effects. Parents
who have a university degree tend to put more importance on formal education and
might spend more time helping their children with school work. A similar reasoning
applies to the case in which high skilled residents are more involved in improving
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the quality of their neighbourhood, e.g., through the organization of neighbourhood
watch schemes.
To control for this potential bias we split our sample according to the level of skill
concentration in each neighbourhood. If collective action of high skilled residents
endogenously increased the local amenity level we would in fact expect this mecha-
nism to be strongest in neighbourhoods that have a high share of highly educated
residents. Results are shown in Table 3.5. Column (1) shows results for individuals
that live in neighbourhoods with a share of high skilled residents below the 25th
percentile with respect to the total number of wards. Column (2) shows results for
individuals that live in neighbourhoods with a share of high skilled residents above
the 25th percentile and below the median. Similarly, columns (3) and (4) show re-
sults for the third and fourth quartile.
For all four quartiles we find a significant and positive difference in the amenity con-
sumption for workers with different educational attainments. It ranges from 0.14%
in the second quartile to 0.29% in the lowest quartile. If anything, the amenity pref-
erence is stronger in areas that have a lower concentration of high skilled workers,
the endogenous creation of amenities by high skilled workers does not seem to be
driving our results.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the debate on factors that determine the location decision
of highly qualified workers. It looks at the relation between amenities and skills and
tests whether preferences for the consumption of amenities differ across education
groups in UK cities. The empirical strategy relies on a two-stage estimation ap-
proach which is implemented using detailed micro-data on workers and local house
prices.
Our results suggest that high skilled individuals consume a higher level of ameni-
ties than lower skilled workers who earn a similar income and that the consump-
tion of amenities increases with income. This relation holds irrespective of unob-
served cross-city characteristics and differences in the demographic composition of
the neighbourhood, though, we find evidence that part of the preference bias can be
explained by highly educated workers choosing to live close to similar people.
Our results are interesting for policy makers as they explain residential choices of
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high skilled individuals and demonstrate a mechanism that may exacerbate segrega-
tion phenomena of disadvantaged education groups in low amenity neighbourhoods.
Also, if the same sorting mechanism that we observe across neighbourhoods works
in a similar way across cities it suggests that the availability of job opportunities is
not the single most important factor for individual location decisions. Individuals
tend to sort into cities that offer a wide range of amenities and the higher is the skill
level the more important become local conditions in terms of quality of life. Finally,
it is likely that demand for amenities will increase over time as they are normal
goods and as households get richer they want to consume more of them. Policy
makers can address this demand by improving local conditions, such as school and
environmental quality, local green areas and a city’s cultural life.
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[1]
Manchester
5.88
 - 6
.24
6.25
 - 6
.38
6.39
 - 6
.51
6.52
 - 6
.70
6.71
 - 7
.04
[2]
London
6.39
 - 6
.94
6.95
 - 7
.06
7.07
 - 7
.18
7.19
 - 7
.44
7.45
 - 8
.31
[3]
Birminham
6.11
 - 6
.36
6.37
 - 6
.45
6.46
 - 6
.55
6.56
 - 6
.69
6.70
 - 6
.94
[4]
Leeds
6.13
 - 6
.27
6.28
 - 6
.35
6.36
 - 6
.47
6.48
 - 6
.63
6.64
 - 6
.81
Figure 3.1: Amenity measure in selected cities: [1] = Manchester, [2] = London, [3] =
Birmingham, [4] = Leeds.
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Table 3.1: Variable description.
VARIABLES Description Source
Amenity level Ward fixed effect derived from a hedonic Nationwide
regression of house prices on housing characteristics Building
Society
Skill dummy Equals one if the individuals has a university degree LFS
based on qualification
Skill dummy based Equals one if the individual belongs to SOC00 11 or LFS
on occupation 21 - 24, or SOC90 1a or 2a - 2d (corporate managers
and professionals) see Elias and McKnight (2001)
Weekly net wage After tax weekly income from labour LFS
Gender Equals one for males LFS
Marital status Indicates whether the individual is single, married, LFS
re-married, separated, divorced or widowed
Age bands Indicate whether the individuals is aged 20-29, 30-44 LFS
and 45-60
Country of birth Indicates the individual’s country of birth LFS
Number of children Indicates the individual’s number of children under 19 LFS
Housing tenure Indicates whether the individual owns or rents LFS
Housing subsidy Equals one of the individual receives any housing LFS
dummy subsidies
Full-time dummy Equals one if the individual is in full-time employment LFS
Survey years Year when the individual was surveyed LFS
Distance from the Distance refers to the geometric distance, the TTWA Census 2001,
ward centroid to the centre is defined as the output area with the Edina
highest population
TTWA centre density in 2011
Share of female Ward level shares of female residents Census 2001
residents
Share of highly Ward level shares of residents with a university degree Census 2001
qualified residents
Share of households Ward level shares of households with children Census 2001
with children
Age composition Ward level shares of residents aged 0-19, 20-29, 30-44, Census 2001
45-64 and 65+
Ethnic composition Ward level shares of white, mixed, Asian, black and Census 2001
other ethnic residents
Marital composition Ward level shares of single, married (married, re-married) Census 2001
and separated (separated, divorced, widowed) residents
Share of Ward level share of unemployed residents Census 2001
unemployed
Listed buildings number of listed buildings per ward (standardized with English
mean of zero and variance one) Heritage
Crime incidents crime incidents per ward including antisocial behaviour, Home Office
robbery, violent crime, damage and arson, public order 2012
and weapons and vehicle crime (standardized with
mean of zero and variance one)
Restaurants and number of establishments per ward with SIC07 equal to BSD 2010
bars 56.10/1, 56.10/2, 56.30/1 or 56.30/2 (standardized
with mean of zero and variance one)
Share of park area the share of the ward area that is covered by a park English
classified as listed park by the English Heritage Heritage
Library dummy Equal to 1 if an establishments with SIC07 equal 91.01/1 BSD 2010
is located in the ward
Museum dummy Equal to 1 if an establishments with SIC07 equal 91.02/0 BSD 2010
is located in the ward
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Table 3.2: Hedonic regressions.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Ln(price/sqm) Ln(price/sqm) Ln(price/sqm)
Semi-detached -0.0674*** [0.0184] -0.101*** [0.00319] -0.0948*** [0.00218]
Terraced -0.0949*** [0.0361] -0.199*** [0.00545] -0.172*** [0.00505]
Cottage -0.0597 [0.0400] -0.000391 [0.0361] 0.00698 [0.0323]
Detached-bungalow 0.0739*** [0.0138] 0.117*** [0.00678] 0.110*** [0.00305]
Semi-bungalow 0.0380* [0.0230] 0.0498*** [0.00627] 0.0579*** [0.00402]
PB Flat 0.176** [0.0861] -0.130*** [0.0172] -0.182*** [0.00986]
PB Maisonette 0.0902 [0.0571] -0.276*** [0.0153] -0.305*** [0.0135]
Conv Flat 0.332*** [0.105] -0.037 [0.0449] -0.145*** [0.0218]
Conv Maisonette 0.164 [0.101] -0.138*** [0.0260] -0.196*** [0.0163]
Feuhold -0.0308 [0.0505] -0.00659 [0.0166] -0.0161 [0.0136]
Leasehold -0.330*** [0.0833] -0.0307* [0.0161] -0.0164 [0.0114]
bedrooms==2 -0.124*** [0.0136] -0.0719*** [0.00749] -0.0647*** [0.00754]
bedrooms==3 -0.214*** [0.0250] -0.161*** [0.0118] -0.152*** [0.00941]
bedrooms==4 -0.247*** [0.0374] -0.215*** [0.0166] -0.222*** [0.0116]
bedrooms==5 -0.255*** [0.0563] -0.244*** [0.0260] -0.268*** [0.0163]
bathroom==2 0.0438*** [0.0108] 0.00231 [0.00761] -0.0170*** [0.00123]
bathroom==3 -0.000484 [0.00635] -0.0329*** [0.00478] -0.0413*** [0.00209]
double garage 0.0543*** [0.0137] 0.0539*** [0.00853] 0.0444*** [0.00359]
parking space -0.0289*** [0.00665] -0.0217*** [0.00373] -0.0122*** [0.00206]
no garage -0.0782** [0.0391] -0.0964*** [0.0219] -0.0953*** [0.00709]
New property 0.0329*** [0.00407] 0.0586*** [0.00255] 0.0705*** [0.00274]
Age <1906 0.0681** [0.0344] -0.0298*** [0.00874] 0.00383 [0.00331]
Age [1906, 1930] 0.0520** [0.0234] -0.0195 [0.0138] 0.0178*** [0.00501]
Age [1931, 1944] -0.0131 [0.0338] -0.0635*** [0.0193] -0.0308*** [0.00874]
Age [1945, 1970] 0.0423 [0.0389] 0.0216 [0.0145] 0.0618*** [0.00845]
Age [1970, 2011] 0.0438 [0.0362] 0.0707*** [0.0151] 0.128*** [0.00872]
First time buyer -0.106*** [0.00613] -0.0746*** [0.00510] -0.0463*** [0.00133]
R-squared 0.567 0.795 0.867
Ward FE NO NO YES
TTWA FE NO YES NO
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on travel to work areas. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Dep Var: log price
per sqm, control include housing type, contract type, number of bedrooms, bathrooms and garages, a dummy whether the property is
new at the time of the transaction, bands for the age of the structure and a dummy whether the owner is a first time buyer. Column (2)
shows results with TTWA fixed effects, Column (3) shows results with ward fixed effects. Number of housing transactions = 1,283,934.
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Table 3.3: Baseline regression to test for the amenity preference bias.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ward FE ward FE ward FE ward FE
Skill dummy based 0.0960*** 0.0651*** 0.0563*** 0.00188**
on qualification (0.0161) (0.0109) (0.00554) (0.000869)
Weekly net wage 0.0808*** 0.170*** 0.0472*** 0.00767***
(0.0240) (0.0424) (0.00805) (0.00109)
Constant 6.076*** 5.860*** 6.381*** 7.761***
(0.0656) (0.0823) (0.0242) (0.490)
N 463,455 463,455 463,455 463,455
R-squared 0.046 0.157 0.801 0.930
TTWA FE NO NO YES YES
Individual level controls NO YES YES YES
Neighbourhood level controls NO NO NO YES
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by travel to work areas. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dep Var: ward FE = ward level fixed effect derived from a hedonic price
regression. In Column (2) individual level controls are added, namely gender, marital status,
age bands, country of birth, number of children, housing tenure, a housing subsidy dummy, a
full-time dummy and survey year controls and a variable measuring the geographical distance
from the ward centroid to the TTWA centre. Column (3) also controls for TTWA fixed effects.
In Column (4) neighbourhood level controls are added, namely the share of female and highly
qualified residents, the share of households with children, age, ethnic and marital composition and
the share of unemployed.
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Table 3.4: Robustness checks of the amenity preference bias.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
full-time urban rural age 25 - 40 age 40 - 55 Occ.
VARIABLES ward FE ward FE ward FE ward FE ward FE ward FE
Skill dummy based on qualification 0.00150* 0.00200** 0.00252*** 0.00321*** -1.32e-05
(0.000818) (0.000928) (0.000842) (0.000721) (0.00120)
Skill dummy based on occ 0.00217*
(0.00115)
Weekly net wage 0.0103*** 0.00885*** 0.00304*** 0.00978*** 0.00682*** 0.00754***
(0.00129) (0.00113) (0.000818) (0.00175) (0.000684) (0.00117)
Constant 7.858*** 8.008*** 6.674*** 7.924*** 7.581*** 7.760***
(0.483) (0.497) (0.679) (0.455) (0.519) (0.490)
N 350,152 357,380 106,075 222,027 187,046 463,331
R-squared 0.932 0.931 0.899 0.933 0.928 0.930
TTWA FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on travel to work areas. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Dep Var: ward FE = ward level fixed effect derived
from a hedonic price regression. Column (1) shows results for the subsample of full-time workers only, columns (2) and (3) shows results for the subsample of urban
respectively rural workers. In columns (4) and (5) the sample is split into workers aged 25-40 respectively 40-55. Column (6) shows results for an alternative skill
measure based on occupation. Control variables are the same as in Table 3.3 column (4).
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Table 3.5: Sample split according to the level of skill concentration in each neighbourhood.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p25- p25 - p50 p50 - p75 p75+
VARIABLES ward FE ward Fe ward FE ward FE
Skill dummy based 0.00287*** 0.00140** 0.00197*** 0.00167*
on qualification (0.000732) (0.000706) (0.000663) (0.000918)
Weekly net wage 0.00598*** 0.00450*** 0.00393*** 0.0108***
(0.000673) (0.000825) (0.000946) (0.00218)
Constant 5.759*** 6.640*** 7.457*** 8.189***
(1.425) (0.928) (0.776) (0.416)
N 115,875 117,883 102,889 112,576
R-squared 0.902 0.906 0.906 0.912
TTWA FE YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on travel to work areas. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Dep Var: ward FE = ward level fixed effect derived from a hedonic price
regression. Column (1) shows results for the subsample of individuals living in neighbourhoods
with a skill concentration below the 25th percentile. Column (2) shows results for individuals that
live in neighbourhoods with a share of high skilled residents above the 25th percentile and below
the median. Column (3) and (4) show results for the third and fourth quartile. Control variables
are the same as in Table 3.3 column (4).
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Chapter 4
Local multipliers in local labour
markets - A case study of the
move of the German government
to Berlin
4.1 Introduction
Substantial differences in economic performance exist across local labour markets
within a country. Governments frequently use relocation programmes of public sec-
tor workers as a tool to address employment problems in declining regions. The
main argument is that job relocation triggers local multiplier effects and, therefore,
boosts regional economic performance. Each additional public sector job may in-
crease demand for locally-produced goods and services. This increase in demand
may trigger additional jobs in the private non-tradable sector. On the other hand,
the new jobs might merely crowd out existing ones. Higher rents and wages increase
local production costs which impede new business formation or hamper existing
businesses’ competitiveness. These general equilibrium effects may offset the multi-
plier effects. Evidence on their impact is, however, limited.
This project uses the move of the German government from Bonn to Berlin between
1999 and 2001 in order to investigate what effect prevails when jobs are relocated
into local labour markets. We conduct the analysis at a fine geographical scale and
use variation of employment changes within the city of Berlin to test for local mul-
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tiplier effects. We use information from the German Establishment History Panel
that comprises a 50% sample of Berlin establishments with at least one employee
from 1992 to 2010. The dataset provides detailed information on employment at
the postcode level.
Analyses of this kind are complicated by two factors: (1) the geographical spread of
the effect is unknown a priori; (2) the locations are not randomly chosen. To solve
these issues, we construct a set of treatment intensity measures that capture the
geographical spread of the effect adapting from Gibbons et al. (2011a). Secondly,
we control for a large set of initial economic and demographic characteristics and
run robustness checks using locations that were chosen for historical reasons only.
Our empirical strategy is a form of difference-in-difference estimation that takes the
possibility of local spill-over effects into account. We compare employment changes
in areas close to a relocation site with those further away for the year right before
the start of the government move to the year when a majority of job moves had
been realised.
Until now empirical evidence on the interaction between public and private sec-
tor employment is scarce and the existing evidence of the impact of public sector
employment on labour markets finds contradictory results. Whereas Edin and Holm-
lund (1997) find that public sector employment reduces unemployment, Algan et al.
(2002) find the opposite effect as public sector employment in the long run destroys
private sector jobs. Both are macro-economic studies that use OECD country data.
There are three studies that look at the experience of single countries using micro-
data. Faggio and Overman (2014) made a first attempt to look at the impact of
public sector employment on local labour markets. Analysing changes in total public
sector employment for 352 English Local Authorities during the period 2003-2007
they find that public sector growth does not have any impact on total private sector
growth. However, it changes the local composition of private sector jobs by increas-
ing the share of private services. Similarly to our project, Becker et al. (2013) use
the move of the government to Bonn after World War II as a source of exogenous
variation. In line with the predictions of a standard economic geography model
they find that an increase in public employment puts downward pressure on private
sector employment. Micro level studies have only very recently become feasible due
to high data requirements. Faggio (2013) is the first to analyse the effect of a pub-
lic sector relocation programme on a very detailed geographical scale using Census
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2001 Output Areas. She finds that in the UK the implementation of a public sector
relocation initiative labelled the ‘Lyons Review’ has highly localised effects which
disappear at a distance of two to three km from the relocation site.
Our work is also related to studies that look at spill-over effects from the tradable
sector on the non-tradable sector. Moretti (2010) quantifies the long-term change
in the number of jobs in a city’s tradable and non-tradable sector generated by an
exogenous increase in the number of jobs in the tradable sector. He finds that in
the US 100 additional jobs in the tradable sector increase employment in the non-
tradable sector by 160 jobs, whereas it has no effect on employment in other parts
of the tradable sector. A similar study compares these figures to Sweden; here the
multiplier effect amounts to 48 jobs for 100 additional jobs in the tradable sector
(Moretti and Thulin, 2013).
Our study is of considerable interest for policy makers. It gives evidence on the
suitability of public sector relocation programmes for addressing local employment
problems. Despite the fact that governments frequently use these policies, evidence
of their impact is scarce. The project also helps understanding uneven spatial im-
pacts of changes in public sector employment, which are relevant for both public
sector job creation and destruction – another highly debated topic. Furthermore,
our project is highly relevant as a case study. The 1994 Bonn-Berlin Act speci-
fied that 50% of government employees have to remain in Bonn. Whether the law
should be changed is frequently debated. This study helps to shed light on the
possible impact for Bonn and Berlin should the German government decide to move
the remaining ministries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give an overview of
the historical setting and provide details on the relocation. In Section 3 we describe
the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the data used in the analysis. Results are
shown in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Short description of the historical setting
When Germany lost WWII the country was divided into four sectors administered
by the Four Powers, USA, Russia, UK and France. Similarly, the city of Berlin,
which was the capital of Germany between 1871 and 1945, was jointly occupied.
The cooling of the political climate between the Western powers and Russia led to
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the division of Germany in 1949 into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and
the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Berlin was claimed by both states result-
ing in the situation shown in Figure 4.2 [L]: though Berlin was located in the GDR
c. 130 km away from the West German territory, the West-Berlin zones occupied by
the US, the UK and France became part of the FRG. The East-Berlin zone occupied
by Russia became part of the GDR. From the West-German perspective the former
capital was isolated and, therefore, unsuitable for government functions. Under the
promise that Berlin would be made capital again as soon as the political situation
changed, Bonn was chosen as new capital and seat of the government of the FRG.
This ‘provisional’ situation lasted until reunification in 1990. A clause in the Uni-
fication Treaty (1990) signed by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) agreed on making Berlin once again capital of
united Germany. A year later it was decided to move the seat of the government
back from Bonn to Berlin. The decision was unpopular and could only be reached
by making large concessions to the city of Bonn, to compensate for the loss of status
and economic power. Part of the agreement was a ‘fair division of labour’ between
Berlin and Bonn implying that core government functions should take their seat in
Berlin but the majority of government jobs should remain in Bonn. Additionally,
Bonn should receive financial compensation as well as new functions and institu-
tions of national and international significance. The initial plan was to move the
government to Berlin within four years and to fully complete the move within at
most twelve years (Deutscher Bundestag, 1991a).
Details on the implementation of the move where left open. By 1992 it became
clear that moving the core government functions within four years was not feasible.
What followed was a long discussion about the timing of the move and its costs.
One motion proposed to stop any further government related investments in Berlin
until the financial situation of the FRG had improved. Another proposed to post-
pone the move until 2010. Furthermore, a mass petition was organized to suspend
a decision about the date of the move until the government had full knowledge of
the costs and the financial situation of the state (Bund) and federal states (Län-
der) had improved (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010). This dispute created uncertainty
among private companies that had started to invest in Berlin. In November 1993
40 national and international companies pointed at the breach of trust should the
government cease its effort to press ahead with the move (Hoffmann, 1998, p. 213).
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The passing of the Berlin-Bonn Act (1994) provided statutory security about the
move to Berlin. Though it did not specify a concrete moving date, the act deter-
mined important details of the implementation of the move such as the definition
of a ‘fair division of labour’ between Berlin and Bonn and concrete compensatory
measures for the former capital. Six ministries should keep their first seat in Bonn1
and get a second seat in Berlin; nine ministries should take their first seat in Berlin
and keep their second seat in Bonn. Additionally, it was decided that the majority
of ministerial positions were to remain in Bonn. It was only by November 1997 that
the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) announced a moving date. The government
was to take up its work in Berlin in September 1999. Until then the timing had
remained heavily debated.2
A timeline summarizing the core events of the decision making process is shown in
Figure 4.1.
The magnitude of the relocation
Parliament and government officially started their work in Berlin in September 1999.
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the number of relocated jobs from Bonn to Berlin.
In total c. 15.000 government related jobs were relocated. An additional 10.000
positions related to foreign representations, the media, political parties and interest
groups followed suit. At the same time Berlin experienced significant outflows of
public sector jobs. A commission that had been established shortly after reunifica-
tion to make recommendations on the redistribution of federal offices across those
federal states, that used to be part of the GDR (new Länder), decided to relocate
several Berlin based institutions. Berlin also lost several of its institutions to com-
pensate Bonn for its employment losses. This situation is depicted in Figure 4.2 [R].
Adding up positive and negative job movements, results in a net gain of c. 18.000
jobs for Berlin. Those jobs did not correspond to the number of relocated workers
as employees were given the choice whether they would like to follow their job to
Berlin or take on a position in one of the federal institutions that were relocated to
1Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), Federal Ministry of Health (BMG), FM of Food, Agriculture
and Consumer Protection (BMELV), FM of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ),
FM for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), FM of Education
and Research (BMBF)
2For instance, in the September 1996 50 MoP of SPD and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN brought
in the motion to postpone the move by at least 5 years.
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Bonn as part of the compensation measures.3
The timing of the relocation
The relocation period was spread across several years, though the majority of jobs
had moved by the official relocation date or shortly after as can be seen in Fig-
ure 4.3. Government employees essentially moved in 1999 and 2000. By the end
of 2000 more than 8000 ministerial employees as well as c. 5300 employees of the
administration of the federal parliament, parliamentary groups and deputies and
their assistants were located in Berlin. Since the Federal Assembly (Bundesrat) had
revised its decision to stay in Bonn in September 1996 all federal states equally es-
tablished a representation in Berlin. The majority of embassies chose to be present
in Berlin when the German government took up its work in 1999 and many more
arrived in the following years. Some of them had made short term arrangements to
accommodate their staff such as renting offices and using facilities of their consulate
generals and branch offices as well as former military missions until they could re-
build or construct a suitable building for their representation (Gehrcken, 2013). The
relocation of institutions out of Berlin is comparatively spread, taking place mainly
between 1996 and 2004.
The choice of location within the city of Berlin
The location decision for the government institutions was heavily debated. While
the airport of Tempelhof was proposed as a possible site for parliament due to the
availability of unbuilt land the final site was chosen for historical reasons. To keep
the costs of the move as low as possible many ministries were accommodated in
existing housing stock. Embassies used the facilities of their consulate generals and
branch offices as well as former military missions. Though, the diplomatic building
stock in Berlin-West had been almost entirely destroyed between 1939 and 19454
many countries still owned a parcel of land in Berlin that they had purchased almost
a century ago. The former embassies in the GDR located in Berlin-East had closed
in 1990 or were used as consulates. Some reopened later on as representations in the
3Approximately 34% of government employees decided to stay in Bonn, most of them were public
sector workers of lower or middle grade.
4In the course of the construction works for the NS capital ‘Germania’ several embassies had been
demolished. For some the planned reconstruction never materialized as diplomatic relations
broke off during WWII. Severe bomb attacks destroyed a large number of buildings in the
Tiergartenviertel (Fleischmann, 2005)
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FRG. Today 163 states are represented in Berlin by 158 embassies and five honorary
consulates. It were therefore mainly historical factors that determined the location
pattern of the government and related institutions.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
We are interested in the change in private sector employment after the relocation of
public sector jobs to Berlin. A change in private sector jobs can either arise through
existing firms hiring or laying off workers or firms entering or leaving an area within
the labour market. To capture both channels the analysis is done on the postcode
level rather than the firm level. Studies that look at the effect of job relocations are
complicated by two factors. First, the geographical spread of the policy is unknown
a priori. To solve this issue, we construct a measure of treatment intensity that is a
non-parametric function of the distance to a relocation site following Gibbons et al.
(2011a). For the construction of the treatment intensity variables we measure the
number of relocated jobs in each postcode as well as the number of relocated jobs
in 1 km wide distance bands starting from the postcode boundary. This approach
allows the relocation of public sector institutions and public sector jobs into an area
to affect surrounding areas and the impact to differ by distance. For instance, local
businesses such as restaurants or other local services might benefit from a higher
number of customers in the area and thus hire more workers. It might also be the
case that firms such as consulting or law services decide to relocate after the inter-
vention in order to benefit from proximity to the public sector. As a consequence
the number of jobs would increase in areas close to the public sector institutions.
Second, when implementing relocation programmes of public sector jobs that aim
at improving local employment conditions, locations are not randomly chosen. We
argue that this concern is much weaker in our analysis than in related studies as
the relocation of the government from Bonn to Berlin was not aiming at improving
local economic conditions in specific neighbourhoods. As discussed in the histor-
ical section the location choice of government institutions was largely determined
by historical factors. The seat of the government was chosen to be located next
to the former Reichstags building, embassies still owned representations or parcels
of land dating back to the time of the German empire or in the former East back
102
to the 70s when the GDR was internationally acknowledged. The Federal institu-
tions selected to compensate Bonn for its loss of employment were chosen to allow
government employees who did not want to move to Berlin to keep a similar job in
Bonn (Bornhöft et al., 2001)5. Their specific location in Berlin was not a factor in
the decision making process. Still due to the sheer size of the relocation one of the
necessary conditions was the availability of a sufficiently large number of offices or
buildings suitable to be converted into offices and land suitable for the construction
of the main government buildings. In our empirical strategy we address these issues
by controlling for time-invariant postcode characteristics, and for differences in pre-
existing employment trends.
We apply a difference-in-difference strategy where we compare employment changes
in postcodes receiving relocations at different distances with postcodes further away
from any relocation. We include treatment intensity variables for six distance bands.
A standard difference-in-difference strategy would not allow for the possibility of em-
ployment spill-overs as it compares areas that were directly treated with those not
receiving any direct treatment. Equation 4.1 shows the specification to analyse the
effect of public sector relocations at varying distances from an area on local private
sector employment in the specific area.
∆privpt = β1∆pubpt +
6∑
d=1
γd∆pubdpt +
J∑
j=1
δjx
j
p,t−n + ∆∗privp,t−n−1 + ∆pt (4.1)
∆ denotes a long lag operator, i.e. ∆privpt = privpt − privpt−n. ∆privp,t is the
change in private sector employment between time t-n and t in postcode p, ∆pubpt
denotes the number of public sector jobs received by postcode p between time t-n
and t and ∑6d=1 γd∆pubdpt denotes the number of public sector jobs that relocated
within a certain distance of postcode p between time t-n and t. The equation is aug-
mented by a set of control variables denoted by the vector xjp,t−n. For each postcode
p the log of total employment as well as the share of part-time employees, different
age, gender, occupation and education groups are included using levels at time t-n.
∆∗ denotes another lag operator. ∆∗privp,t−n−1 refers to private sector employment
changes prior to the relocation period and ∆pt denotes the error term.
In our analysis we take differences of private employment between 1998 and 2002,
5The Federal Cartel Authority (Bundeskartellamt) for instance was moved to Bonn to provide an
alternative possibility of employment for employees of the ministry of economics. All these
decisions were independent of the local employment situation in Berlin
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i.e. t-n=1998 and t=2002. As shown in Figure 4.3 net job turnover in Berlin was
highest in 1999, 2000 and 2001. The chosen years correspond to the time just before
and after the highest treatment intensity. A short differencing time span is of advan-
tage, especially in the case of Berlin which was going through a time of structural
change, making it less likely that ongoing trends confound the estimates.∑6
d=1 γd∆pubdpt refers to a set of spatially lagged treatment intensity variables. They
measure all public sector employment that has been relocated outside a given post-
code up to a distance d.6 Using ArcMap we construct five one kilometre wide rings
from the postcode boundary and an additional ring ranging from five kilometres
to 15 km.7 As we know the exact geographical location of each institution that
received public sector employees we can count the number of jobs that fall into each
ring. The spatially lagged treatment intensity variables are constructed in a cumu-
lative way. ∆pub1pt refers to all relocations within a 0-1km distance band from the
postcode boundary, ∆pub2pt refers to all relocations within a 0-2km distance band
from the postcode boundary (including relocations considered in the 0-1km ring),
∆pub3pt refers to all relocations within a 0-3km band (including relocations consid-
ered in the 0-1km and 1-2km rings), and so forth. The outer ring ∆pub6pt refers to
all relocations within a 0-15km band from the postcode boundary. Including sepa-
rate 1km wide rings would give the same results, however, the cumulative definition
of the treatment intensity variables simplifies the comparison of the coefficients and
thus the interpretation of the results. In the cumulative specification the coefficients
capture the total effect of all relocations within the given distance ring, whereas in
the case of separate 1km wide rings all coefficients would have to be added up to
get an estimate of the total effect. If relocated institutions are likely to engage more
frequently with surrounding private businesses we expect the multiplier effect to be
strongest in the closer rings.
Table 4.2 compares 1998 levels of the employment structure for postcodes receiv-
ing relocated jobs and postcodes not directly receiving relocated jobs. While age
shares for employees are similar for postcodes receiving a relocation and those not
receiving a relocation, there are significant differences in the number of total em-
6We treat the two central postcodes as ‘seed’ locations which are not affected by employment
relocations into surrounding postcodes to avoid multicollinearity problems in the treatment
intensity variables. Given the intensity of direct treatment these postcodes received it is less
likely that spill-overs accounted for employment growth within these postcodes
7We use the ‘buffer’ tool in ArcMAP to construct the rings.
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ployees and the share of full time employees between the two groups. Occupation
and qualification shares are comparable apart from the share of workers in profes-
sional occupations and highly qualified workers. The inclusion of the employment
structure variables controls for their potential impact on changes in employment.
For instance, postcodes that had a large number of employees might have experi-
enced faster employment growth than postcodes with fewer employees. We take
1998 levels of these variables which correspond to a year prior to the start of the
relocation.
In Equation 4.1 we estimate the effect of changes in the number of public sector
jobs on changes in the number of private sector jobs, considering changes that occur
simultaneously. In the robustness section we explore the possibility of long term
effects by looking at differences over a longer time span.
4.4 Data
Information on employment is taken from the weakly anonymous Establishment
History Panel (EHP) (see Gruhl et al. (2012)). The dataset is assembled by the
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and holds information on a 50% random
sample of all German establishments employing at least one worker on the social
security records. The time span of the panel ranges from 1975 - 2010 for former
West-Germany and from 1991 - 2010 for the New Länder. Variables include the
number of employees of each firm and the number of employees in each of the fol-
lowing categories: age bands, gender, qualification class, occupation (1 digit) and
nationality each split further down into full and part time workers. Information on
wages include the median wage at firm level for full time workers, as well as the 25th
and 75th quartile. The same quartiles are provided for female workers, and workers
holding different level of qualification (high, medium, low, unknown). Additional
variables include the date of market entry and exit as well as a time consistent in-
dustry classification code (3 digits).
For this project, we restricted the data to Berlin only and, in cooperation between
LSE and IAB, enhanced it by postcode information which is not part of the EHP.8
All Berlin establishments were linked with one of 190 Berlin postcodes, which are
8The enhanced dataset is not part of the standard data portfolio of the Research Data Centre.
Access for replication studies is possible after successful application. Contact the RDC at
iab.fdz@iab.de for further advice.
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the main unit for our spatial analysis. While the data is generally available at the
establishment level there is one complication. A firm owning several establishments
of the same 5-digit industry code within one municipality has to register them under
a single ID and address. We further discuss possible implications for our results in
the robustness section. Observations for two postcodes had to be dropped out of
confidentiality reasons as the specific postcodes contained less than 20 establish-
ments.
The official start of government activities in Berlin was the 1st September 1999.
Estimates of the total number of jobs that were destined to relocate were frequently
cited in the media as well as in the general discussion in parliament. For our anal-
ysis this information are indicative but of little concrete use as the relocation of
the government and related institutions along with their employees was spread over
a much longer time span and information on the spatial distribution of these jobs
within Berlin was not provided. Due to the lack of official sources on public sector
employment we collected information on the number of jobs of each relocating insti-
tution, the year the institution moved in or out of Berlin and the new address of the
institution in Berlin respectively the former address in Berlin of those institutions
that were relocated to Bonn and the New Länder.
We were able to collect the numbers of government employees working in Berlin in
1997, 1999, 2001, 2004 which were taken from official documents (BT-Drucksache)
and an issue of the ‘Spiegel’, a weekly newspaper (Bornhöft et al., 2001). The num-
ber of relocated jobs of federal institutions was also taken from official documents
(BT-Drucksache). The ‘Berliner Zeitung’, a daily newspaper based in Berlin pub-
lished information on the number of employees in the federal administration and
parliamentary groups, as well as the number of deputies and their employees in
1999. We attributed 1998 employment levels to the Länder representations which
were published in the Generalanzeiger, a local newspaper in the Bonn region. The
Ministry of Foreign affairs (Auswärtiges Amt) publishes each year a list of diplo-
matic staff in foreign embassies that have a representation in Germany. From these
documents we took the number of diplomatic staff in Germany in 1996. As the
documents do not contain any information on members of the embassy adminis-
tration and technical support staff we assume that their number is proportional to
the number of diplomatic staff and estimate the total number of workers in each
embassy based on the number of people registered at the Ministry of foreign affairs
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in 1998.
We attribute the number of jobs to a Berlin postcode by checking the address of the
institution receiving employment in the specific year. Addresses were taken from
registers that publish information on all public institutions in Germany. These ad-
dress registers are published every year. In the case of an institution having multiple
sites we attribute all employment to the main address.9 An overview of the sources
of the number of relocated jobs, the address and relocation timing is provided in the
appendix.
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of the number of jobs relocated between 1999 and
2001 across 190 postcodes in Berlin. The map shows aggregate numbers of relocated
jobs for each postcode. Although, we have exact addresses for the relocated institu-
tions, we perform the analysis at the postcode level, as this is the smallest spatial
unit available in the EHP. Postcodes differ in size, the median postcode measures
about 3 km2, the smallest postcodes is about 0.4 km2, the largest is about 35 km2.
30 out of 190 postcodes received a positive public sector employment shock; eight
postcodes received a negative shock. Relocated employment per postcode ranges
from -813 employees in postcodes that lost an important federal institution to c.
5200 employees in a postcode in Berlin ‘Mitte’, the most centrally located district in
Berlin, where several ministries and embassies are clustered. The number of treated
postcodes in Western Berlin is higher than in the East. The total employment that
the areas west and east of the former line of the Berlin Wall received is balanced,
though, as the postcode with the highest number of received public sector workers
lies in the east. All federal institutions that were moved out of Berlin were geograph-
ically spread across West-Berlin as they fulfilled administrative tasks for the FRG
during the time of division. The eight postcodes that lost public sector workers are
therefore spread across western postcodes of the city.
We first undergo a plausibility check to verify the addresses and employment data
we collected from independent sources. Instead of using the change in private sector
employment as the dependent variable we regress the change in employment in the
public administration (SIC code 75) and foreign organisations (SIC code 99) on the
number of relocated jobs related to the move of the government. If the Establish-
ment History Panel comprised all employment we would expect that each relocated
9Latitude and longitude are added to the data using the online georeferencing tool provided at
http://www.gpsvisualizer.com/geocoder/.
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government and embassy job would increase employment in these industries by one.
The results in Table 4.3 column (1) indicate that postcodes to which we attribute
public sector jobs experienced a significant increase in employment in the public
administration and international organizations. The correlation of the employment
changes that were measured using two independent sources amounts to 0.81. As
public servants and embassy employees are not subject to German social security
and thus do not appear in the EHP, it is reasonable to find a coefficient smaller than
one.
The plausibility check indicates that public sector employment as measured by em-
ployees in the public administration and foreign organisations increased in those
areas that received government institutions. Receiving public sector workers in the
surrounding buffers has, as expected, no impact on employment changes as shown
in column (2). The fact that we attribute relocated employment to an institutions
primary address does not seem to introduce any spatial measurement error. This
suggests that the majority of jobs are located at the primary location. The data we
collected is still likely to suffer from measurement error, as for instance, the estimate
of jobs in each embassy is based on several assumptions. This error will bias our
estimates towards zero and the presented evidence is therefore likely to be a lower
bound of the true impact.
We also use Equation 4.1 to analyse the effect of the government relocation on pri-
vate organizations that are directly linked to government activities such as lobbying
organisations and trade unions. Through the industry classification code 911 and
912, these organizations can be identified in the EHP.10 From other sources it is
known that most interest groups moved from Bonn to Berlin along with the gov-
ernment. Table 4.3 shows that there is a positive effect of a change in public sector
worker employment on the number of employees working for interest groups within
the same postcode. The relocation of 100 government workers let on average to the
move of 5.5 lobbyists as shown in column (3). The inclusion of the non-parametric
treatment effects slightly decreases the main effect but none of the spatial spill-over
coefficients is significant. These findings indicate that interest groups locate in di-
rect proximity to government institutions rather than in areas further away. Given
the aim of lobbying organization to influence the political process, this finding is as
10This classification encompasses activities of business, employers’ and professional organizations,
activities of trade unions and activities of other membership organizations
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expected.
Those postcodes to which we attributed public sector jobs from the historical sources
experienced employment growth in the public sector relative to those postcodes to
which we didn’t attribute any jobs. We don’t find any correlation between public
sector jobs relocating near the postcode boundary on employment in the public ad-
ministration. We are thus confident that the data we collected and the addresses we
attributed to each institution give a realistic description of the spatial distribution
of the actual employment shock.
4.5 Results
Table 4.4 shows estimation results of Equation 4.1 for the change in total private
sector employment between 1998 and 2002. In column (1) private sector employ-
ment change is regressed on the relocation within the same postcode as well as the
treatment intensity variables only, column (2) includes postcode level controls and
column (3) also controls for pre-trends in private sector employment growth between
1995 and 1997. The table shows that public sector jobs generate jobs in the private
sector in areas close to the relocation site. 100 new public sector jobs create on
average 54 private sector jobs in the postcode receiving the relocation. The effect
is significant at the 10% level. We also find a significant effect of public sector jobs
moving into proximity of private sector firms. The relocation of 100 public sector
jobs into a 1 km wide distance ring around the postcode boundary increases pri-
vate sector employment in that postcode by approximately 33 workers. This spatial
spill-over effect is significant at the 1% level. Job relocations more than 1 km away
have no additional effect, relative to areas at a distance of 5 to15 km away from any
relocation site. A variable capturing the distance to the former Berlin wall as well
as the inclusion of a dummy that takes value one for former West-Berlin postcodes
in columns (4) and (5) do not alter the results.
The results in Table 4.4 show that a significant multiplier effect exists. The reloca-
tion of public sector workers generates additional jobs in the private sector. This
effect is highly localised but reaches further than the postcode boundary. Postcode
sectors have been drawn to facilitate the delivery of mail and do not necessarily cor-
respond to local clusters of economic activity. The non-parametric specification pro-
vides a flexible approach. It takes into account that postcodes are not self-contained
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units while it is able to identify the spatial reach of the employment shock. This also
explains why the effect is more significant for employment relocations in a 1 km wide
ring, as this ring might result in a better approximation of the local concentration
of employment than the actual postcode boundary.
The effect comes entirely through job creation in the service sector. Table 4.5 shows
results for the split of total private employment into manufacturing and services.
Postcodes directly receiving or in close proximity to public sector relocations did
not experience a change in manufacturing employment significantly different from
changes in postcodes located further away as shown in column (1). Job changes in
private services were much more pronounced in and around the receiving areas as
shown in column (2).
To understand which service sectors grew due to the relocation of public sector em-
ployment, the partition is refined in Table 4.6. The interaction might be the result
of interactions between public institutions and private businesses, or it might be the
case that it is the result of newly arrived employees consuming local services and
goods.
We find evidence for both channels: the relocation of public sector institutions in-
creases employment in private businesses and trade (comprising retail and wholesale
activities) as well as employment in the real estate sector and personal services. The
most important channel for the employment multiplier are business to business ac-
tivities. Out of the total of 53 jobs that are created in the immediate proximity to
a relocation site of 100 public sector workers 25 are created in the private business
sector as shown in column (6). Government institutions demand services from con-
sulting or law firms which increases employment in these specific sectors.
Furthermore, three additional jobs for 100 public sector workers are created in the
real estate sector (column (5)), 4.6 in trade (column (1)) and 1.5 in the personal
service sector (column (8)). The arriving government employees might provide the
customer basis for local restaurants, cafes or retail shops. Also, as noted in the
data section, mainly high skilled workers decided to move to Berlin along with their
job. These workers might favour proximity to work and are more likely to sub-
stitute housework through professional services. Workers might therefore look for
apartments close to their work place, which increases retail activity in areas close
to government institutions. Similarly, these workers might have a high demand for
personal services, such as laundry services or hair dressers which explains the sig-
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nificant results for these industry sectors.
The hotel and restaurant industry might be expected to increase employment in re-
sponse to the relocation, as well. Business clients visiting public institutions might
stay overnight and the greater local workforce might increase local demand for cater-
ing. We do not find any significant employment increase in areas close to relocation
sites in these sectors. The reason is most likely that both sectors have been growing
rapidly in the years prior to the relocation, as becomes evident when looking at the
large and highly significant pre-trend coefficient.
4.5.1 Falsification test
Berlin has experienced several dramatic changes during the last decades. The fall
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent reunification of East- and West-
Germany had a strong effect on the Berlin economy. The move of the government
took place less than 10 years after these events during which Berlin went through
a phase of economic and social transformation. We therefore undertake additional
checks to show that the employment multiplier effect we find is due to the relocation
of the government and not to ongoing transformation processes that were triggered
by the reunification. To rule out the possibility that the effect we find is due to
spatially differentiated employment growth that happens to coincide with the sites
of the government we apply Equation 4.1 to the time period before the move of
the government took place. Ideally we would like to use a time period before the
decision of the move of the government was made. However, as shown in Figure 4.1
this date coincides with the reunification and before 1991 there are no data available
for East-Berlin.11
As discussed in the historical section, the timing of the move was very uncertain
until the last moment due to the strong opposition against the relocation project by
politicians as well as the general public. It was only in 1997 that a final moving date
was announced. We therefore use the period before the decision on the final moving
date for our falsification test, i.e. we use private sector employment growth between
1995 and 1997 as the dependent variable in our specification. This specification still
allows us to control for pre-existing trends in employment changes and we include
1993 to 1994 differences as a control.
11We exclude years 1991 and 1992 from the analysis because of data problems relating to the
introduction of the employment notification procedure in the federal states of eastern Germany.
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Results for private sector employment, manufacturing and services are shown in
Table 4.7. We do not find evidence for stronger employment changes in postcodes
that were to receive public sector institutions in later years. Before the move of the
government to Berlin the treatment intensity variables had no effect on changes in
the private, manufacturing or service sector. As for the main multiplier effect we
split the service sector according to different industries shown in Table 4.8. The
positive effects on employment changes in trade, real estate, business and personal
services in the postcodes receiving the relocation are not present in the years prior
to the relocation. These results suggest that ongoing transformation processes that
were triggered by the reunification do not drive the employment multiplier, as the
effect only shows up after the relocation of the government.
4.5.2 Further robustness checks
As an additional robustness check we assess the role of the bandwidth for our re-
sults. In the baseline specification we opted for 1km distance bands. If the distance
band is chosen to be very wide, localised effects are not captured. If the distance
bands are very narrow it might be the case that no additional relocations occur at
the specific distance. In Table 4.9 we assess the robustness of our results when we
use 1.5km, 2km, 2.5km and 3km wide distance bands instead of 1km wide bands.
The choice of the width of the distance band does not change the size of the effect of
relocations within the postcode boundary on changes in total private employment
within the postcode. The coefficients in columns (1) to (3) are very close to the
baseline coefficient of 0.53 estimated in Table 4.4. The wider the choice of the band-
width, the weaker is the effect of relocation sites located within the first distance
band from the postcode boundary. Whereas the effect is around 33 private sector
jobs for 100 relocated public sector jobs at a distance of 1km it decreases to 12.8 for
a 1.5km wide distance band, to 9.8 for a 2km wide distance band and goes down to
5.3, respectively 2.5, when a 2.5km or 3km wide distance band is chosen.
As an alternative to distance bands of different widths we also experimented with
parametric weighing functions, which allocate a weight based on the inverse dis-
tance measured from each postcode to each postcode that receives a relocation.
In Function 1 we use the absolute inverse distance, in Function 2 we use the
squared inverse distance. We calculate the treatment intensity of a postcode as
112
treatp =
∑190
i=1
1
distij+1 ·∆emprelocj respectively treatp =
∑190
i=1
1
(distij+1)2 ·∆emprelocj and
use this variable as the independent variable in Equation 4.1. Results for private
sector employment as well as the industrial split are presented in Table 4.10. For
each industry sub-sample we contrast the effect of the treatment variable according
to distance Function 1 and distance Function 2 on changes in employment between
1998 and 2002 with the effect of the treatment variable on changes in employment
between 1995 and 1997 as a falsification test.
The same industries that react to the public sector relocation using the non-parametric
specification show significant employment growth when using the treatment inten-
sity according to a distance weighing function. For each 100 public sector employees
weighted by the inverse of their absolute distance to the postcode private sector
employment increases by 32 workers and by 50 workers if the weight is chosen as the
inverse of squared absolute distance. The effect is very similar for private service
employment. As in the case of the non-parametric regression significant effects are
found for the real estate sector, private businesses and personal services. Using the
weighing function we also find a significant effect on employment in finance whereas
we fail to replicate the effect on trade. In the falsification test all significant effects
disappear.
As mentioned in the data section, another concern that might impact our finding
is that we attribute addresses of multi-site firms to the headquarter address. There
might be a tendency that this address is in the centre of Berlin, where the public
employment shock is largest. As a result private sector employment increases in
proximity to public sector institutes might seem larger than they actually are, given
that the true change is spread across multiple sites. We do not think that this form
of measurement error drives our results for two reasons. First, since the error is sym-
metrical, a shrinking multi-site firm would induce a measured employment decline in
the centre that is stronger than the true one. Since overall employment was declining
in Berlin throughout the study period, this negative bias would arguably outweigh
any positive ones. In this case, our positive local employment effects would consti-
tute a lower bound to the true effect. Second, since the measurement problem for
multi-site firms also existed during the placebo period before the government move,
any strong bias into one direction should show up in our falsification test. This is
not the case. We therefore conclude that the measurement problem is unlikely to
have a significant impact on our results.
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4.6 Conclusion
We quantify the local multiplier effect of a public sector shock on private employ-
ment using the move of the German government from Bonn to Berlin as a natural
experiment. We find a significant positive effect of public sector employment that
relocated into the postcode or within a distance of 1 km from the postcode boundary
on private sector jobs. The relocation of 100 public sector workers into a postcode
results in an employment gain of 53 in the private sector. We find evidence of spatial
spill-over effects: public sector employment relocation into a 1km wide distance ring
measured from the postcode boundary increases private sector employment within
the postcode by an additional 33 jobs for each 100 public sector jobs. Separating
private sector employment into services and manufacturing we find that the effect
comes through job creation in the service sector only. For manufacturing jobs we
find neither evidence for a multiplier nor for a crowding out effect.
We find no such effect on private sector employment during the years leading up to
the relocation. Employment changes between 1995 and 1997 are not correlated in
any significant way with the future relocation. The results are furthermore robust
to the choice of the width of the distance band as well as parametric weights for the
relocation sites impacting postcode level employment at different distances.
Our results help understanding the geographical spread of employment multipliers.
Similarly to the literature on external economies of agglomeration (see Rosenthal
and Strange (2008b); Arzaghi and Henderson (2008)) we find that employment spill-
over effects attenuate with distance. This indicates that job relocation can be used
as a very local economic development policy.
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1990:
Berlin becomes capital of 
reunified Germany
1991:  The Bundestag decides 
to move the seat of the 
government from Bonn to Berlin 
with 338 against 320 votes
1994: The Bonn/Berlin Act 
provides statutary security 
about the move of the seat 
of the government to Berlin 
1997: The Bundestags decides 
about the final moving date which 
is to take place in summer 1999
1999: The 
government takes 
up its work in Berlin
2001: The majority of 
planned relocations 
has been realized
Figure 4.1: Timeline of the decision making process.
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Figure 4.2: Historic setting - [L] Period of division lasting from 1949 to 1990. [R]
Implementation of the move of the government from Bonn to Berlin.
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Figure 4.3: Timing of the relocation
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Figure 4.4: Concentration of employees in ministries , Länder representations and
embassies by postcode sector. (Source of shapefile: Statistical Office for
Berlin-Brandenburg (Amt fÃ14r Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg))
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Table 4.1: Overview about the relocated institutions and related jobs.
Institution Number of jobs moved
Positions moved from Bonn to Berlin
Ministries 9,075
Bundestag, -rat, -präsidialamt 5,276
Representations of the Länder 626
Foreign representations 6,300
Media, parties and interest groups 3,7001
Positions moved from Berlin to Bonn
Federal and other institutions -4,054
Positions moved from Berlin to new Länder
Federal Institutions -2,9272
Total 24,977 - 6,981 = 17,9963
1According to Deutscher Bundestag (1992) 10,000 jobs in foreign representations, media companies,
parties and interest groups would move from Bonn to Berlin.
2Germany as a federal country tries to balance the distribution of federal institutes across all
federal states. Initially is was planned to move 4700 jobs out of Berlin to the New Federal States
but some relocations never materialized.
3The DIW estimates a net gain of 18,159 positions for Berlin(Geppert and Vesper, 2006), the
Prognos AG (2003) estimates a net gain of 14,500 positions.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics.
Postcodes not Postcodes Difference
receiving jobs receiving jobs in means
Variables Mean Std. Mean Std.
log total employment 7.47 0.824 8.11 0.875 -0.647***
% full time employment 77.9% 0.081 74.5% 0.082 3.4%***
% female employment 46.1% 0.130 53.6% 0.079 -7.5%***
% low qualificed employment 13.0% 0.063 11.5% 0.052 1.5%
% medium qualificed empl. 53.8% 0.095 53.4% 0.085 0.4%
% high qualificed employment 9.1% 0.060 13.5% 0.093 -4.4%***
% other qualificed employment 24.1% 0.107 21.6% 0.104 2.5%
% workers in unskilled occ 33.6% 0.094 28.9% 0.096 4.8%***
% workers in skilled occ 42.7% 0.088 42.3% 0.126 0.4%
% technicians 5.0% 0.031 4.3% 0.028 0.7%
% semi-professionals 9.1% 0.095 11.6% 0.110 -2.6%
% engineers 3.4% 0.038 3.6% 0.040 -0.2%
% professionals 1.5% 0.016 3.9% 0.064 -2.4%***
% managers 3.3% 0.021 3.8% 0.022 -0.5%
% employees aged 16 - 24 11.6% 0.048 10.6% 0.033 1.0%
% employees aged 25 - 39 42.5% 0.045 42.8% 0.040 -0.3%
% employees aged 40 - 54 33.9% 0.040 34.3% 0.038 -0.4%
% employees aged 55 - 65 11.9% 0.028 12.2% 0.027 -0.3%
Number of postcodes 150 38
Notes: All variables refer to 1998 levels.
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Table 4.3: Regression of difference in employment in the public administration and
international organisations on difference in public sector employment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆pub9802 ∆pub9802 ∆pub9802 ∆pub9802
treat 0.815*** 0.812*** 0.0545*** 0.0451*
[0.0617] [0.0667] [0.0155] [0.0238]
0-1km -0.00189 0.0449
[0.0386] [0.0392]
1-2km -0.00729 0.00231
[0.0407] [0.00643]
2-3km 0.0407 -0.00384
[0.0386] [0.00270]
3-4km -0.0292 0.00107
[0.0461] [0.00223]
4-5km 0.00313 -0.00089
[0.0232] [0.00153]
5-15km 0.00117 -0.00284
[0.0160] [0.00235]
N 188 188 188 188
R-sq 0.52 0.527 0.347 0.56
Controls YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%
Dep. Var.: ∆pub9802 = change in employment in the public administration and international
organisations (1) and (2) and change in employment in special interest groups (3) and (4) between
2002 and 1998. Column (2) and (4) include employment relocations into the six distance bands. All
columns include initial (1998) postcode level controls: log of total employment, shares of female and
part-time workers; age, education and occupation structures; share of R&D employees. Column 3
and 4 include trends in the sectors employment growth between 1995 and 1997 a distance measure
of the postcode centroid to the Berlin wall and a West-Berlin dummy.
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Table 4.4: Regression of difference in private sector employment on difference in public
sector employment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802
treat 0.497 0.543* 0.540* 0.524* 0.526*
[0.332] [0.277] [0.279] [0.279] [0.280]
0-1km 0.325** 0.324*** 0.329*** 0.331*** 0.331***
[0.130] [0.123] [0.124] [0.124] [0.123]
1-2km -0.012 -0.0197 -0.0185 -0.0199 -0.0201
[0.0415] [0.0368] [0.0380] [0.0383] [0.0384]
2-3km -0.0195 -0.00652 -0.00656 -0.00681 -0.0071
[0.0388] [0.0364] [0.0369] [0.0370] [0.0368]
3-4km 0.0163 0.00188 -0.00117 -0.000712 -0.000548
[0.0333] [0.0338] [0.0337] [0.0338] [0.0339]
4-5km -0.00567 -0.0083 -0.00695 -0.00999 -0.00975
[0.0205] [0.0210] [0.0215] [0.0219] [0.0217]
5-15km -0.0117 0.000341 -0.000286 -0.00351 -0.00307
[0.00724] [0.00966] [0.00988] [0.0106] [0.0116]
∆priv9597 -0.0743 -0.0754 -0.075
[0.126] [0.126] [0.127]
Distance to wall -9.363 -8.873
[11.13] [11.72]
W-Berlin -15.87
[115.3]
N 188 188 188 188 188
R-sq 0.345 0.461 0.463 0.464 0.464
Controls NO YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%
Dep. Var.: ∆priv9802 = change in private sector employment between 2002 and 1998. Columns (2)
to (5) include initial (1998) postcode level controls: log of total employment, shares of female and
part-time workers; age, education and occupation structures; share of R&D employees. Columns
(3) to (5) include trends in the sectors employment growth between 1995 and 1997. Columns (4)
and (5) also includes a variable that measures the distance of the postcode centroid to the Berlin
wall as well as a west Berlin dummy in column (5).
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Table 4.5: Regression of difference in private sector
employment on difference in public sector employment.
(1) (2)
Manufacturing Services
VARIABLES ∆mnf9802 ∆srv9802
treated -0.00705 0.538**
[0.0149] [0.263]
0-1km 0.00645 0.316**
[0.00572] [0.129]
1-2km 0.00192 -0.00716
[0.00485] [0.0406]
2-3km 0.0036 -0.021
[0.00590] [0.0353]
3-4km -0.00505 0.00322
[0.00612] [0.0288]
4-5km 0.00193 -0.00818
[0.00421] [0.0185]
5-15km -0.00708** 0.00401
[0.00282] [0.0104]
N 188 188
R-sq 0.118 0.473
Controls YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels
*: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%. Dep. Var.: ∆ mnf = change in man-
ufacturing employment between 2002 and 1998. ∆ srv = change in
service employment between 2002 and 1998. Include are initial (1998)
postcode level controls: log of total employment, shares of female and
part-time workers; age, education and occupation structures; share
of R&D employees, trends in the sectors employment growth between
1995 and 1997, distance of the postcode centroid to the Berlin wall
and a West-Berlin dummy.
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Table 4.6: Regression of changes in private sector employment in different industrial sectors on changes in public sector employment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trade Hotels Restaurants Finance Real Estate Business Media Personal Services Tourism
VARIABLES ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9802
treat 0.0459* -0.00353 0.00295 0.0325 0.0304*** 0.255* 0.0778 0.0150*** 0.0104
[0.0238] [0.00454] [0.0170] [0.0486] [0.0111] [0.154] [0.0506] [0.00511] [0.0262]
0-1km 0.00628 0.0131 0.00483 0.105 -0.00551 0.0673 -0.00295 0.00465** -0.00197
[0.0125] [0.00820] [0.00844] [0.0926] [0.00936] [0.0740] [0.0183] [0.00183] [0.0292]
1-2km -0.0129 -0.00385 -0.0169 -0.00468 0.0072 0.00382 0.00946 -0.00272 -0.0173
[0.0103] [0.00246] [0.0126] [0.0177] [0.0113] [0.0187] [0.00962] [0.00262] [0.0107]
2-3km 0.00665 0.000937 0.00585 0.0107 -0.00882 0.00337 -0.00357 -0.00139 0.00564
[0.00805] [0.00173] [0.00590] [0.0119] [0.00557] [0.0139] [0.00671] [0.00534] [0.00675]
3-4km 0.00678 0.0000527 0.00265 -0.0176 0.00788* -0.0143 -0.00127 0.000705 -0.00151
[0.00858] [0.00157] [0.00564] [0.0107] [0.00440] [0.0129] [0.00378] [0.00480] [0.00596]
4-5km -0.0117 -0.00000273 -0.000516 0.00556 -0.00184 0.00384 -0.000636 0.00168 0.00224
[0.00783] [0.000731] [0.00211] [0.00704] [0.00246] [0.00798] [0.00230] [0.00249] [0.00301]
5-15km 0.00283 -0.000906 0.00121 -0.00505 0.000506 -0.0093 -0.000617 0.00189 -0.00477
[0.00346] [0.000719] [0.00149] [0.00542] [0.00135] [0.00675] [0.00141] [0.00121] [0.00293]
∆priv9597 0.547 0.167*** 1.288*** -0.025 -0.063 -0.793*** 0.311 -0.059 0.583
[0.375] [0.0475] [0.401] [0.0949] [0.127] [0.181] [0.387] [0.145] [0.415]
N 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
R-sq 0.25 0.321 0.238 0.286 0.132 0.558 0.385 0.171 0.274
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%. Dep. Var.: ∆priv9802 = change in service employment between 2002
and 1998. Included are initial (1998) postcode level controls: log of total employment, shares of female and part-time workers; age, education and occupation structures;
share of R&D employees, distance of the postcode centroid to the Berlin wall and a West-Berlin dummy.
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Table 4.7: Falsification test: Regression of difference in
private sector employment on difference in public sector using
1996 - 1998 differences.
(1) (2) (3)
Total Private Manufacturing Services
VARIABLES ∆priv9597 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9597
treat -0.0192 0.00993 0.0163
[0.0477] [0.0123] [0.0392]
0-1km 0.0467 0.000671 0.0333
[0.0405] [0.00590] [0.0357]
1-2km 0.00567 0.00547 0.0225
[0.0360] [0.00493] [0.0310]
2-3km -0.00456 -0.000504 -0.0107
[0.0252] [0.00565] [0.0260]
3-4km -0.0293 -0.00379 -0.0269
[0.0204] [0.00707] [0.0219]
4-5km 0.0129 0.00385 0.012
[0.0133] [0.00516] [0.0149]
5-15km 0.00234 -0.000874 0.00657
[0.00938] [0.00318] [0.00759]
N 188 188 188
R-sq 0.345 0.144 0.257
Controls YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *:
10% **: 5% ***: 1%. Dep. Var.: ∆priv9597 = change in employ-
ment between 1997 and 1995. Included are initial (1995) postcode
level controls: log of total employment, shares of female and part-time
workers; age, education and occupation structures; share of R&D em-
ployees, distance of the postcode centroid to the Berlin wall and a
West-Berlin dummy.
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Table 4.8: Regression of changes in private sector employment in different industrial sectors on changes in public sector employment using 1996 - 1998
differences.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trade Hotels Restaurants Finance Real Estate Business Media Personal Services Tourism
VARIABLES ∆priv9597 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9597
treat -0.00238 0.0273 0.00766 -0.00776 0.00838 -0.000325 0.000561 0.0000835 0.0187
[0.0123] [0.0165] [0.00665] [0.0151] [0.0102] [0.0263] [0.00386] [0.00166] [0.0131]
0-1km 0.0118* -0.00607* 0.00292 -0.00666 0.00162 -0.000768 -0.00918** -0.000528 0.0242**
[0.00674] [0.00349] [0.00366] [0.0135] [0.00631] [0.0163] [0.00385] [0.00125] [0.0119]
1-2km 0.000334 -0.00255 -0.000127 0.0261 -0.0000531 0.000231 0.00293* -0.000438 -0.00671
[0.00546] [0.00274] [0.00179] [0.0167] [0.00450] [0.0108] [0.00176] [0.000961] [0.00480]
2-3km -0.00428 -0.000312 0.000649 -0.0153 -0.00265 0.0106 -0.00181 0.0011 0.0019
[0.00535] [0.00154] [0.00210] [0.0108] [0.00288] [0.0112] [0.00125] [0.00168] [0.00301]
3-4km 0.00866 0.00162 -0.000751 -0.000584 -0.00138 -0.0249* 0.00102 -0.000394 0.000386
[0.0105] [0.00202] [0.00189] [0.00336] [0.00263] [0.0131] [0.00121] [0.00135] [0.00332]
4-5km -0.00606 -0.00158 0.000153 0.00116 0.00202 0.0147* -0.000488 -0.00022 -0.00146
[0.00889] [0.00141] [0.000761] [0.00199] [0.00224] [0.00788] [0.000827] [0.000573] [0.00206]
5-15km 0.0035 0.00125** 0.000609 0.00145 -0.000676 0.000267 0.000758* 0.000238 0.00403**
[0.00351] [0.000560] [0.000448] [0.00176] [0.000708] [0.00267] [0.000442] [0.000476] [0.00180]
N 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
R-sq 0.172 0.659 0.431 0.422 0.189 0.17 0.624 0.567 0.287
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%, Dep. Var.: ∆ priv = change in service employment between 1997 and
1995. Included are initial (1995) postcode level controls: log of total employment, shares of female and part-time workers; age, education and occupation structures;
share of R&D employees, distance of the postcode centroid to the Berlin wall and a West-Berlin dummy.
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Table 4.9: Robustness checks using different band widths.
(1)
Var. ∆priv9802
treat 0.539*
[0.282]
0-1.5km 0.128
[0.0822]
1.5-3km -0.00788
[0.0214]
3-15km 0.00155
[0.0126]
N 188
R-sq 0.393
Contr. YES
(2)
Var. ∆priv9802
treat 0.545*
[0.279]
0-2km 0.0978*
[0.0573]
2-4km -0.0234
[0.0151]
4-15km 0.001
[0.0127]
N 188
R-sq 0.382
Contr. YES
(3)
Var. ∆priv9802
treat 0.549**
[0.270]
0-2.5km 0.053
[0.0437]
2.5-5km -0.0183
[0.0150]
5-15km 0.00323
[0.0132]
N 188
R-sq 0.349
Contr. YES
(4)
Var. ∆priv9802
treat 0.584**
[0.269]
0-3km 0.025
[0.0230]
3-15km 0.00603
[0.0133]
N 188
R-sq 0.334
Contr. YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%,
Dep. Var.: ∆priv9802 = change in private sector employment between 1998 and 2002. Included
are initial (1995) postcode level controls: log of total employment, shares of female and part-
time workers; age, education and occupation structures; share of R&D employees, distance of the
postcode centroid to the Berlin wall and a West-Berlin dummy.
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Table 4.10: Robustness check: Distance functions.
Private Manufacturing Service
∆priv9802 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9597
Fct. 1 0.316** -0.0639 0.0122 0.0186* 0.308** -0.066
[0.147] [0.0494] [0.00944] [0.00980] [0.140] [0.0453]
Fct. 2 0.498** -0.0597 0.015 0.0159 0.487** -0.0487
[0.218] [0.0522] [0.0102] [0.0115] [0.205] [0.0468]
Trade Hotel Cafes
∆priv9802 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9597
Fct. 1 0.0113 0.00547 0.00245 0.00123 -0.00107 -0.00175
[0.0180] [0.00976] [0.00346] [0.00461] [0.0134 [0.00348]
Fct. 2 0.0318 -0.000775 0.00311 0.0126 -0.00237 0.00157
[0.0220] [0.0103] [0.00470] [0.00903] [0.0169] [0.00602]
Finance Real Estate Business
∆priv9802 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9597
Fct. 1 0.0492* 0.0123 0.0158* -0.000591 0.134* -0.0152
[0.0282] [0.0113] [0.00946] [0.00466] [0.0796] [0.0182]
Fct. 2 0.0673** 0.00211 0.0222** 0.00136 0.231* -0.0204
[0.0300] [0.0143] [0.00990] [0.00672] [0.121] [0.0279]
Media Personal Services Tourism
∆priv9802 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9597 ∆priv9802 ∆priv9597
Fct. 1 0.0389 -0.00598 0.00635** -0.00197 -0.000155 0.00325
[0.0266] [0.00516] [0.00257] [0.00189] [0.0199] [0.00862]
Fct. 2 0.0656 -0.00411 0.00727** -0.00133 0.00904 0.00571
[0.0413] [0.00560] [0.00321] [0.00156] [0.0269] [0.0122]
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *: 10% **: 5% ***: 1%,
Dep. Var.: ∆priv9802 = change in private sector employment between 1998 and 2002 weighted
by its distance to the postcode centroid. Fct. 1 and Fct. denote different weighing functions.
Included are initial (1995) postcode level controls: log of total employment, shares of female and
part-time workers; age, education and occupation structures; share of R&D employees, distance of
the postcode centroid to the Berlin wall and a West-Berlin dummy.
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Appendix A
Real wage inequality in Britain
A.1 Data description
ASHE
Wage information are taken from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. The
data is a 1% sample of workers on the PAYE register and is considered as the most
reliable dataset on wages and earnings in the UK. There are 90,836 observations
available in 2001 and 89,177 in 2011. Control variables include personal character-
istics such as age, gender and occupation as well as the work postcode.
Census
The UK census is published every ten years and provides the most detailed informa-
tion about demographic characteristics available in the UK.1 The smallest spatial
unit for which census data are published are Census output areas which have a tar-
get size of 125 households. The 2011 Census tried to change the area definition of
the 2001 output areas as little as possible. I aggregate all Census variables to 2001
travel to work area definitions.
For the 2001 statistics I use the Census variable CS032 which has information on
the number of economically active individuals aged 16 to 74 with no qualifications
or level unknown, lower level qualifications and higher level qualifications. The term
’higher level’ refers to qualifications of levels 4 and above i.e. first degrees, higher
degrees, National Vocational Qualification levels 4 and 5, Higher National Diploma,
Higher National Certificate and certain professional qualifications. For the 2011
1The person response rate was approximately 94 percent in England and Wales in 2001 and 2011.
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statistics I use the Census variable LC5601 which has information on the number of
economically active individuals aged 16 to 64 with no qualifications, other qualifi-
cations, currently in apprentenship and qualification level one to four. To calculate
shares of highly qualified individuals that are consistent over time I group level
4 qualifications and above against all other qualification groups and divide both
numbers by the total of economically active individuals aged 16 to 74 in 2001, re-
spectively 16 to 64 in 2011.
Landregistry data
The land registry tracks all residential property sales and their location in England
and Wales. In 2001 a total of 1.23 million sales were recorded, in 2011 this number
amounted to 0.65 million. Recorded are the full address of the property, the price
paid for the property, the date of transfer, the property type (Detached, Semi, Ter-
raced or Flat/Maisonette), whether the property is newly built or not and whether
the property is freehold or leasehold.
Nationwide Building Society data
The second source of house price data comes from the Nationwide Building Society.
The transactions are those for which the Nationwide provided mortgages in 2001
and 2011. In 2001 there are c. 70,000 transactions, in 2011 c. 47,000 transactions.
Recorded are the price paid for the property as well as a large set of structural
characteristics. These include the tenancy type (freehold, leasehold, feuhold), the
structural type (detached, semi-detached,terraced, flat) floor size, the construction
year, the number of bathrooms and bedrooms, the type of parking (none, space,
garage, double garage) and an indicator whether the property is newly built.
A.2 Calculation of regional expenditure shares
The ONS publishes detailed household expenditure by UK countries and regions de-
rived from the Living Costs and Food Survey of the respective year. From 2001-02,
the Classification Of Individual COnsumption by Purpose (COICOP) was intro-
duced as a new coding frame for expenditure items. COICOP is the internation-
ally agreed classification system for reporting household consumption expenditure.
Total expenditure is made up from the total of the COICOP expenditure groups
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(1 to 12) plus ‘Other expenditure items (13)’. Other expenditure items are those
items excluded from the narrower COICOP classifications, such as mortgage interest
payments, council tax, domestic rates, holiday spending, cash gifts and charitable
donations. It should also be noted that rent excluding service charges and benefit
receipts associated with housing (net rent) has been used when calculating total
expenditure. According to the ONS, this convention ensures that rebates, benefits
and allowances are excluded from the calculation of total household expenditure on
rent.
To replicated the housing shares used in the construction of the RPI, I sum expen-
diture on: 4 = Housing costs net of housing subsidy, fuel and power, 5 = Household
goods and services, 8 = Communication, 12.5.1 = Moving house, 13.1 = Hous-
ing: mortgage interest payments council tax etc., 14.5 = Purchase or alteration of
dwellings, mortgages for each region and divide the summed housing related expen-
diture by the total expenditure. Due to the small sample size in the Living Costs
and Food Survey regional expenditures are averaged across several years. I attribute
2001 to 2005 averages to 2001 and 2009 to 2011 averages to 2011. Table A.1 shows
the resulting expenditure shares that I use in the construction of the alternative local
RPI. The expenditure shares on housing increased for all regions over the decade. In
2011 the expenditure share on housing was highest for London (45.7%) and lowest
for Yorkshire and the Humber with (39.1%), confirming that expenditure shares are
higher in high cost areas.
Table A.1: Expenditure shares on housing in 2001 and 2011 for English Governemnt
Office Regions and Wales.
Region share 2001 share 2011
North East 0.341 0.382
North West 0.369 0.397
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.354 0.381
East Midlands 0.396 0.404
West Midlands 0.361 0.391
East 0.416 0.417
London 0.415 0.447
South East 0.395 0.433
South West 0.412 0.411
Wales 0.366 0.385
Notes: Derived from the Classification of Individual Consumption by
Purpose for Government Office Regions averaged over 2001 to 2005
and over 2009 to 2011.
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Appendix B
Real wages, amenities and the
adjustment of working hours
across local labour markets
B.1 Data
The ASHE is a panel dataset that has information on individual workers for a
1% sample of workers on the PAYE register. Workers are classified into two skill
categories based on the procedure proposed in Elias and McKnight (2001) which
uses information from the LFS to infer qualification/skill levels from three digit
occupation codes. I use all individual workers in the analysis that do not change
skill categories over time and for whom none of the control variables (age, age2, firm
size, indicators for the public sector, rural areas, collective agreements, industry and
occupation classification) is missing.
The amenity data on elevation and coastal length has been kindly provided by Steve
Gibbons. The lengths of coastline is obtained from Ordnance Survey GIS data,
elevation is obtained from the Ordnance Survey Panorama Digital Elevation data.
The climate amenity variables sunshine duration, rain fall, and wind speed where
downloaded from the Met Office website (http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/). Sunshine
duration is measured in hours per day, rainfall is measured in mm per year and
wind speed is measured in knots at a height of 10 metres above ground level. All
variables are based on average climate data for the years 2001 to 2006.
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Appendix C
The role of education for amenity
based sorting in British cities
C.1 Plausibility check for amenity measure
We interpret the neighbourhood fixed effect estimated in Equation 3.1 as an ag-
gregate measure of local amenities. In order to show that this interpretation is
reasonable and that our amenity measure is a reliable indicator of the quality of the
neighbourhood we collected information on neighbourhood characteristics such as
crime incidents, listed buildings and parks, restaurants, cafes, bars, public houses
and clubs as well as libraries and museums for all neighbourhoods. We run a hedonic
regression to see how well these characteristics perform in explaining the variation
in our aggregate measure of amenities. Our aim in this context is twofold. First,
we can check the plausibility of our aggregate amenity measure by looking at the
correlation with neighbourhood characteristics that measure historical, architectural
or consumer amenities. Second, we can look at the contribution of each component
to the total amenity level. Equation C.1 is estimated using OLS where awk is our
amenity measure, zwk is a vector of the listed neighbourhood characteristics and υwk
are TTWA fixed effects.
awk = z′wkθ + υwk + ξwk (C.1)
The results of Equation C.1 are shown in Table C.1. In column (1) our measure of
neighbourhood quality is regressed on amenity variables only whereas in column (2)
TTWA fixed effects are included as additional controls. We find that the number of
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historical buildings in a ward significantly increases the amenity measure. A positive
correlation is also found for the share of total ward area covered by gardens and parks
and the availability of a local library. The number of crime incidences on the other
hand significantly decreases our measure of neighbourhood quality. These amenities
correlate with the aggregate measure as expected. The presence of a museum in a
specific neighbourhood has a positive but insignificant effect on the amenity level.
The advantage of living right next to a museum is likely to be small. While people
surely value the cultural offer of their city, the frequency of actual museum visits is
relatively low.1
The sign and significance level of most amenity coefficients remain unchanged when
TTWA dummies are included in the regression. TTWA dummies capture cross-city
differences in other unobserved amenity components, as for instance differences in
climate or physical geography but also the relative importance of access to jobs. The
effects of the number of listed buildings and crime incidents on our amenity measure
remain relatively stable when TTWA fixed effects are included in the regression.
This indicates that they have a localized effect, i.e. determine neighbourhood quality
rather than influencing the attractiveness of the city as a whole. The coefficient for
libraries and parks are smaller in absolute size when TTWA fixed effect are included.
While these amenities are significantly correlated with our aggregate measure they
equally increase the overall attractiveness level of a labour market area. When
cross-city variation is accounted for the effect of restaurant and bars becomes highly
significant as would be expected.
Overall the plausibility test shows that neighbourhood attributes that are considered
as amenities increase our measure of neighbourhood quality whereas attributes that
are considered as disamenities decrease the measure.
1The proportion of adults who visited a museum in the last 12 month was 52% in 2013. The
proportion of adults who visited a museum at least once a month during the last 12 month
was around 3.5% (Department for Culture Media and Sport).
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Table C.1: Plausibility check for the amenity measure.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ward FE ward FE
Listed buildings 0.0954*** 0.0480***
(0.0219) (0.00459)
Crime incidents -0.0676** -0.0998***
(0.0295) (0.00845)
Restaurants and bars 0.00465 0.0544***
(0.00950) (0.00636)
Share of park area 1.119*** 0.313***
(0.264) (0.0875)
Library dummy 0.179*** 0.0506**
(0.0672) (0.0202)
Museum dummy 0.0584 0.0498
(0.0511) (0.0303)
Constant 6.378*** 6.498***
(0.0366) (0.00976)
N 10,966 10,966
R-squared 0.127 0.821
TTWA FE NO YES
Notes: Standard errors are clustered on travel to work areas. Sig-
nificance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dep Var: ward
FE = ward level fixed effect derived from a hedonic price regression.
Amenity controls include the number of listed buildings, crime inci-
dents and restaurants and bars per ward, the share of the ward area
that is covered by a park and a dummy whether a library or mu-
seum is located in the ward. All count variables are standardized,
having a mean of zero and a variance of one. 2011 population levels
are added as additional control. Column (2) also controls for TTWA
fixed effects.
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Appendix D
Local multipliers in local labour
markets - A case study of the
move of the German government
to Berlin
D.1 Long description of the historical setting
When the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Re-
public (GDR) were founded in 1949 it was unclear how long this separation would
last. Berlin, German capital between 1871 and 1945, was claimed to be part of both
states. In the constitution of the GDR Berlin was declared its capital whereas in
the basic law of the FRG (Great-) Berlin was considered as an 11th federal state.
As a result the city which geographically fell into the Soviet occupation zone was
divided into East-Berlin the sector governed by the USSR and West-Berlin, made
up of the three sectors governed by USA, France and Britain.
The two German states did not recognize each other’s sovereignty straight away.
The FRG saw the division as a temporary state and both the political decision
makers as well as the general public advocated a reunified Germany with Berlin as
its capital (Süß, 1999). That the situation was widely seen as transitional was also
reflected in the discussion about the seat of the government of the FRG. The new
capital should have a provisional character and be only of medium importance. It
was seen as unlikely that Bonn would concentrate too much power (Dreher, 1979)
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to hamper the move of the government back to Berlin once the two German states
reunified.
The perception that the division would only be of short duration changed when in
August 1961 construction works of the Berlin Wall began. In December 1972 the
FRG and the GDR came to terms with the status quo and mutually recognized each
other as sovereign states by signing the Basic Treaty. Shortly before, the allies had
resolved their dispute on their rights and responsibilities in Berlin in the Quadripar-
tite Agreement. Berlin would continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal
Republic of Germany.1 In his government declaration in 1973 Willy Brandt referred
for the first time to Bonn as the federal capital of Germany. Though the ultimate
aim of the West German government was still reunification the political discussion
about Berlin as capital was muted substantially.
Reunification and the Bonn/Berlin question
Political protest against the East German government began in September 1989
with the so called Monday-demonstrations in Leipzig. With the fall of Berlin Wall
in November 1989 it was once again possible to freely move within the Eastern and
Western parts of the city. Berlin became capital of united Germany in 1990 when
the Unification Treaty (1990) was signed between the newly elected government of
the GDR and the FDR. However the decision on the seat of the government was
postponed until after the election of the first assembly (Bundestag) of reunified Ger-
many.
The crucial debate about the move of the government to Berlin took place on 20th
June 1991. The assembly was divided. The deputies of the ten western federal states
had already shown their preference for Bonn during the negotiation of the Reuni-
fication Treaty (Süß, 1999). Polls among the total of 662 members of parliament
saw Bonn as the clear favourite (Tschirch, 1999). Bonn advocates pointed towards
the successful democratic as well as the federalist tradition. European integration
had been facilitated by Bonn’s proximity to the western allies and the EU seat
in Brussels. Integration would slow down if Berlin became the new capital (Salz,
2006). Additionally, large infrastructure investments had turned Bonn into a highly
efficient administration. These investments would be lost and the means for setting
1This rule was frequently a source of conflict between the FDR and GDR, if for example federal
offices of the FDR were established in West-Berlin
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up the government in Berlin would be better spend on construction projects in the
new federal states (Tschirch, 1999).
The main argument of the pro Berlin faction was that of credibility. Since 1949 when
the FRG was founded politicians had repeated again and again that Berlin was the
actual capital of Germany. Bonn had become capital with a provisional mandate
which would move back to Berlin once East and West Germany were united. Fur-
ther important arguments were the importance of the move as a sign of solidarity
between the old and new federal states and Berlin’s potential as a bridge to Eastern
Europe. Economically the move of the government was expected to strengthen the
weak local economic position of Berlin and the economically underdeveloped east.
The city of Bonn on the other hand feared that ‘the small Bonn’ would lose its
political significance as well as economic power (Deutscher Bundestag, 1991b, p.
2736-2738).
The most important arguments in the discussion were linked to rather abstract con-
cepts. Credibility and the future of the reunited Germany stood out for the pro
Berlin side whereas Bonn was seen as a symbol of successful democratic tradition
(Tschirch, 1999). In the final ballot the assembly decided to move the seat of the
government from Bonn to Berlin with 338 against 320 votes (Deutscher Bundestag,
1991b). The feeble majority could only be reached by making large concessions to
the city of Bonn. A fair division of labour between Berlin and Bonn should be ne-
gociated where core government functions should take their seat in Berlin but the
majority of government jobs should remain in Bonn. Bonn should receive financial
compensation as well as new functions and institutions of national and international
significance. A commission should be appointed to work on proposals for the distri-
bution of national and international agencies across the new federal states, as the
constitution of Germany states that each federal state should have some national
power. The national parliament (Bundestag) was supposed to take up its function
in Berlin within 4 years. Within 10-12 years all government functions should be
located in Berlin (Deutscher Bundestag, 1991a). The Federal Assembly decided two
weeks later with 38 against 30 votes to remain in Bonn (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010).
Realization of the move
The decision made in 1991 left the details of the move open. While working on a
practical concept it became clear by 1992 that a move within four years was not
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feasible. What followed was a long discussion about the timing of the move and
its costs. One motion proposed to stop any further government related investments
in Berlin until the financial situation of the FRG had improved. Another proposed
to postpone the move until 2010. Furthermore, a mass petition was organized to
suspend a decision about the date of the move until the government had full knowl-
edge of the costs and the financial situation of the state had improved (Deutscher
Bundestag, 2010). This dispute created uncertainty among the private companies
that had started to invest in Berlin. In November 1993 40 national and international
companies pointed at the breach of trust should the government cease its effort to
press ahead with the move (Hoffmann, 1998, p. 213).
The uncertainty about the move diminished in 1994 when the Berlin/Bonn Act
Berlin-Bonn Act (1994) passed in March 1994. Though it did not specify a concrete
moving date, the act provided statutory security that the move was to take place.
It also detailed the implementation of the move such as a definition of a fair division
of labour between Berlin and Bonn and concrete compensatory measures for Bonn.
Six ministries should keep their first seat in Bonn2 and get a second seat in Berlin;
nine ministries should take their first seat in Berlin and keep their second seat in
Bonn. Additionally, is was decided that the majority of ministerial position should
remain in Bonn. The following years were mostly concerned with the practical im-
plementation of the move. Construction of the new buildings (Jakob-Kaiser-Haus,
Paul-Löbe-Haus) began in spring 1997 but it was only by November 1997 that the
Federal Parliament announced a moving date. The government was to take up its
work in Berlin in September 1999. Until then the timing had remained heavily de-
bated.3
Parliament and government officially started their work in Berlin in September 1999.
The majority of employees moved in 1999 and 2000 so that by the end of 2000 more
than 8000 ministerial employees were located in Berlin. In the subsequent years
more jobs were gradually moved from Bonn to Berlin. In 2010 c. 10,000 positions
were established in Berlin. Since the Federal Assembly had revised its decision to
stay in Bonn in September 1996 also the Federal States established their represen-
2Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), Federal Ministry of Health (BMG), FM of Food, Agriculture
and Consumer Protection (BMELV), FM of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ),
FM for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), FM of Education
and Research (BMBF)
3For instance, in the September 1996 50 MoP of SPD and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN brought
in the motion to postpone the move by at least 5 years.
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tations in Berlin. In total c. 600 employees moved between 1998 and 2003, plus c.
70 members of the Federal Assembly.
The majority of foreign representations decided to relocate their seats from Bonn
to Berlin. Most of the embassies chose to be present in Berlin when the German
government took up its work in 1999 and made short term arrangements to accom-
modate their staff. Besides renting offices and apartments the embassies used the
facilities of their consulate generals and branch offices as well as former military
missions until they could rebuild or construct a suitable building for their represen-
tation (Gehrcken, 2013). Though, the diplomatic building stock in Berlin-West had
been almost entirely destroyed between 1939 and 19454 many countries still owned
a parcel of land in West-Berlin. The former embassies in Berlin-East had closed in
1990 when the GDR became part of the FRG. Some reopened later on as represen-
tations in the FRG. Today 163 states are represented in Berlin by 158 embassies
and five honorary consulates.
To compensate Bonn for its loss of employment several federal offices were moved
from Berlin to Bonn in 1999 and 2000. Berlin also lost several of its prior functions to
the New Laender. The recommendations of the federal commision concerned several
Berlin based institutions that moved in the subsequent years. Before reunification
28,000 employees had worked for federal offices in Berlin (Guerra, 1999). The two
relocation programms concerned c. 7000 positions.
4In the course of the construction works for the NS capital ‘Germania’ several embassies had been
demolished. For some the planned reconstruction never materialized as diplomatic relations
broke off during WWII. Severe bomb attacks destroyed a large number of buildings in the
Tiergartenviertel (Fleischmann, 2005)
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D.2 Details on data sources
Relocated institution Year Source of employment data Source of address in Berlin
Federal Ministries 1997 BT-Drucksache 13/9537 OECKL Taschenbuch des öffentlichen Lebens
1999 BT-Drucksache 14/1601 OECKL Taschenbuch des öffentlichen Lebens
2001 Spiegel 18/2001 "Die Wacht am Rhein" OECKL Taschenbuch des öffentlichen Lebens
2004 BT-Drucksache 16/158 OECKL Taschenbuch des öffentlichen Lebens
Embassies 1996 Liste der diplomatischen Missionen Senatskanzlei Berlin,
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1998 Liste der diplomatischen Vertretungen
Federal Institutes 1999 BT-Drucksache 12/2853 Drucksache 15/875,
(New Länder) 2003 OECKL Taschenbuch des öffentlichen Lebens
Federal Institutes Teilungskostenbericht fuer das Jahr 2009 Drucksache 15/875,
(Bonn compensation) OECKL Taschenbuch des öffentlichen Lebens
Representations of 1998 Bonner General-Anzeiger, 09.02.1998, "Verkaufen, Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung,
the Länder vermieten, verwerten: Abschied der Länder" OECKL Taschenbuch des öffentlichen Lebens
Deputies and deputee 1999 Berliner Zeitung 05.07.1999, "Die Bonner Anschriftenverzeichnis des Bundes
employees, Factions, kommen: Bundestag startet offiziellen Umzug"
Federal Parliament
(Bundestag) and
administration
Office of the 1998 Berliner Zeitung 24.11.1998, "Bauminister übergibt Anschriftenverzeichnis des Bundes
Federal President Schlüssel für das neue Bundespräsidialamt"
Federal Assembly 2000 Handelsblatt 31.07.2000, "Bundesrats- Anschriftenverzeichnis des Bundes
(Bundesrat) Umzug nach Berlin fast abgeschlossen"
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